

**TRAINING THE ENEMY: TERRORIST EXPLOITATION OF PRIVATELY  
OWNED THIRD-PARTY PARAMILITARY TRAINING COURSES  
IN THE UNITED STATES**

by

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IC Scholar, DIA  
MSSI Class of 2007

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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Terrorist groups across the globe are constantly in need of strong training for their members, particularly when involved in insurgent operations. Yet, most of their training camps are in difficult to reach areas by design, and are heavily targeted by the United States, its allies, and in some cases, the host country itself. Groups are therefore continuously on the lookout for new safe havens, even though the number of possibilities are constantly shrinking. According to *The Manchester Document*, a terrorist manual seized from the Manchester, England home of an Osama bin Laden disciple, there are 13 qualifiers for training locations, 4 qualifiers for the trainers, and 6 for the trainees, all related to security alone.<sup>1</sup> As terrorist groups have proven themselves to be highly flexible and adaptable to any situation, it is likely that they will continue to seek training alternatives, particularly those that do not involve extensive operational security (OPSEC) on their part.

Terrorist training camps abroad are under constant attack by the United States military and its allies. This means loss of life, equipment, and an established location, all of which must be replaced if training is to continue. The number of possibilities for new and suitable camp locales is dwindling as security concerns and operational challenges limit options. In addition, members who have attended are not only linked with each other, but also linked by evidence of travel to countries known as hosts for terrorist organizations. Although there are benefits for terrorist groups to run their own camps control over curriculum, group cohesion, and indoctrination – there are also major

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<sup>1</sup> Al-Qaida, *The Manchester Document: Terrorist Manual*, "Sixth Lesson: Training," online scanning of document, UK/BM-43 Translation, 2-3, URL: <[www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/jihad manual.html](http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/jihad_manual.html)>, accessed 30 October 2006.

hurdles. The difficulties faced in this regard are likely to create the impetus for adaptation and third-party courses may be the best answer.

Privately owned courses that are open to the public provide a viable alternative. They may fall short in reinforcing Islamist ideology, but they have the potential for huge benefits for the foreign terrorist. Training includes most of the skills required for both freelance terrorists and insurgents; they would not “red flag” an individual because of foreign travel, there seems to be relatively weak security and little monitoring by the U.S. government based on open source interviews, and there is value added in learning American culture as well as U.S. military tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). In addition, “above board” and publicly accessible training may simplify the funding apparatus and create fewer opportunities for tracing by the U.S. Treasury Department.

## **TERRORIST TRAINING**

In deciphering what training environments would be best suited for terrorist organizations, it is important to understand two things; first, what the curriculum is for Islamist training camps and what skills need to be taught, and second, what are the characteristics of their current camps? By understanding their requirements and the status of their overseas camps today, any motive for change can be uncovered.

Certain resources, like *The Manchester Document* and other manuals, can be used to outline weapons and tactics needed by Islamist terrorists as well as the breadth of security concerns. Not only do terrorist organizations want their members to be taught how to fire a weapon, but also how to act in military situations, how to maintain good

OPSEC (operational security),<sup>2</sup> how to communicate secretly,<sup>3</sup> how to withstand interrogation,<sup>4</sup> and how to assassinate individuals using “rifles and pistols” as well as “poisons and cold steel.”<sup>5</sup> Although the above are only a few examples mentioned as lessons in *The Manchester Document*, there are resources for discovering what trainees are actually taught in their camps. Brian Jackson compiled a short list for his book *Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups*:

[Jama’ah Islamiyah] members who attend training camps receive physical conditioning and are trained in the use of the following types of weapons and tactics:

- Basic firearms (pistols, automatic rifles, mortars, etc.)
- Military tactics
- Explosives, including the safe handling of explosive materials and the use of the improvised explosive device
- Assassination techniques<sup>6</sup>

When taught by members of the terrorist organization themselves, these skills may be tailored to the specific mission the trainee will encounter later on. Yet they are not abilities limited to terrorists and do exist in any other high-level military-type training setting.

Terrorist camps themselves have certain characteristics that must also be understood to obtain a complete view of training operations. There are 13 prerequisites for training locations including: “distance from the populated areas with the availability of training necessities...availability of medical services during the training...the place

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<sup>2</sup> *Manchester Document*, Lessons 8 and 9.

<sup>3</sup> *Manchester Document*, Lesson 13.

<sup>4</sup> *Manchester Document*, Lesson 17.

<sup>5</sup> *Manchester Document*, Lessons 14 and 16.

<sup>6</sup> Brian Jackson, et al., *Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2005), 77.

should not be situated in such a way that the training and trainees can be seen from another location.”<sup>7</sup> Thus, training camps are located in sparsely populated areas with access to food and water, as well as medical facilities within a reasonable distance. In addition, there must be room and equipment appropriate to the number of trainees and trainers that are aptly competent to teach. With access to training manuals that delineate all necessary precautions and requirements, it seems that establishing camps should not be that strenuous, yet as will be seen in subsequent chapters of this thesis, there are serious obstacles.

### **PRIVATELY OWNED THIRD-PARTY PARAMILITARY COURSES IN THE U.S.**

It is widely accepted that paramilitary courses exist in many countries around the world, yet they are ubiquitous within the United States as well. A simple Google search turned up 750,000 hits for “survival schools,”<sup>8</sup> 15,800,000 for “weapons training,”<sup>9</sup> and 1,060,000 for “mercenary training”<sup>10</sup> and these were by no means exhaustive lists. Survival and bushcraft programs can be found predominantly in the western U.S., Arizona, and Florida depending on the type of terrain addressed. Weapons programs on the other hand exist in various forms throughout the country, although many are

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<sup>7</sup> *Manchester Document*, Lesson 6, 2.

<sup>8</sup> Google Search for “survival schools,” URL: <[www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en-us&q=survival+schools&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8](http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en-us&q=survival+schools&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8)>, accessed 1 November 2006.

<sup>9</sup> Google Search for “weapons training,” URL: <[www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en-us&q=weapons+training&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8](http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en-us&q=weapons+training&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8)>, accessed 1 November 2006.

<sup>10</sup> Google Search for “mercenary training,” URL: <[www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en-us&q=mercenary+training&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8](http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en-us&q=mercenary+training&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8)>, accessed 1 November 2006.

headquartered in the southern U.S. If travel is not a limitation, whichever skills are sought, a privately owned company is guaranteed to teach them.<sup>11</sup>

Besides security procedures, which will be discussed in Chapter 7, there are two pieces of critical information regarding privately run training courses. The first is what classes are offered and what skills will be taught. Using only the World Wide Web, programs run the gamut from simple wilderness survival to weapons training to paramilitary tactics and lethal techniques. Two companies have been singled out as representative examples of a larger cadre, Front Sight Firearms Training Institute and the Global Survival Institute. Front Sight is the more professional-looking option based on the extent of its website and the standards of its applicant process. It provides weapons training running the gamut from handguns to martial arts to the Uzi submachine gun and caters both to private citizens and to law enforcement and government officers.<sup>12</sup> The Global Survival Institute also claims to train military personnel as well as anyone else who signs up for their classes in escape and evasion, extreme survival, lethal techniques, and the most daunting, “travel like a ghost.” It is this last one, described as “designed for those who refuse to become victim to the emerging surveillance society,” that is of particular note because it includes topics like counter-surveillance techniques, financial privacy and asset protection, changing identity, and the formidable section on “personal

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<sup>11</sup> Training manuals, videos and DVDs may also be found online with no security check or risk of exposure. One example is Special Forces Adventure Training (SFAT) “Survival DVD Instruction” and the “Special Forces Weapons Systems CDROM” offered from the United Kingdom for £9.99 and £7 respectively. These and numerous others put out by the same organization can be found at URL: <[www.special-forces-adventure-training.co.uk/special\\_forces\\_products-to-buy.htm](http://www.special-forces-adventure-training.co.uk/special_forces_products-to-buy.htm)>, accessed 1 November 2007.

<sup>12</sup> Front Sight Firearms Training Institute, *Course Descriptions*, URL: <<http://www.frontsight.com/Courses.asp>>, accessed 24 June 2007.



security in a declining society.”<sup>13</sup> The range of options available to the public is dizzying, particular when the implications and uses of those tactics are understood fully.

The other key piece of information regarding these courses is the quality and background of their instructors. Although former members of the U.S. military may have a vast knowledge on the various topics, they can present a danger to valuable military methods and Army TTPs. Front Sight includes quotes from three of its employees proving their qualifications, but also highlighting the very backgrounds that might make them desirable teachers for potential terrorists. Those listed include a full time police officer and SWAT team member, a Deputy Sheriff and law enforcement firearms instructor, and the Front Sight Range Master, a 20-year veteran of the Marine Corps.<sup>14</sup> The Global Survival Institute also heralds its instructors, although mentions them by first name only; Bob, the Director and Chief Instructor, is a former officer in the U.S. Army and “commanded a classified Nato [sic] military operation in Europe along the iron curtain for several years.”<sup>15</sup> Among others, the staff also includes Bow, a Canadian ex-infantry paratrooper, Chuck, a former U.S. Navy Corpsman and Air Force Medic who served in Vietnam, and Eric, a current Staff Sergeant in the U.S. Air Force.<sup>16</sup> These are only two examples of courses open to the public that are not only taught by people with U.S. military experience, but are advertised as such. They may make for well-informed

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<sup>13</sup> Global Survival Institute, *Class Information: Travel Like a Ghost*, 2007, URL: <[http://www.survivaltrainingohio.com/class\\_info/PRIVACY.htm](http://www.survivaltrainingohio.com/class_info/PRIVACY.htm)>, accessed 24 June 2007.

<sup>14</sup> Front Sight Firearms Training Institute, *World Class Instructors*, 2006, URL: <<http://www.frontsight.com/worldclassinstruction.asp>>, accessed 24 June 2007.

<sup>15</sup> Global Survival Institute, *Staff*, 2007, URL: <<http://www.survivaltrainingohio.com/Staff/index.htm>>, accessed 24 June 2007.

<sup>16</sup> Global Survival Institute, *Staff*.

instructors, but they also are likely to give away valuable insight into military methods and could advertise U.S. TTPs to the adversary.

The existence of these programs provides a possible outlet for terrorist organizations looking for alternate training opportunities. Not only are private courses available in the United States, but they also teach an array of skills, former U.S. military personnel as instructors, and have minimal security practices. The details of these courses will be outlined in Chapters 5 and 7 and drive to the core of this thesis' research question: how can, and why would, terrorist groups or group members exploit privately owned third-party training courses in the United States in lieu of their own heavily targeted camps?

## **HYPOTHESIS, TERMS AND ASSUMPTIONS**

This thesis seeks to demonstrate how and why the terrorist training paradigm might shift from the camps of terrorist organizations in places like Pakistan and Sudan, to privately owned third-party courses within the United States itself. The oversights made regarding flight schools before September 11<sup>th</sup> cannot be allowed to occur in this area as well. It is at the peril of U.S. citizens and soldiers if the adaptability of the country's adversaries is ignored and a lack of imagination is allowed to limit the scope of investigations.

For the purposes of this thesis the term "terrorist" has been limited to *international Islamist terrorists*, such as those belonging to al-Qaida or its related factions. Islamism "amounts to an effort to turn Islam, a religion and civilization, into an

ideology.”<sup>17</sup> IslamistWatch defines Islamists as “hav[ing] many goals, the ultimate one is establishing a worldwide Caliphate (Islamic state): to overthrow and destroy democratic governments across the globe and replace them with a single Taliban-style Islamic fundamentalist theocracy.”<sup>18</sup> It has been chosen to describe the terrorists in question in place of words commonly used such as “fundamentalist” or simply “Islamic” because the latter two are over-simplified assessments of the beliefs held by these groups and misrepresent a large portion of the Muslim population. Although other terrorists groups exist that may wish to exploit the training opportunities discussed herein, the discussion will be limited to Islamists as the body of work studying them is greater and the strategic implications more immediate and critical.

A working definition of what is meant by “privately owned third-party training courses” should be explained up front as well. These are companies owned by individuals in the United States that teach survival techniques, firearm usage, and paramilitary tactics. References to these courses should be understood to include all levels of expertise and areas of “study” unless a particular sub-class is noted. These courses will be described in more detail below, but were all found using open sources and are available to any member of the public who can pay the entrance fees and meet the age and health requirements stipulated by the individual programs.

Three main assumptions are made in this thesis. The first is that the terrorists assessed here are only those defined by the term “Islamist” above. It will not involve terrorist groups with other motivations such as the Marxist Tamil Tigers or the Irish

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<sup>17</sup> Daniel Pipes, “Distinguishing Between Islam and Islamism,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 30 June 1998. Article can be found at URL: <<http://www.danielpipes.org/article/954>>, accessed 17 June 2007.

<sup>18</sup> IslamistWatch is a catalog of the writings, beliefs, motives, and methods of the Islamist movement and can be found at URL: <<http://www.islamistwatch.org>>, accessed 13 July 2007.

Republican Army. The second is that the training outlined in Chapter 4 focuses on weapons and paramilitary training and not on ideological or religious indoctrination. Although Chapter 7 discusses that aspect of terrorist training while arguing pros and cons of third-party courses, it is not considered the focus of this thesis. The third stated assumption is that the scope of available privately owned third-party paramilitary training courses is limited to those within the United States and does not delve into programs that may be found overseas. Although the final chapter of this thesis discusses this aspect as a proposal for further study, such courses are not included in the body of the argument. These assumptions should help to clarify the arguments of this thesis and establish the foundation for the following explanation of the chapters.

## **SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS**

The literature cited in this thesis and used as the springboard and support for the hypothesis combined two discrete areas of study. The first delves into terrorist organizations and individuals. It includes their own manuals, open source news articles, and scholarly books and journal articles. Authors such as Harvey W. Kushner and Marc Sageman, both experts in the field, proved critical to understanding the nature of terrorist networks and the thought process behind their infrastructure. The second area looks at domestic American militant extremists and their training practices. As the impetus for much of the weapons and survival programs that exist within the U.S., their history and methods were important in laying the groundwork for the courses seen in abundance today. The legacy they leave for pushing their Second Amendment rights provides the freedom for foreign terrorists to exploit paramilitary courses for their own ends.

These areas of study may seem too diverse to compel a unified thesis, but the third section of the literature review in Chapter 2 proves that similarity converges where ideology diverges. Again Harvey Kushner plays a critical role through his 1998 book *Terrorism in America* and brings domestic and international Islamist terrorists side-by-side. There is no indication, or supposition, that the two have or will work together, but the same was said of Sunni and Shi'a groups in Iraq, so the parallels are of utmost importance.

Chapter 3 describes the methodology followed for the thesis, which was relatively straightforward and focused primarily on brainstorming techniques, "Red Team" analysis and qualitative reasoning methods. Archival and literary research was the first step in establishing academic roots both in relation to Islamist terrorists and pseudo-military training in the United States. This was synthesized with current research into terrorist groups' training requirements and adaptive abilities to achieve an understanding of their perspective. This "Red Team" approach made up Chapter 4 and provided a list of training needs and goals, which was followed in Chapter 5 by an analysis of the offerings of privately owned third-party training courses in the U.S. uncovered through open source content analysis. The two are compared in Chapter 6 to lay the groundwork for an evaluation against current security measures and screening practices as well as law enforcement vigilance. These latter two research fields were collected through literary sources, interviews with law enforcement and non-profit watchdog organizations' personnel, and legal statutes. The final piece, found in Chapter 7, was a cost/benefit analysis weighing pros and cons of terrorists' own camps and the third-party option. The

sum of these processes should provide a coherent picture of the research problem and the likelihood of a paradigm shift.

While Chapter 7 details the bulk of the thesis' findings and outlines the cost/benefit analysis mentioned above, Chapter 8 goes one step further. A summary of the research and a delineation of the conclusions that can be drawn are only one portion of this paper's final segment. The fact that privately owned third-party courses should be so attractive to terrorists has important implications for the U.S. government and its law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Terrorists will be harder to track with fewer "red flags" and more distant connections to each other. They will gain critical knowledge of American TTPs as well as of the culture and public opinion formation. This value added will greatly enhance their ability to blend in with Americans as well as their ability to fight the U.S. military overseas and plan against U.S. targets. To this end, certain actions are recommended for the government in terms of information sharing and coordination, monitoring of courses, and increasing security practices. A central database of training courses and mandatory reporting requirements will enhance the effort to bring these private programs into the collection loop; something which is imperative to avoiding the flight school oversight of pre-September 11<sup>th</sup> America.

Chapter 8 also elaborates on a number of related topics that warrant further study. These include links between domestic militias and publicly available training courses, more in-depth surveys of paramilitary programs to determine instructor backgrounds and precise security methods, as well as an expansion of research into mercenary training overseas. The most formidable unanswered question is whether terrorists are attempting any sort of shift in training paradigm. A supplemental annex (Annex 1) is attached

outlining an indicator-based model for tracking changes to terrorist training practices and is meant to jump-start a thesis or critical assessment of this possibility.

In all, this thesis seeks to explain not only the pros and cons of each terrorist training paradigm, but also the impact of each upon the terrorist organization, their operations, and the security of their members. As further obstacles arise toward maintaining their own camps, they are likely to seek a new solution that suits their needs. As Anthony Cordesman of the *Naval War College Review* states, “negating one kind of threat of terrorists or other asymmetric opponents simply forces them to devise and implement another kind.”<sup>19</sup> It is the job of the U.S. government, academics, and the intelligence community to seek out these adaptations *before* terrorists can implement them and take advantage of weaknesses in the system.

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<sup>19</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, “The U.S. Military and the Evolving Challenges in the Middle East,” *Naval War College Review* (Summer 2002): 85-86.

## **CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW**

Third-party training for terrorist members is a relatively unknown quantity. However, there exists significant research on a few related topics. Training courses within the United States were unearthed primarily through open source resources, such as the Google search engine on the World Wide Web. Scholarship was found on two topics that, when synthesized, create the body of work that forms the basis for this thesis. The first element is that of terrorist training; the existence of camps, training requirements, tactics, and member involvement. Although the vast majority of study has been devoted to terrorist organizations' own camps abroad and the simple fact of their existence, certain pertinent details could be gleaned from similar sources.

The second element is that of paramilitary and weapons training within the United States. It offers an important understanding of the environment in which such training can exist and the opportunities that are provided in abundance. More importantly, when this research on extremist groups is set side-by-side with that of Islamist terrorist training, the similarities and possible crossover are evident. Two key books are discussed in the final section of this chapter describing just such a relationship. While no real research may exist on the specific topic at hand, the supporting literature aptly tackles the various aspects of the thesis and thus creates a foundation on which the hypothesis is built.

### **TERRORIST TRAINING**

Most literature on terrorist training involves identification and examination of camps and madrassas in places like Pakistan, Sudan, and most recently, Somalia. More generalized discussions of the terrorist psyche and motivations mention, at least briefly,



where individuals with such intentions go to receive their training and inculcation of Islamist ideals. This topic dominates news articles as much as it does U.S. military target lists. Shortly after 11 September, CNN.com made a point of discussing the area of Pakistan closest to the Afghan border because it has traditionally been the location for tens, if not hundreds, of camps.<sup>20</sup> The Associated Press featured an article soon after the invasion of Iraq, describing a terrorist training camp discovered there.<sup>21</sup> That considerable time has been devoted to identifying such is significant for the purpose of this thesis. They are no longer secret.

Not only is the public aware, but so too is the U.S. military and its allies. In the *Parameters* article “Rolling Back Radical Islam,” Ralph Peters suggests taking on radical Islam on the “frontiers,” particularly in the form of training camps, as this is where it will be most predominant and most vulnerable.<sup>22</sup> As these camps are identified as centers of gravity in the terrorist organization and the primary mechanism for training and indoctrinating new members, “the US must,” as Liaqat Ali, a former militant said, “strike the training camps if it hopes to win the war on terrorism.”<sup>23</sup> As more are targeted, terrorist organizations will have to continuously look for other viable options. The number of places where they can train freely and without undue intervention is dwindling rapidly: “The three places where al Qaeda can train openly, and most effectively, are

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<sup>20</sup> Satinder Bindra, *India Identifies Terrorist Training Camps*, CNN.com/World, 19 September 2001.

<sup>21</sup> Associated Press, “Marines Discover Terror Training Camp Near Baghdad,” Fox News Online, 16 April 2003, URL: <[www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,84291,00.html](http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,84291,00.html)>, accessed 31 October 2006.

<sup>22</sup> Ralph Peters, “Rolling Back Radical Islam,” *Parameters* 32, Iss. 3 (Autumn 2002): 4.

<sup>23</sup> Bindra.

Pakistan, the Philippines, and Palestinian controlled Gaza. None of these areas are perfect for al Qaeda.”<sup>24</sup>

To decipher what requirements or recommendations exist for terrorist members and organizations on the topic of training, a major resource was *The Manchester Document*. This terrorist manual was seized from the Manchester, England, home of an Osama bin Laden disciple and has given valuable insight, as one of a few primary documents available. In particular *The Manchester Document* outlines strict guidelines on what security procedures must be enacted for any training camp and the conduct of trainees. Thus it was critical in understanding the mindset and approach to training necessary for the “red teaming” portion of this study as well as the hurdles involved in running their own camps.

There are considerations to be weighed when relying primarily on one source, particularly with the adaptability of terrorist groups. The fact that *The Manchester Document* is now widely available and studied by law enforcement and government agencies around the world might suggest that terrorist groups would seek to alter their requirements and strategy to defeat any defense against them. Yet, the document mainly details good operational security and a laundry list of recommended tactics. Although it is possible that they may shift, since it did not discuss specific missions or targets there is no reason to believe that they must change the basic concepts of the manual. Thus, *The Manchester Document* is likely to remain a legitimate source of information on terrorist requirements and basic security procedures and so played a significant role in the formation of this thesis.

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<sup>24</sup> James Dunnigan, *Where Islamic Terrorist Training Camps Still Thrive*, Strategy Page Online: Dirty Little Secrets, 3 August 2005, URL: <[www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/200583234258.asp](http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/200583234258.asp)>, accessed 31 October 2006.

Formal scholarship on terrorism also played a role in establishing the basic premises of this thesis and in understanding the terrorist perspective. Marc Sageman's seminal work, *Understanding Terror Networks*, addresses many aspects of the global Salafi movement and can be applied to most Islamist terrorist organizations. In particular, he discusses recruitment or "joining the jihad" and identifies it "more of a bottom-up than a top-down activity."<sup>25</sup> This elucidation is important in understanding how new members might opt to train before ever officially joining a terrorist organization. In fact, Sageman supports the notion that it would be in their best interest to improve their resumé:

A lot of Muslim young men want to join the jihad but do not know how. Joining the jihad is more akin to the process of applying to a highly selective college. Many try to get in but only a few succeed, and the college's role is evaluation and selection rather than marketing. Candidates are enthusiastic rather than reluctant.<sup>26</sup>

According to *The Manchester Document*, individuals are encouraged to blend in with society and not draw undue attention. Harvey W. Kushner elaborates on this point in his book, *Holy War on the Home Front*, by citing a section of the police academy training manual called *Terrorism: Awareness, Prevention, Response*. In it is a list of "behavioral indicators" for identifying persons engaged in terrorist activities which is topped by "Assume[s] Americanized appearance."<sup>27</sup> This idea draws on the Islamic practices of *taqiyya* and *kitman*, by which a Muslim may hide his religious identity and

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<sup>25</sup> Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 122.

<sup>26</sup> Sageman, 122.

<sup>27</sup> Harvey W. Kushner, *Holy War on the Home Front: The Secret Islamic Terror Network in the United States* (New York, NY: Sentinel, 2004), 131.

neglect certain requirements of Islam, such as *Salat* or prayer five times a day, if his situation necessitates it.

These practices of *taqiyya* and *kitman* are described under the heading of “Islam and Denial and Deception” by an article published in the Middle East Review of International Affairs. According to the authors, “*taqiyya* means precautionary dissimulation” and “*kitman* constitutes mental reservation or concealment of malevolent intentions.”<sup>28</sup> Shultz and Beitler also explain the basis of the concepts in the Qur’an and their historical precedents during the Spanish Inquisition. While this text helped underscore the importance and common use of *taqiyya* and *kitman* in modern history, another author, Daniel Pipes, explained their original use by Shi’a Muslims, the minority sect, in posing as Sunni Muslims, the majority sect, in order to protect themselves. Pipes quotes a saying of the Syrian ‘Alawis (also known as Nusayris), a sub-sect of the Shi’a, “a man dresses does not change him. So we remain always Nusayris, even though we externally adopt the practices of our neighbors. Whoever does not dissimulate is a fool, for no intelligent person goes naked in the market.”<sup>29</sup> The MEMRI article and Pipes book were important in clearly understanding the concepts of *taqiyya* and *kitman* as they play serious roles in the lives of Muslims attempting to blend in with society and would be critical for those shifting training to programs within the United States.

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<sup>28</sup> Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Ruth Margolies Beitler, “Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al-Qai’da’s Operations,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 8, no. 2 (June 2004): 56.

<sup>29</sup> Sulayman Efendi al-Adhani, *Kitab al-Bakura as-Sulaymaniya fi Kashf Asrar ad-Diyana an-Nusayriya*. As quoted in Daniel Pipes, *The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 293.

## MILITIAS GROUPS AND PARAMILITARY TRAINING WITHIN THE U.S.

As mentioned above, the majority of information gathered on privately owned training courses in the United States was collected through the Internet and websites hosted by organizations which offer such programs. Although no resources could be found listing how many exist or the nature of their training, scholarship was found on the rise of militias in the United States and the pervasiveness of radical political movements. The literature described below was supplemented with information from the websites of organizations such as the Southern Poverty Law Center as they track domestic hate groups and extremist activity.

The dominant work in this field was Daniel Levitas' *The Terrorist Next Door: The Militia Movement and the Radical Right*. In its pages he outlines the history of terrorism in the U.S. and how it has evolved over time. In relation to this thesis, he discusses the training schools and seminars of the CPDL (Christian-Patriots Defense League), the CSA (The Covenant, the Arm, and the Sword of the Lord) and the AAM (American Agriculture Movement). These organizations were founded partially on the presumption of protecting America from its enemies within and without through violence if necessary. One particular session was billed as:

an 'ecological seminar to clean up this land of ours' and one of the organizers... described it benignly as a 'Bible study' session. But the program featured training in explosives, guerrilla warfare, knife-fighting, hand-to-hand combat, first aid, and 'usable poisons.'<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Daniel Levitas, *The Terrorist Next Door: The Militia Movement and the Radical Right* (New York, NY: Thomas Dunne Books, 2002), 183.

Such militia movements and training were not isolated events. In his article, “The Rise of Citizen Militias,” Daniel Junas states that “by early 1995, movement watchers had identified militia activity in at least 40 states, with a conservatively estimated hard-core membership of from 10,000 to 30,000 and growing.”<sup>31</sup> Although it seems likely that someone of Arab descent would have trouble attending a program run by militant white racists, the fact that they exist and that there is so much demand for paramilitary training leaves other similar options open. Not only will demand drive the creation of publicly accessible courses, but they are also likely to be run and taught by people with some background in the subject themselves. Militia groups train their members; that knowledge will be passed on to whomever they train on their own.

The Levitas and Junas books mentioned above provided another important dimension to the research conducted. They describe the evolution of laws limiting gun ownership and paramilitary training. Both authors cite laws preventing paramilitary training in certain states and that the brazen actions of militias provided the impetus to push through gun control legislation. Yet, these acts were not all-inclusive. The bill drafted by Representative Robert G. Frey only made it a felony to engage in paramilitary training with the “aim or intent of creating a civil disorder.”<sup>32</sup> Thus training courses may exist for educational, commercial or any number of other reasons.

## **WHERE THE TWO FIELDS CONNECT**

The final piece of the puzzle is where the two disparate disciplines discussed above come together. Two books in particular capture the dynamic relationship between

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<sup>31</sup> *Eyes Right!: Challenging the Right Wing Backlash*, ed. Chip Berlet (Somerville, MA: Political Research Associates, 1995), 227.

<sup>32</sup> As quoted in Levitas, 204.

international Islamist terrorists and domestic right-wing extremist militias. The first is the second volume of a product of the RAND Corporation called *Aptitude for Destruction: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups*. By focusing on the two chapters related to Muslim groups, Hizballah and Jemaah Islamiyah (the book's spelling), one can understand not only the training methods of the organizations, but also how adept they are at incorporating new information and systems.

Kim Cragin, author of the section on Hizballah, states that "Hizballah's success [against the Israeli military] was due, in great measure, to its ability to learn and integrate new knowledge into its daily practices on multiple levels." Further, "it also showed its ability to observe weakness in its own tactics...and make the necessary changes to survive, whether those changes were transformational or incremental."<sup>33</sup> The study also lauded the flexibility of Jemaah Islamiyah saying, "the diversity of JI's learning sources has enhanced the organization's overall operational and tactical learning."<sup>34</sup> Thus it seems to be widely accepted that terrorist groups are not only adaptable and learn from their experiences, but that they know the value of training with others, in this case other terrorist groups, to expand their understanding and knowledge of tactical options.

Finally, there was one book that delved into the terrorist threat to America as a whole: Harvey W. Kushner's *Terrorism in America: A Structured Approach to Understanding the Terrorist Threat*. He begins by going through the mandatory definitional debate and the concept of terrorism. He then devotes a chapter each to international terrorism and domestic terrorism, with the rest focusing on what the future will bring and what terrorist and extremist groups operate or maintain a presence within

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<sup>33</sup> Kim Cragin, "Hizballah," in Jackson et al., 53.

<sup>34</sup> John C. Baker, "Jemaah Islamiya," in Jackson et al., 85.

the United States. Although Kushner wrote all of this before 11 September (three years before, in fact), the salient points remain the same.

Kushner highlights three significant similarities between international, Islamic, terrorists and domestic terrorists like Timothy McVeigh. Not only do both “come together to commit criminal and terrorist acts,” but they also use similar recruiting techniques and have an “ephemeral structure” that may be cell-based and difficult to track.<sup>35</sup> The parallels here may mean two things; one, that training classes created for the purpose of one group will fit quite well for the purposes of the other, or two, that the collaboration previously seen between regional terrorist groups for training will extend to mutual aid between Islamists and domestic militants. This latter point builds upon current observations of events, like that outlined by the Center for Defense Information’s Mark Burgess. Not only is al-Qaida a global movement, but entities like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) are crossing oceans to help train the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).<sup>36</sup> Although the end missions may be different in both instances, similar training requirements and some common ground may give rise to increased collaboration.

In addition to his comparison of domestic and international terrorists, Kushner warns of the “the greatest threat to the security of the United States in the next millennium:” the “freelancer.”<sup>37</sup> He posits that the terrorist who is unfettered by the strictures of a formal organization will have the ability to do the most damage to the U.S. and its citizens. That is not to say that a freelancer will not have specific goals, ones that

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<sup>35</sup> Harvey W. Kushner, *Terrorism in America: A Structured Approach to Understanding the Terrorist Threat* (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Ltd., 1998), 89-93.

<sup>36</sup> Mark Burgess, “Globalizing Terrorism: The FARC-IRA Connection,” *Center for Defense Information*, 5 June 2002.

<sup>37</sup> Kushner, *Terrorism in America*, 92.



may align with those of established groups, but that they are more flexible both in physical target and objective. Kushner's "freelancer" would benefit greatly from privately owned, but public, tactical training courses, since they are not as likely to have access to the "traditional" training camps of international terrorist organizations.

The sum of this literature not only provides groundwork for the hypothesis that terrorists may shift to train at privately owned third-party training courses in the U.S. but also is the basis of the findings. By synthesizing the scholarship on the issues of terrorist training requirements and U.S. domestic paramilitary training a greater understanding of the issue can be built. Using the methodologies in the next chapter this literature review was expanded upon through concerted research to produce the arguments and findings in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

### CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

The methodology for this thesis included a number of collection and analytical techniques that were synthesized together to form comprehensive scholarship. Although discrete methods were used including *literature review*, ‘*red teaming*,’ *interviews*, *brainstorming*, and *indicator analysis*, the author applied a concept called “grounded research.” It is defined by Clark Moustakas as engaging in “data collection, coding, and analysis simultaneously and in relation to each other rather than as separate components of a research design.”<sup>38</sup> Thus, the various processes described below, although carried out as individual endeavors, were conducted concurrently as one dynamic project each profiting from revelations discovered through the other approaches.

The first step was establishing a base of scholarship from which the hypothesis could build. As described in Chapter 2, there were two literary strands that had to be researched and then combined to achieve the background necessary for this relatively new and undiscovered topic. Information on Islamist terrorist groups and their training was discovered through searches for primary sources, such as *The Manchester Document*, Sageman’s *Understanding Terrorist Networks*, as well as news briefs and journal articles on the subject. The author simultaneously undertook literary investigations into domestic militia groups and paramilitary training in the United States. There was significant work on right-wing domestic groups such as the studies by Daniel Levitas and Daniel Junas. In addition, the plethora of books by Harvey Kushner were influential in establishing the terrorist threat in America and when combined with other cross-discipline articles and

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<sup>38</sup> Clark Moustakas, *Phenomenological Research Methods* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), 5.

edited compilations on the subject led to the third section of the literature review: the amalgamation of international and domestic terrorism.

The area of weapons and survival training courses in the U.S. required study beyond the academic field. Inquiries were made to non-governmental organizations like the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Montana Human Rights Network, the International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professionals and others to determine whether any inclusive list existed. When this attempt proved unfruitful, OSINT searches were made on the Internet using the search engine Google. Through their own websites, data was collected on what types of courses were offered, who the instructors were, and what the application and vetting processes were like. Not only did this method provide information on the courses, but it also supplied the answer to *how* terrorists could find these training opportunities without significant human contacts to give them an introduction.

To supplement the sections on terrorist training curriculum and requirements, a certain amount of 'red teaming' was undertaken. Although it cannot be professed to have been strictly professional 'red teaming,' it did attempt to look at the situation through the eyes of a terrorist organization. Using knowledge gleaned about the adaptability of such organizations and security and training necessities, a better picture of the situation from their perspective could be put forth.

Collecting data on the procedures and involvement of law enforcement and independent groups, with regard to privately owned third-party training programs, was the most difficult task. To determine this aspect of the thesis, a set of informal interviews, conducted mostly by email, were conducted. Questions were posed to

members of the law enforcement community as well as the organizations that monitor hate group and extremist activity in the United States. Through these interviews and an assessment of state statutes (included as Annexes 1a, b, and c) it was determined that no concerted effort exists beyond control of domestic militias. These findings were synthesized with the previous data on terrorist training and paramilitary training opportunities to create a concentrated conclusion to the hypothesis using qualitative reasoning methods.

The final piece involved forming recommendations for the U.S. government and law enforcement communities as well as elaborating on the unanswered questions brought about by this thesis. In both cases, the technique known as “brainstorming” was the most effective. The “Recommendations” section was based on what the author believed would be found in the course of the research and was not; a concerted monitoring effort by independent organizations, a centralized database within federal law enforcement, and stricter security policies on the part of the companies offering training. These, and others, were developed through brainstorming sessions conducted both alone and in conversation with others.<sup>39</sup> Likewise, brainstorming was influential in elucidating those questions that the author believes warrant further investigation. In many cases, they represent aspects of this thesis that the author would have undertaken with more time, or related areas that are of interest. In all, free association, margin notes, and in particular, ‘mind mapping’ were critical in expanding the “Recommendations” and “Unanswered Questions” sections of Chapter 8.

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<sup>39</sup> Suggestions from retired FBI agent Robert Taubert were particularly helpful in directing ideas, although none were specifically cited in this thesis. Robert Taubert, FBI (retired), e-mail interviews by author, 26 June 2007 and 28 June 2007.

In addition to the methodology employed for the body of the thesis, one more technique was used for the supplemental information in Annex 3: indicator analysis. Although those pages were drawn from a previous paper by the author, they utilize and suggest a very important method for determining whether a shift has occurred in the terrorist training paradigm. By identifying indicators that can be monitored to show what system a terrorist organization is using to train its members, ample warning can be given to the U.S. IC, LE, and government. It is provided as a resource for further study into an indicator-based model of terrorist training and, although only cursory, it is hoped that Annex 3 will help jump-start work on this important topic.

## CHAPTER 4: TERRORIST TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

To explore the hypothesis of this thesis that terrorist groups could shift their training paradigm to privately owned third-party paramilitary programs in the United States it is necessary to understand what their precise training requirements are. The skills needed will vary with the missions so this section attempts a more in depth look by using “red team” analysis building from literary scholarship, training manuals, historical antecedents and knowledge of the culture and movement of Islamists today. The findings of this chapter will be compared with the details of third-party courses found in Chapter 5 to create the foundation upon which the debate over a paradigm shift may be waged.

The resources for this chapter include those referenced above in the Literature Review of Chapter 2, but draws its conclusions primarily from the “red teaming” methodology. *The Manchester Document* provides a starting point for this discussion as it outlines the “weapons of special operations.” These are: “1. cold steel weapons (rope, knife, rod...) 2. poisons 3. pistols and rifles 4. explosives.”<sup>40</sup> The majority of written instruction contained in the manual refers to the history, use, and details of various firearms in the chapter entitled “Kidnapping and Assassination Using Rifles and Pistols.” Specifically it cites specifications and proper grip of automatic pistols and revolvers as well as rifles such as the Kalashnikov AK-47.<sup>41</sup> Not only does the manual include descriptions, but it also provides diagrams and information on tactical usage with historical examples.

Using this beginning as a guide, “red team” analysis can expand the list of requirements by understanding what missions are likely and what skills would be

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<sup>40</sup> *Manchester Document*, Lesson 10, 2.

<sup>41</sup> *Manchester Document*, Lesson 14.

necessary for their success. Terrorist actions were divided into five categories to encompass the range of possibilities; training needs were then developed to be consistent within each grouping. Although the categories may seem relatively broad, they cover all options without getting bogged down in an attempt to predict precise modes of attack and therefore more aptly address the issue of training as it would be seen from the perspective of an international terrorist organization with diversified interests.

The first category involves the bombing of an installation, landmark or civilian population. These bombings may be carried out by a suicide bomber on foot, in a vehicle, or by any other delivery method or placement where explosives are the primary weapons. Attacks like this have been relatively common in the past and include the 1993 World Trade Center bombing where a car bomb was detonated in the underground garage beneath the building complex, as well as the most recent attack in Britain on the Glasgow Airport, although the later can be deemed unsuccessful. Although some additional skills, such as driving a car, may be necessary for delivering or placing the explosives, this type of mission has a fairly concise set of needs.

Individuals carrying out bombings first and foremost must have explosives training and familiarity with conventional and unconventional bomb-making techniques. According to a 1997 report by the U.S. Department of Justice, "Bombmaking information is literally at the fingertips of anyone with access to a home computer equipped with a modem."<sup>42</sup> Although it may help to have in-person instruction, the widespread

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<sup>42</sup> United States Department of Justice, *1997 Report on the Availability of Bombmaking Information*, April 1997, Section 1.B. Document may be found at URL: <<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/bombmakinginfo.html>>, accessed 20 June 2007.

availability of such online manuals means bombs are more readily fabricated and, excepting a secure location in which to make them, are fairly easy to obtain.

Other necessary training for this type of mission includes understanding the culture of the country where the attack is to occur and study of infrastructure. These two points are vital to assessing possible targets to accomplish not only the most damage, but also to achieve the desired reaction from the people, government or international community. In order to have them “Do” what the terrorist group desires, they must “Think” a certain way in response to what they “See” happening. This reaction paradigm is common in denial and deception studies, but is also applicable to targeting for a terrorist attack and in both cases relies on a sound knowledge of adversary systems and thought processes.

The second category of mission is an attack like the one planned by the 6 men arrested in New Jersey who planned an assault on the military base of Fort Dix.<sup>43</sup> This operation requires a very different skill set than a straightforward bombing. Not only would knowledge of explosives be useful, but members involved must also be experts in handling various weapons and have a good grasp of both guerilla tactics and U.S. military defensive tactics. The chief concern is obtaining sufficient weapons training in handguns and semi-automatic or automatic rifles. The New Jersey plotters attempted this through paintball games and open access shooting ranges.<sup>44</sup> Depending on the number of confederates, it is likely that automatic rifles, like the U.S. military’s M-16, and grenades will be the optimal choices since any military post will be well defended. The necessary

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<sup>43</sup> “6 Held on terror conspiracy charges in NJ.”

<sup>44</sup> “6 Held on terror conspiracy charges in NJ.”



firearms may be smaller or less powerful if the proposed target is a guarded, but non-military installation such as a power plant, government building or financial institution.

This type of attack would also require significant training in tactics for assault of a defended position and fighting with a lesser force of numbers and firepower. Just as a sports team must learn and practice its plays, so too must an army, however small, be taught how to fight as a unit against their particular adversary. This training would be enhanced by knowledge of the target including layout, capabilities, response tactics, and protocol. The terrorist group must also prepare for success by learning how to defend the position against superior firepower, at least to the point that their specific goals are met.

The third category of terrorist activities is one that the United States military has become more familiar with since the invasion of Iraq in 2003: insurgency. Becoming competent and well adapted for this type of action would require a terrorist organization to train its members in a wide variety of areas. These include explosives, weapons, tactics, and urban and wilderness survival.

Knowledge of explosives is not only important for carrying out suicide bombing missions, but also for attacks on convoys using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and the increasingly prevalent explosively formed penetrators or EFPs. These tend to be made using discarded or unexploded ordnance and either a wire attached to the detonator or a remote device. As with the bomb making mentioned above, instructions on fabrication may be found online and improvised on the spot.

Weapons training may be the most important aspect of insurgent preparation particularly since advances in this arena would greatly improve efficacy against U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The weapon of choice for Islamist insurgents is

usually the AK-47 automatic rifle. With an effective range of 350 meters and the ability to fire 600 rounds per minute<sup>45</sup> it is also easier to obtain due to its prevalence in the former Soviet Republics. Also in great demand are RPGs or rocket propelled grenades because of the amount of damage they are capable of inflicting. Although favored less because of their implication of proximity, handguns and pistols should also be learned for closer combat conditions and kidnapping operations. Fighting an irregular war means being prepared for all types of scenarios and knowing how to effectively use the weapons on hand, thus pistols, rifles, and RPGs should be studied by the terrorist intent on engaging in the insurgency.

Tactics is another critical area an insurgent should commit time and care to develop. In waging a war against a technically superior enemy it is important to understand how one can obtain the advantage by using positioning, precision targeting, and guerilla tactics. Training should include urban warfare, assaults on defended positions and ambushes of teams on foot as well as those with vehicular transport. Not only should the terrorist's own strategy and battlefield awareness be developed, but they must also seek to identify the U.S. and coalition troops' tactics, techniques and procedures so that those may be exploited to the terrorist's advantage. If this is done, terrorists may be better able to predict adversary movements and strikes, identify vulnerabilities, know what weapons fire to expect, as well as how best to disrupt communications and what targets will be most missed.

Wilderness survival techniques may also prove vital to insurgents, especially if they have gone to fight in a country and environment unfamiliar to them. Sustaining

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<sup>45</sup> Izhmash JSC Official Site, *AKMS Kalashnikov (AK-47) Specifications*, 2005, URL: <<http://www.izhmash.ru/eng/product/akms.shtml>>, accessed 20 July 2007.

oneself while living in less than optimal conditions, often constantly on the move, can prove difficult. Training in methods for living in the wilderness away from civilization would be a boon to those fighters in more remote regions, particularly in the mountains of Afghanistan or the desert expanses of Iraq. Students would need to learn how to find food and water, create shelter, and avoid any dangers whether poisonous plants, animals, or natural phenomena. Not all insurgent fighting is done in urban centers or with the cooperation of the local population, so survival skills would be very important for terrorists training for insurgent operations.

The fourth category of terrorist missions to be addressed here is the possibility of insurgent or irregular warfare within the United States itself. It is not certain that this is likely to happen in the near future, but as Islamist rhetoric states that the movement “wishes to destroy all States and Governments anywhere on the face of the earth which are opposed to the ideology and programme of Islam regardless of the country or the Nation which rules it,”<sup>46</sup> it must be considered a possibility as part of this “red team” analysis. The skills required for such an undertaking would be similar to those outlined above with respect to an overseas insurgency. An individual would need explosives and firearms training, tactical instruction for both urban and rural scenarios, wilderness survival for the various ecosystems found in the United States to escape surveillance, as well as significant cultural understanding to enhance targeting. By conducting such operations in the U.S., terrorists would need to gain entry to the country or remain undetected, if already here, through the techniques of *taqiyya* and *kitman*. Knowledge of

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<sup>46</sup> Sayeed Abdul A'la Maududi, *Jihad in Islam* (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications Ltd.), 9. As quoted by IslamistWatch at URL: <<http://www.islamistwatch.org/texts/maududi/maududi.html>>, accessed 20 July 2007.

the country and societal norms would be quite important in correctly utilizing *taqiyya* and *kitman* to blend in and escape suspicion.

The final category encompasses those attacks that cannot yet be anticipated, even by those organizations that will eventually carry them out. To this end, a member of a terrorist group or an aspiring terrorist would attempt to prepare for any contingency. Training to this end would be comprehensive and would likely include: advanced weapons courses in pistols and rifles, hand-to-hand combat, wilderness survival techniques for deserts, mountains, and deciduous forests, instruction on tactics for irregular warfare and those of the U.S. military, bomb making, and cultural immersion in the target country for assessing vulnerabilities and for escaping surveillance.

Ideological and religious training, as mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis can be readily obtained through the Internet or pamphlets and will not be addressed as part of this hypothesis. The key here is deciphering what terrorist training requirements may be by using “red teaming” techniques. The types of missions will necessitate certain skill sets and therefore particular training. These findings can then be compared to types of courses offered by privately owned third-party training programs in the United States to determine whether enough overlap exists to make them a viable alternative to terrorist organizations’ own training camps overseas.

## CHAPTER 5: THIRD-PARTY COURSE OFFERINGS

There are hundreds of companies in the United States that offer a wide variety of training services and can be easily found through the open source Internet. Although a brief overview of such third-party courses was included as part of the introduction to this thesis, it is important to delineate exactly what skills are taught. If the hypothesis that terrorists can switch their training paradigm to use of privately owned third-party schools is to be tested, one must understand how these courses match up against the terrorist training requirements of Chapter 4.

Using the Internet search engine Google, six types of training programs were identified, each teaching a specific skill set; they are wilderness survival, hand-to-hand combat and “cold steel” weapons such as knives, basic firearms (in a shooting range), advanced firearms (in scenarios), paramilitary, and basic tradecraft like countersurveillance. This section will discuss the details of such courses although it will not cover the security practices of these companies or pertinent laws as those issues will be given direct treatment in Chapter 7.

Wilderness survival classes are the most ubiquitous classification of courses available and include every type of terrain and all skill levels. The website *Equipped To Survive* provides a compendium of 78 companies that offer some form of survival training, 48 of which are located in the United States.<sup>47</sup> Those examples as well as others found through the Internet show the diversity of options in this area. Terrains include forests, deserts, and plains as well as courses only given at certain points in the year to achieve high heat and low temperature weather conditions. Due to the vastness of the

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<sup>47</sup> Doug Ritter, “Survival Schools and Courses,” *Equipped To Survive*, 30 May 2007, URL: <<http://www.equipped.com/srvschol.htm>>, accessed 20 July 2007.

United States it is possible to find almost any climate that suits training needs and the full gamut are represented by groups in the wilderness survival industry.

Across the board, certain skills are included in this type of training. The *Northwest School of Survival* lists the objectives of its “Desert Survival Seminar,” ones that are common to most programs:

- shelter methods and shelter construction
- fire skills and cooking methods
- water procurement and disinfection
- clothing and equipment needs
- edible plants
- navigation<sup>48</sup>

Instruction in these areas combined with basic and environment-specific first aid make up the core of wilderness survival training. Some go so far as to include courses like Mountain Shepherd’s “Hidden Pursuit” which involves not only the basic techniques mentioned above, but also avoiding detection, camouflage, and “escape and evasion” exercises.<sup>49</sup> Thus for any level of intensity, location, or desired skill set, there are publicly available courses ready to provide those services.

Hand-to-hand combat is the second type of course that exists in the U.S. for public consumption. Although formal companies specializing in weapons training, such as Front Sight Firearms Training Institute, may offer martial arts and “edged weapons”

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<sup>48</sup> Northwest School of Survival, *Desert Survival Seminar*, 2007, URL: <<http://www.nwsos.com/desert.htm>>, accessed 20 July 2007.

<sup>49</sup> Mountain Shepherd Wilderness Survival School, *Courses*, 2007, URL: <[http://mountainshepherd.com/index/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=15&Itemid=29](http://mountainshepherd.com/index/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15&Itemid=29)>, accessed 20 July 2007.

classes,<sup>50</sup> the best place to obtain these skills are from martial arts schools and self-defense classes. Since these are quite common and the utility relatively low with relation to terrorist groups, suffice it to say that there are a plethora of options for learning hand-to-hand combat techniques in the United States.

When it comes to firearms training, it is important to make the distinction both between which weapons are taught and under what conditions are they practiced. Using a shooting range to reinforce how to properly use a gun is a simple and effective way to train. Ranges exist across the country and most are open to the public for a fee and allow for rental of pistols, rifles, and shotguns including semi-automatic machine guns.<sup>51</sup>

Yet static shooting can also be learned through courses dedicated to its instruction. Front Sight is an excellent example of a company that provides a variety of weapons training in a formal atmosphere, including the use of firearms in both indoor and outdoor ranges. Such classes are taught for handguns, shotguns, rifles (including M-16s), and the Uzi submachine gun. Each weapon may be learned in progressively more intense settings as well as for certain circumstances, as in the case of “defensive handgun.”<sup>52</sup> While the proper use of an AK-47 may be found on the popular Internet video site YouTube,<sup>53</sup> operations like Front Sight allow individuals to have hands on training in a variety of weapons.

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<sup>50</sup> Front Sight Firearms Training Institute, *Firearms Training Course Descriptions*, 2006, URL: <<http://www.frontsight.com/Courses.asp>>, accessed 20 July 2007.

<sup>51</sup> One example is the Project 200 Shooting Range in El Cajon, CA. A list of their rental weapons can be found at URL: <<http://www.p2krange.com/firearmrentals.html>>, accessed 20 July 2007.

<sup>52</sup> Front Sight, *Course Descriptions*.

<sup>53</sup> Risks Inc., *Tactical Weapons Training*, 10 February 2007, URL: <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8cf0mLEojhs>>, accessed 20 July 2007.

Since the courses offered by Front Sight are representative of what can be found elsewhere in the U.S., it is critical to elaborate upon their non-static weapons training courses. Again there are classes on handguns, shotguns, rifles, and Uzis, but in this case they are used in obstacle courses and in tactical situations. The tactical classes are conducted in both daytime and night iterations, which further expand the possible skills acquired from this company. Not only does this panoply of courses exist for each weapon individually but there is also a 4-day “Four Weapon Tactical” class that combines them.<sup>54</sup> Considering the programs mentioned above are publicly available, they leave little weapons training uncovered for anyone seeking a comprehensive skill set.

Courses that combine intensive weapons instruction with tactical maneuvers qualify under a different category: paramilitary training. Such classes are often limited to individuals who have taken the prerequisite lower level courses as they include elements each. Lessons look at the tactical use of firearms, escape and evasion, as well as first aid and wilderness survival. These types of classes can usually be found within the website for weapons or survival training companies, as in the case of Front Sight and Mountain Shepherd, mentioned above.

The final category of courses that can be found online is that of “tradecraft.” Instruction on tradecraft includes techniques traditionally associated with intelligence field officers and includes surveillance and countersurveillance, hiding one’s identity and creating a new one, as well as financial methods for hiding and laundering assets. The Global Survival Institute conducts the quintessential example of this type of class and

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<sup>54</sup> Front Sight, *Course Descriptions*.



covers topics as far ranging as fake IDs to codes and ciphers, not to mention “personal security” techniques such as booby traps and “legal weapons.”<sup>55</sup> These classes are not only highly specialized, but also teach skills that would allow an individual an unprecedented advantage even against U.S. law enforcement personnel.

So many options exist for public consumption in every type of training. By doing a simple Internet search one can identify hundreds of courses in wilderness survival, hand-to-hand combat, both static and tactical firearms, paramilitary, and even espionage tradecraft. Furthermore, the variations within each category allow an individual to tailor his or her training to fit any end, as the combinations are boundless. The widespread availability of the courses described above may give terrorists a prime venue for carrying out their training undetected; the following chapter will compare the required skills of terrorists to the public sector offerings to determine whether enough overlap exists to make a training paradigm shift feasible.

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<sup>55</sup> Global Survival Institute, *Class Information: Travel Like a Ghost*.

## CHAPTER 6: REQUIREMENTS VS. COURSES

The preceding two chapters outline the requirements terrorists have for training as well as the courses and skills available for public consumption in the United States. By comparing these data sets one can determine whether privately owned third-party training courses can provide the same services as terrorist training camps overseas. As can be seen below, there is significant overlap such that skills required may indeed be taught in third-party schools with auxiliary access to ideological and religious instruction.

Using the “red team” approach of Chapter 4, the different categories of terrorist missions and their requisite skill sets may be evaluated next to those opportunities in the private sector. The first mission discussed was that of terrorist bombings. To achieve a successful bombing, whether delivered on foot, in a car or by suicide attack, an individual must know how to fabricate the explosive device and have cultural knowledge of the society in which the attack is meant to take place. Chapter 4 cited a U.S. Department of Justice report on the availability of bomb making manuals on the Internet.<sup>56</sup> This may not be a skill widely taught by private sector companies due to its illicit nature, online resources may easily replace such training.

Bombers also must be aware of the culture of the target country in order to evaluate vulnerabilities and the buildings or locations that, if exploded, would have the most profound impact. By exploiting training courses inside the U.S. terrorists can immerse themselves in American culture which will not only enhance their targeting capabilities, but also will allow them to blend in with the rest of society more convincingly.

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<sup>56</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, *1997 Report on the Availability of Bombmaking Information*.

The second category includes armed terrorist assaults on installations and important buildings. The example used above was that of the New Jersey plotters who were training to attack the military base of Fort Dix. To carry out this plan, the group would need advanced firearms training for handguns and rifles as well as tactical instruction on how to work as a unit and use positioning to their advantage. While the actual terrorist cell used shooting ranges and paintball, companies like the Front Sight Firearms Training Institute teach precisely the type of skills needed. Not only could they learn tactical use of automatic machine guns, but they could also practice using them at night, a time when they would likely choose to assault the target installation.

This sort of attack would also have a greater likelihood of success if the terrorist cell had prior knowledge of U.S. military systems, weapons, and tactics. By understanding how their adversary thinks, the group could better anticipate counterattacks and difficulties in the mission. The two main examples cited in this thesis, Front Sight and Global Survival Institute, herald the fact that many of their instructors are former military or law enforcement personnel; these companies were chosen because they represent the norm. Individuals participating in their programs not only receive high-level weapons training, but are also exposed to the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of the United States military. Training by military personnel means terrorists could have a better idea of what responses to assault will be as well as what firepower to expect.

The category of terrorist actions requiring the largest set of skills is insurgent operations. Participating individuals need advanced tactical and static firearms training, knowledge of explosives, desert and mountain survival capabilities, as well as an

awareness of U.S. and coalition tactics, weaponry and communications systems. Privately owned third-party courses in the United States abound with weapons instruction for all types including automatic rifles and submachine guns. Although the AK-47 may be popular for insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not generally taught in U.S. classes. That said there is plenty of access to similar rifles and the Internet again is a valuable resource for shifting from one like weapon to another. Explosives knowledge may also be discovered using the World Wide Web and search engines like Google. The properties of explosives are widely discussed on sites as common as Wikipedia, the Web Encyclopedia,<sup>57</sup> and one can even find manuals on how to construct a bomb using a variety of materials.<sup>58</sup>

Survival skills are also important to terrorists living and fighting in the midst of an insurgency. Since urban areas are often the hubs of conflict, it will probably be necessary to live a very simple, low profile lifestyle in order to escape detection and simultaneously be prepared to attack. To this end, training would be vital for desert and mountain survival in particular, although the course location could be chosen to fit the necessary climate. The prevalence of survival schools in the diverse environments of the United States provides an ideal opportunity for terrorists planning to join an insurgency where they will have to adapt to a wilderness with which they may be unfamiliar.

Finally, an aspiring insurgent would benefit greatly from an understanding of coalition weapons, tactics, and systems. Similar to the ability to anticipate when attacking a U.S. military installation in the U.S. mentioned above, knowledge of the

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<sup>57</sup> "Explosive Material," *Wikipedia*, 14 July 2007, URL: <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explosives>>, accessed 20 July 2007.

<sup>58</sup> U.S. Department of Justice, *1997 Report on the Availability of Bombmaking Information*.

enemy will, as Sun Tzu says, bring “no danger.”<sup>59</sup> While training in the U.S. terrorists will be taught American TTPs by former military personnel as well as information on how those forces react in certain tactical situations. Although this knowledge in no way assures victory, it gives the possessor a significant advantage in battle when identifying vulnerabilities, disrupting communications pathways, denying collection systems of intelligence on their movements, and simply reacting in a firefight.

The fourth category of attacks is similar to the third with one exception; it examines an insurgent or irregular warfare situation *within the United States itself*. The same skill set as that described above applies although with certain amendments. First, the wilderness survival training would be directed at different climates and would probably include tips for deciduous forests more than deserts. Second, explosives training and instruction on bomb making would play a more precise role as targets become buildings and facilities more than IEDs aimed at halting convoys. Third, and perhaps most critically, knowledge of U.S. military TTPs would not be sufficient as terrorist groups would also have to take into account the domestic response mechanisms and any threats posed by armed, but unorganized, members of the local population. Thus, the comprehension that would be most useful would be cultural immersion and the applicability of that information toward blending in and toward urban warfare operations. Simply by living and training in the U.S. for an extended period of time, observant and motivated terrorists can pick up on the quirks of American society as well as learn where the priorities of politicians and the public lie. This advanced cultural understanding

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<sup>59</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 2001), 14.

would greatly aid a sleeper cell's practice of *taqiyya* and *kitman*, as well as improve their ability to target attacks effectively and anticipate government and popular responses.

The final category of terrorist operations discussed in Chapter 4 was an all-inclusive look at what skills could possibly be necessary to prepare for any contingency. Knowing the ability and proclivity of terrorist organizations to adapt their tactics, even an aspiring member may not know what precisely to train for. In this case, privately owned third-party courses would be perfectly suited. They cover the gamut from wilderness survival in almost any terrain to advanced firearms and countersurveillance. With the right funding, an individual could continue taking courses that would make them ideal for almost any mission that might arise. For someone desiring to get involved in the Islamist jihad, it would be a terrific way to make oneself available for whatever action is proposed.

Considering the ubiquity of training courses of all varieties in the United States, it is feasible that terrorists could use them instead of their own camps. The following chapter will consider what security precautions could thwart that plan and whether it is even in their best interest do shift their training paradigm. Through these findings and the arguments for and against privately owned third-party courses, it is certain that they provide adequate services for an aspiring terrorist or insurgent and even have the value added of cultural immersion and understanding.

## **CHAPTER 7: FINDINGS: IMPETUS FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT?**

### **SECURITY PROCEDURES (OR THE LACK THEREOF)**

The question of a training shift to third-party courses would be moot if they were inaccessible or unsafe from members of terrorist groups. Security practices on the part of the private companies are an important consideration, as are law enforcement vigilance and independent non-profit or non-governmental organization monitoring. Although each of the above should represent critical nodes in vetting applicants and ensuring that students do not pose a threat to the safety of the United States and its citizens, they seem to fail in respect to this particular problem.

What should be the primary line of defense against an exploitation of paramilitary training courses is the U.S. government and its agencies. The majority of responsibility for scrutinizing the issue of training courses and camps falls on the shoulders of state legislatures and local law enforcement. According to a 1997 *Gonzaga Law Review* study, co-authored by the co-founder and Chief Trial Counsel of the Southern Poverty Law Center, “twenty-four states, including seven with anti-militia laws, have another type of statute prohibiting training with firearms or other destructive devices...”<sup>60</sup> Although this may appear to be a strong stroke against such training, the description continues with the condition, “...while knowing or having reason to know that such

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<sup>60</sup> These states are: Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island (which have both state anti-paramilitary training statutes as well as anti-militia laws) and Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia (which have state anti-paramilitary training laws only). See Ellen M. Bowden and Morris S. Dees, “An Ounce of Prevention: The Constitutionality of State Anti-Militia Laws,” *Gonzaga Law Review*, 32 (1996/1997): 523.

techniques will be used to further a civil disorder.”<sup>61</sup> Having to satisfy this conditions means that most are deemed legal. The study looks at this particular hurdle to prosecuting militias in the U.S., but in doing so also points out the flaw in statutes against paramilitary training. Attached to this thesis as Annexes 1a, b, and c are examples of the statutes described herein from California, Pennsylvania, and Florida, and represent the typical wording found in the laws from the other 21 states. Therefore, there is no legal precedent for regular government monitoring of privately owned training courses that seek only to share knowledge and teach Americans to defend themselves.

Even in the case of militias, law enforcement personnel are not the primary monitoring agents. Lt. John P. Sullivan, founder and officer in charge of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group states, “active monitoring of these activities by state and local law enforcement can only proceed when there is a criminal nexus sufficient to open an intelligence and/or criminal investigation.”<sup>62</sup> The same idea would apply to the publicly accessible, non-militia, courses in question here. Lt. Sullivan goes on to say that “the bulk of monitoring on an on-going basis is conducted by groups like the ADL, Klanwatch, The Investigative Project, etc. that scan and monitor these groups and alert law enforcement when patterns emerge.”<sup>63</sup> These non-governmental organizations are the second line of defense against abuses of paramilitary training.

Formal organizations, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center, are “dedicated to monitoring hate groups and extremist activity in the U.S.”<sup>64</sup> Their primary focus is

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<sup>61</sup> Bowden and Dees, 523.

<sup>62</sup> Lieutenant John P. Sullivan, Founder and OIC Los Angeles Terrorist Early Warning Group, LA Sheriffs Department, Los Angeles, CA, e-mail interview by author, 7 June 2007.

<sup>63</sup> Lt. Sullivan, e-mail interview, 7 June 2007.

<sup>64</sup> The Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project website, 2007, URL: <<http://www.splcenter.org/intel/history.jsp>>, accessed 20 June 2007.



therefore directed at racism, human rights abuses, legal battles, and violence on the part of domestic extremist groups. There appears to be an absence of associations looking at private paramilitary training, even if it is loosely related to hate groups and may be potentially teaching dangerous skills to militant individuals.

The final protection against weapons program exploitation would actually be the first contact for any potential terrorist using this training model. As mentioned in Chapter 5, there are thousands of websites devoted to training that would be useful to individuals bent on committing acts of terrorism, yet the training group's obsession with guns and evading surveillance does not extend to their own security practices.

The procedures common to many of these training programs can be seen in Annexes 2a and 2b, which provide examples of the applications required by two training companies operating in the United States: Front Sight Firearms Training Institute and the Global Survival Institute. The courses offered by both, as well as descriptions of their staffs are detailed in Chapter 5, but it is their application process that is worthy of note. Although Front Sight goes so far as to require a *criminal* background check which fulfills requirements for the federal law that prevents the possession or use of a firearm by a convicted felon, the only other obstacle to an applicant who is not a felon is a signed affidavit of "no mental illness, or substance abuse" and a "character witness."<sup>65</sup> The Global Survival Institute is even more frightening; the courses offered cover far higher levels of tactical, survival, and paramilitary training, are taught by current and former U.S. military personnel, and the company only requires that students provide an email

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<sup>65</sup> Front Sight Firearms Training Institute, *Application for Instruction*, 2006, URL: <<https://www.frontsight.com/pdf/1008192489.pdf>>, accessed 24 June 2007. Reproduced as Annex 2a.

address and a list of allergies.<sup>66</sup> If local and federal law enforcement do not monitor these programs and neither do independent NGOs, the companies themselves must have at least minimal security measures and reporting requirements, but they do not.

## **COMPARISON: TERRORIST CAMPS VS. THE PRIVATE SECTOR**

The previous chapters and sections suggests *how* terrorists might use privately owned third-party training camps for their purposes, but the question to be answered now is *why*. A cost/benefit analysis will show the pros and cons both of their own camps abroad and of the courses that exist within the United States. Although there are benefits and drawbacks in both instances, it has been determined that third-party training provides the best option considering the current situation facing terrorist organizations and the requirements of their instruction.

### **Terrorist Training Camps**

Terrorist training camps have become a primary focus of the U.S. military as a means of disrupting their activities worldwide. Although the U.S. military and intelligence community are far from perfect, sites are regularly discovered and destroyed and so new locations are constantly required. With well-established camps, not only may they no longer be viable, being reduced to rubble and no longer secret, but much of the equipment and weaponry collected there may be lost as well. With transient and stationary camps alike, members of the groups who were present for training may be killed in action if an attack is unwarned and unexpected; this means loss of life, fewer

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<sup>66</sup> Global Survival Institute, *Application*, 2007, URL: <[http://www.survivaltrainingohio.com/docs/wilderness\\_app.pdf](http://www.survivaltrainingohio.com/docs/wilderness_app.pdf)>, accessed 24 June 2007. Reproduced as Annex 2b.

fighters, and may add to trepidation on the part of terrorists thinking of training at a similar camp. As more are taken down, it will become harder to find covert places to set up bases and to convince new members to risk training there.

Basic operational difficulties are exacerbated by such targeting and are not simple in their own right. Funding is a complex problem that involves charities worldwide, money laundering, shell companies, hawala<sup>67</sup>, and hiding assets. This system, no matter how well planned, is traceable at some level by experts at the U.S. Treasury Department and similar institutions around the world. Likewise, weapons acquisitions can give international law enforcement and intelligence personnel an opening to follow the trail and trace terrorists to their bases of operation if the purchases are not 100% hidden from view. Running training camps often requires significant stores of weapons of all varieties for teaching purposes and therefore are a giveaway to investigators, as well as a significant expense. Camps also require instructors who are not only versed in the necessary skills but are able to pass on that knowledge to students. Although they may be hardened soldiers who picked up skills as they fought, say in 1980s Afghanistan, it seems many are seeking haphazard training like the six men who plotted an attack on Fort Dix in New Jersey. These men trained by playing paintball in the New Jersey woods and going to firing ranges in the Pocono Mountains. Without formal instruction they

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<sup>67</sup> *Hawala* is an informal Arab banking system whereby an individual may walk into a shop in Chicago give the “banker” \$500 to be sent to a relative in, say, Karachi. The “banker” has a relationship with someone in Germany, who has one with the operator of a hawala business in Karachi. No money is ever transferred or sent across borders, making it very difficult to track by traditional means, although the interpersonal relationships allow the relative in Karachi to receive her \$500.

would be unqualified to tutor others and would also have benefited from more experienced teachers.<sup>68</sup>

Operating training camps also presents a number of security concerns for terrorist organizations and their members, which in turn makes it more difficult to sustain their existence and functionality. *The Manchester Document* has this to say about individual operational security (OPSEC):

The Trainees

1. The trainees should not know each other.
2. The trainees should not know the training place.
- ...

The Trainers

1. Not revealing the identity of the trainer to trainees.
2. The training team members should not know one another.<sup>69</sup>

Although these points may be stressed in theory, it is impossible for people training together for a reasonable period of time not to learn to recognize each other and learn at least one of their alias names. Trainers in particular will be likely to form some familiarity if they work together for an extended term. The consequences of such relationships, however discouraged, is that someone rolled up later on will be able to identify others who they saw at the training camp and may even be able to give personal information about them.

The final strike against terrorists training in their own camps is the countries in which most of them operate. By traveling to places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Sudan, terrorists “red flag” themselves; they give investigators and intelligence analysts a tip-off to their true identities and intentions. To avoid such evidence they must either go to great

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<sup>68</sup> “6 Held on terror conspiracy charges in NJ,” NBC and The Associated Press, 8 May 2007, URL: <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18549005/>>, accessed 14 July 2007.

<sup>69</sup> *Manchester Document*, Lesson 6, 3

lengths to hide those trips or make elaborate explanations for them. Particularly as analysts learn more about the religion and culture of Islam, the excuse of traveling to make the Haaj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, will be uncovered as those countries implicated in hosting terrorist training facilities are nowhere near the holy sites. Regardless of explanation such trips are an indicator used by law enforcement and intelligence professionals to help identify possible terrorists and to establish probable cause for warrants or more in-depth collection.

Terrorists running their own camps do receive a number of benefits for doing so. First, they have absolute control over training programs. This includes not only what tactical and weapons instruction will be provided, but may also be mission specific. They may train for particular terrain, certain types of bomb-making, as well as coordinate similar tactics so all members know the style of fighting desired.

Organization-specific camps also provide opportunities for ideological and religious indoctrination and radicalization. By bringing disparate fighters together under one roof, metaphorically speaking, group unity and cohesion is enhanced and the bonding solidifies devotion to the mission. Any doubts can be quashed and replaced with determination and the brotherhood that only comes from training and fighting together as a unit.

The final mark on the plus side of self-training is that it is out of view. By maintaining camps in remote regions, or at least out-of-sight, and requiring strict codes of silence, outsiders will not be able to see exactly what is going on and what is being taught. This *denial* of information makes discovering terrorist groups' intentions

considerably more difficult as training measures often reveal mission requirements and no access to the former means little insight into the latter.

### **Private Sector Training Programs**

Privately owned third-party courses in the United States have their own set of drawbacks, and likewise a plethora of incentives. On the “con” side, the biggest issue is the lack of ideological schooling. Training at a publicly accessible facility would mean previous radicalization and subscription to the cause or a simultaneous development of those sentiments. Without classes on the Qur’an and impassioned speeches by Islamist imams, individuals would rely on Internet websites, chat rooms, and personal conversations with likeminded persons. These possibilities exist and are in use already, but the lack of religious classes in person would be evidence of a relinquishment of control over curriculum. Although there are courses in the U.S. on any form of weapons or survival training, it may not be as precisely tailored to future missions.

Security may also be an issue in some cases. As mentioned above, there seem to be lax standards at the vast majority of schools, though there is always the possibility of challenges. Depending on the course, an Arab-looking student may stand out and draw suspicion due to the current political climate and awareness of international Islamist terrorists in the post-September 11<sup>th</sup> world. This could be countered with the techniques of *taqiyya* and *kitman* and professions of being non-Muslim. If utilized properly, and not in exaggeration, it may only tax the individual in having to practice denial and deception on a regular basis and not in the probability of discovery.

There is also the possibility that training companies will keep records of who attended their programs. This is unlikely to pose an immediate threat since such lists, if

they exist, do not seem to be shared with any outside sources, but should an individual raise attention elsewhere, there is a chance, however slim, that this will be uncovered and add fuel to an ongoing investigation. Yet, should an individual terrorist's past training come to light, it is doubtful that a link will be made to others since training was conducted separately.

The final potential hurdle to third-party training is that of finances. Although, as will be discussed below, it may be easier to provide money for third-party training rather than for conducting sponsored camps, it may be slightly more expensive. Course fees add up over time as would travel within the U.S. to training locations and the higher cost of living in a developed or Western nation. There would be savings on weapons acquisition, bribes of local officials, and feeding and housing trainees so the costs may even out in the end. In addition, individuals receiving funds for training should also have a job since they are meant to be posing as every day citizens or visitors of the United States in order to escape detection by the U.S. government. Securing a job and participating in society would also enable them to pay some of their living costs themselves and thus lessen any need for a formal terrorist funding apparatus.

When considering the faults of third-party courses, there must also be an evaluation of their benefits. Besides avoiding all of the "cons" of operating their own camps, as enumerated above, they allow an individual to ostensibly fly "under the radar." Without the huge "red flag" of travel to countries with known terrorist organization operations and training camps, there is far less for U.S. and other countries' governments to catch. A clean person can obtain a student visa or visit relatives in the United States much more easily than someone with those noticeable stamps in their passport.

Furthermore, it would enable resident aliens or U.S. citizens to receive paramilitary training without drawing attention to themselves. Capitalizing on the freedoms endowed by the U.S. Constitution, any person may express their Second Amendment rights and learn to defend himself or herself using firearms or other deadly weapons. With the aid of *taqiyya* and *kitman*, a potential terrorist can gain entry into any number of the schools mentioned above since most have only a cursory application and vetting process in place as can be seen through Annexes 2a and 2b.

Third-party courses may also simplify the terrorist financing apparatus by allowing some transfers to be conducted aboveboard. Since funding would not be sent overseas to sustain training camps, it could remain within the U.S. or be more easily brought up from South America.<sup>70</sup> Charities could retain their non-association with terrorist organizations by giving money only as personal loans and grants to Muslims trying to better themselves in the United States. Such a system, once established, could greatly enhance their ability to *deny* collection efforts against their financing operations. Further, considering the adaptability of terrorist groups it is possible that a formal financing structure might be avoided almost entirely as individuals in-country pursue their own training through third-parties.

The final and potentially most devastating advantage of terrorists using third-party companies to train is the value added of understanding U.S. culture, response mechanisms (particularly in public opinion), weapons systems and TTPs. The ability of terrorists or potential terrorists to exist without drawing attention from law enforcement

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<sup>70</sup> The “triborder” region of South America, where the borders of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay intersect has been cited as a haven for terrorist training and financing. Timothy L. O’Brien, “South American Area is Cited as Haven of Terrorist Training,” *The New York Times*, late ed., 10 October 2003, A28.



personnel is reliant on their use of *taqiyya* and *kitman*. Yet these practices are only as good as their purveyors' understanding of the host culture. They are meant as ways to fit in with society, by denying their Muslim faith and adopting characteristics of those around them. By living and training within the U.S. individuals will gain critical knowledge of not only popular American culture, but also how the public responds to crises, what is deemed most important, and what would create the impetus for change. Persons residing in the United States and particularly, citizens, that practice *taqiyya* and *kitman* would be primed for carrying out operations that would have the most profound effect on the U.S. and its people.

In the world of denial and deception analysis the See-Think-Do paradigm is at the core of understanding a D&D operation. In this paradigm a denial and deception operation is formed by showing a decision-maker an act (*See*), to get him or her to *Think* that a particular notion is true (or false if the planner so chooses), with the end goal that he or she will *Do* something in response. This sequence of events will only be successful if the D&D planner understands the connections between steps and how the decision-making apparatus works. There is a similar process when choosing to carry out a terrorist attack and a terrorist with an innate understanding of American culture will be ideally placed to carry out operations meant to elicit precise responses from the American people and policy-makers in Washington.

The second half of this "value added" is the benefit of being taught by former U.S. military personnel and instructors who are familiar with that style and those TTPs. Many of the courses fit this model and could be teaching the adversary exactly what to expect from the U.S. military and its coalition partners. Battles may not be exactly like

chess matches, but if you can decipher the style of your opponent, you will obtain the ability to see their next moves before they make them and thus, come one step closer to checkmate. By understanding how the military will react in any number of situations, insurgents can adapt their moves to counter. This is a critical issue for American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, but it would also be a boon to terrorist groups operating in other parts of the world.

## CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

### SUMMARY

As international terrorist training camps come under more scrutiny with the Global War on Terrorism, they will need to develop new ways to avoid detection while maintaining standards for their members. The United States military and its allies are targeting such camps in places like Pakistan and Iraq to eliminate the threat that they pose to the world at large. Thus, this thesis proposed that a new terrorist training paradigm would be sought.

A brief study of terrorist groups was commenced using literary sources, as well as *The Manchester Document*, a seized al-Qaida manual. These investigations provided a list of terrorist training requirements, an overview of their camps, as well as assessments of their organizational adaptability and practices. A “red team” approach provided the terrorist perspective and laid the groundwork upon which an evaluation of training options could be conducted.

It was hypothesized that a new iteration in the terrorist training paradigm would capitalize on the freedoms enjoyed in the United States by exploiting privately owned third-party training courses. These courses exist in abundance in the U.S. and can be found using open source search engines on the Internet. They range from simple survival instruction, to weapons training, hand-to-hand combat, and paramilitary or tactical programs. Not only are these courses available to the general public, but the vast majority have lax security practices requiring nothing more than an application and a check.

Although there is ample opportunity for terrorists to train in the United States, a cost/benefit analysis was performed to determine whether it was in their interest to do so. Some points were made in favor of running their own camps abroad including, control over the training curriculum, indoctrination and radicalization, unity and camaraderie amongst members, and denying access to outsiders by operating in remote areas.

Yet, these pros were countered with a host of detractions. Camps are heavily targeted by the U.S. military and its partners. This means not only destruction of the site, but also loss of weapons, training props, and potentially the lives of trainees. Once a site has been discovered, the area around it cannot be reused, as it will be monitored more closely, and multiple hits on training grounds may make potential recruits reluctant to attend. These points are in addition to every day operational hurdles and security challenges. Financing operations, obtaining weapons, and maintaining skilled instructors are complicated by strict rules about familiarity between participants and connections that can be made between them down the road. The difficulties faced in running camps are steep and must be weighed against the potential virtues of using third-party companies.

Privately owned third-party courses would not provide ideology or a precisely tailored curriculum, but they would allow individuals to train “under the radar” and add the value of cultural knowledge. By training in the United States there would be no “red flag” for travel to countries known to host terrorist organizations and their training camps and thus group members would not raise suspicions or provide any reason for further scrutiny. The courses are legal and open to the public, thanks to avid defense of the Second Amendment by American domestic militants, so again, no flags would be raised.

A final, and critical, argument for in-country training is the added benefits of immersion in American culture and taking instruction from persons familiar with U.S. military TTPs. Using the Muslim principles of *taqiyya* and *kitman*, terrorists and potential terrorists may hide their true identity and seek to blend in with the rest of society. An understanding of cultural practices will aid this endeavor and may also prove influential in the planning of future attacks. This latter point becomes even more prescient with regard to learning military tactics and their usefulness on the battlefield. Terrorists taught by former U.S. military personnel or persons with experience in the field, will give them a deadly edge when preparing to fight U.S. soldiers overseas. The sum of these arguments, if combined with the adaptability of terrorist groups, provides a very interesting, and potentially dangerous picture.

## CONCLUSIONS

It would be very possible for terrorists to shift their training paradigm from their own heavily targeted camps to the use of privately owned third-party courses in the United States. Furthermore, it is in their best interest to do so:

U.S. military planners and counterterrorism experts ... speculate that future terrorist and asymmetric opponents will strive to create far looser and more broadly distributed networks, groups of cells that have a high degree of individual independence and survivability and that do not have rigid hierarchies, headquarters, or physical facilities that can be located and attacked.<sup>71</sup>

It cannot be assessed at this time whether they have attempted any change in this direction or whether they will, but there are considerable reasons how they absolutely could and why the benefits would outweigh the costs.

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<sup>71</sup> Cordesman, 85-86.

The challenges of running camps in countries that are well known for hosting terrorist groups and avoiding detection and destruction must take their toll. By using widely available courses in the U.S., members will cease to have links to each other through training, they will raise fewer “red flags” for suspicious international travel, and they will be better placed to *deny* that paramilitary training is occurring at all.

Programs exist with a plethora of options that include the range of skills desired by terrorists, both for “freelancers” and individual cells as well as for insurgents. Taking notes from former U.S. military instructors will further aid their fight against the U.S. and its coalition partners in guiding tactics and targeting. While living in the U.S., trainees can immerse themselves in American culture, bolster their deceptions of *taqiyya* and *kitman*, and avoid detection by U.S. and international law enforcement agencies.

## IMPLICATIONS

Should terrorist organizations adopt the practice of using privately owned third-party training courses instead of their own camps, the results could be devastating for the United States and others wishing to quell the upsurge in terrorism. Consequences would run the gamut from difficulty in tracking terrorists, superior fighters on the battlefield, enemies that know U.S. or allied tactics and weapons systems, and the potential for sleeper cells with significant training within the U.S. These are not implications to be taken lightly as they might result in deaths and, in the extreme, U.S. defeat.

The first consideration in such an event would be the absence of terrorist training camps to take down. As of now, the U.S. and its allies continue to search for facilities housing large groups of terrorists and use this as the primary method toward destroying

terrorist infrastructure. Should groups abolish their own camps, there would be no visible training apparatus to target or dismantle and the entire organization might become even more ephemeral than it is today. In a 2002 *Washington Quarterly* article, Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev discuss whether organizations like al-Qaida need a physical base of operations and postulate that they may adapt to a completely global model.<sup>72</sup> Should this occur, the current primary method of disrupting terrorist networks would be obsolete and the U.S. would be forced to rely solely on less tangible means.

Terrorists who have been trained in the United States by companies open to the public would be significantly harder to track. First, they would no longer have the “red flags” used in the past to identify them. Indicators like trips to Pakistan or Sudan would be nonexistent and once in the U.S. they need not leave to train. Second, there will be fewer visible connections between terrorists, particularly if Harvey Kushner’s “freelancer” model develops. Training may take place on an individual basis and communications kept to a minimum. Since no organized camps or long distance travel are necessary, members need only understand the training requirements and find programs that offer the right courses. Not only will this make them trickier to root out, but it also may lay the groundwork for sleeper cells within the U.S. that can exist below the radar for years. There is an Arab parable about a shopkeeper who is wronged by a man in the next village and waits forty years to get his revenge. When he does, his friends ask, “Why the rush?” The American notion of instant gratification does not have the same sort of parallel in Arab culture; freelancers in particular may train and remain in the U.S. until the opportune moment.

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<sup>72</sup> Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev, “Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?” *The Washington Quarterly* 25, Iss. 3 (Summer 2002): 97.

Funding may also become much more difficult to follow. Trails currently leading from charities through money laundering operations and shell companies to terrorist organizations abroad will cease to be the only route. While those methods will continue to sponsor the parent group and fund actual operations, sending money to members for training may circumvent the system. Charities can give grants or loans to individuals for personal expenses in the name of helping Muslims toward socioeconomic advancement. Such charities, if utilized correctly, could maintain a “clean” image and record as none of the proceeds, even those used by individuals, would be traceable to terrorist organizations.

The second overall consideration of a shift in the terrorist training paradigm is that terrorist may be far better trained, especially in U.S. tactics, systems, and even culture. No doubt their own camps teach what they believe to be necessary skills for terrorist activities and insurgent operations, yet they are still training within their own mental “box.” Learning at courses within the U.S., possibly even taught by former U.S. military personnel, will expose them to our TTPs or tactics, techniques and procedures. If one uses the D&D dynamic as a model, the loss of sources and methods will result in an increased ability of the adversary to counter U.S. operations. In this case, by understanding how the U.S. fights and how it will react in any given situation, the terrorist will be able to adapt his own techniques to best oppose even a superior military force. Training in the U.S. will also increase the adversary’s knowledge of U.S. and allied weapons and communications systems, allowing them to prepare for attacks and possibly avoid detection by exploiting any weaknesses.



The battlefield is not the only place where increased understanding of the U.S. may be applied. By living and training in the U.S., terrorists or potential terrorists will familiarize with American culture and society. Not only will this improve their efforts at taqiyya and kitman, but it will also focus the planning of future terrorist attacks by targeting core infrastructure or places considered emotionally important to the American people. By definition, terrorism is that which instills terror and elicits a particular response from the target government or people. An adversary can only expect a certain outcome when they understand the processes that feed it. An intimate awareness of what drives the links in the See-Think-Do cognitive chain will buoy effectiveness of attacks and cripple U.S. potential for response.

Knowing the penchant of terrorist organizations for exploiting the media to their own ends, a tangent result of terrorist training within the U.S. may be a future PSYOP against the American people or a verbal attack on U.S. credibility. Public rhetoric may be leveraged to shame the U.S. and win a psychological victory if it were exposed that America trained its enemy in the tactics used to defeat itself. Although the direct effects of this training may seem more decisive, a campaign of this nature could further diminish the faith that the rest of the world has in the sole remaining super power to patrol even within its own borders. Any damage to U.S. credibility could greatly impair its ability to carry out operations against terrorists across the globe by diminishing cooperation with allies and friendly nations.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

As this thesis shows, the dangers of disregarding the adaptive capabilities of the current terrorist threat may prove disastrous. Although monitoring of flight schools only came to the fore following the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, paramilitary and weapons training courses could be handled differently and thus prevent dire outcomes. The success of such operations depends on close coordination between local and federal law enforcement, encouraging independent monitoring, and strengthening the lenient security requirements of programs. Detailed here are five recommendations for law enforcement and intelligence professionals to better address the issue of terrorist training within American borders.

First, there must be a national database of survival, weapons, and paramilitary training courses in the United States. Monitoring should not be limited to camps and seminars organized by individual groups for their own members only – like those of the various militias. Although this is an important aspect of controlling domestic militant extremism, it ignores a large portion of training opportunities. Not only would a registry allow law enforcement to keep track of the popularity of such training, but it would also simplify any investigation once a connection with a terrorist group or individual has been made. There are many non-profit organizations, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center and Militia Watchdog, which engage in some of these monitoring activities, but they must be integrated into a more formidable network and listings with central coordination and foundation in law enforcement.

Likewise, such coordination should not be limited to the federal level. The FBI is notorious for keeping its investigations and collection closely guarded; yet it must

cooperate with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) *and* local area officials if threats are to be averted.

Further, this exchange must not be unidirectional. This second recommendation is already being undertaken to a certain extent in the context of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), but it is being almost entirely promoted as information and intelligence sharing between federal government and, more specifically, Intelligence Community (IC) agencies. This approach will not be adequate for training courses because of their local nature. Therefore, sharing must extend to the local level where Sheriff's offices and Chiefs of Police may act with authority.

A third recommendation is to enact legislation that would outline uniform security protocols and mandatory reporting requirements for all levels of private military and weapons training programs. Standards would be graduated based on the type of course in question; minimal prerequisites for survival courses, criminal and psychological background checks for weapons training, and full background checks as well as complete personal information for any tactical or paramilitary-esque training. If a waiting period is necessary to buy a weapon, it should be necessary when learning the most effective way to use one. In all cases, course organizers would need proof of identification of the individual and payment in the form of a check or credit card. None of these obligations should be overly taxing to the companies running such courses, but would prove invaluable to tracking individuals engaged in significant training activities.

The fourth recommendation may prove somewhat controversial, but considering the main threat, it must at least be mentioned. As noted earlier, Islamist terrorists use the notions of *taqiyya* and *kitman* to blend in with society and assume whatever persona is

necessary to complete their mission or protect their life. Thus, they may appear as American (and potentially non-Muslim) as any other person both in word and deed. This means the only way of distinguishing may be a certain degree of ethnic or racial profiling. In the current political and social climate one must tread very carefully when using such terms and even more so in acting upon them, yet their utility in uncovering a movement that is predominantly Arab cannot be neglected. Harvey Kushner makes a more emphatic argument on this behalf stating:

The only explanation as to why we continue to ignore the secret Islamic terror network in America is that the demands of political correctness have made us so afraid of being branded racists that we force ourselves to be color blind, identity blind, and gender blind till we end up, quite simply, totally blind.<sup>73</sup>

The point here is not that people should be suspicious of all Arabs or all Muslims since the overwhelming majority are not guilty of any crime. Judging people based solely on one characteristic, whether it be race, gender or religion, is not only bigoted, but it also makes for deficient police work. Yet, one cannot deny facts and trends – if a criminal was cited as a tall blond man, those fitting that description would get pulled in for questioning – the same should go for Arab men.

The fifth and final recommendation is directed at a very specialized portion of the Intelligence Community: the denial and deception analyst. If the paradigm shift outlined above occurs, terrorists will be trading tactical D&D, for a larger denial operation; namely, denying that any training is taking place at all. The IC is continually trying to develop its D&D analysis capabilities and more and more analysts have been exposed to its methodology. As these numbers increase, so too will the benefits to the entire

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<sup>73</sup> Kushner, *Holy War on the Home Front*, 165.

community, in particular in the identification of D&D operations and trends. Although indicators of a training modification may exist in other areas (as suggested in greater detail below), the D&D analyst is best suited to recognize anomalies in terrorist group activity and therefore to highlight changes. By stressing the importance of D&D analysis, the issue will be viewed from a very different perspective than that applied by traditional intelligence analysts and so will provide greater insight and potentially more warning.

### **UNANSWERED QUESTIONS...**

During the course of the thesis it has become apparent that although some questions have been answered, many more require significantly more attention. Four areas have been identified in particular for further study, each highlighting a different aspect of the issues that this thesis touched upon. First, a more in-depth look should be taken of the relationship between privately owned third-party courses and the militia movement. As noted in Chapter 2: Literature Review, above, there is a good deal of scholarship on militant extremists in the United States, but much of the information on militias and training could be updated to reflect recent developments. Furthermore, it would be interesting to interview members of these groups to discover how many utilize private courses that are not sponsored by their own affiliated organizations and how many run their own that are open to the public. The link between the two would have more local law enforcement implications than strategic, but it may be possible to decipher national trends and areas of concentration for such activities.

Second, this thesis would benefit from surveys to both the law enforcement community and the owners and operators of survival and weapons training facilities. Both received a preliminary look to determine the likelihood of terrorist exploitation and the extent to which law enforcement had a presence in the area, but a much more detailed assessment would show precise chinks in the armor and give government officials and legislators hard numbers from which to work.

The original hypothesis for this study involved looking at privately owned third-party training courses *abroad*. Specifically, and most dangerously, the mercenary programs that exist in places like South Africa and are often taught by former military personnel. Although this topic was discussed with U.S. military officers with second- or third-hand knowledge of such endeavors, it was deemed too difficult to collect on. Regardless, it is a very important body of research because of the weighty strategic repercussions for the United States, especially when the U.S. is involved militarily in developing or struggling countries. A project such as the one suggested here would likely be best carried out from South Africa or another country identified as having mercenary training programs. While the hurdles are somewhat daunting, the payoff to U.S. situational awareness would be immense.

The final unanswered question is the culmination of this thesis and would be the logical next step if only there were more time to undertake it; *are* terrorists exploiting privately owned third-party training courses in the U.S.? This thesis describes *how* they might train this way and, more importantly, *why* it is in their best interest to do so, but it does not uncover *if* they are. As far as could be uncovered, no one either in the U.S. government or the private sector is looking at this issue and that may be a serious lapse in

judgment. This concern should not be neglected due to a lack of imagination in the same way that flight schools were ignored before September 11<sup>th</sup>. Annex 3, below, provides a research model for an indicator-based assessment of the terrorist training paradigm and how one might determine if a shift has occurred. It is by no means complete, but hopefully will lay the groundwork for an in-depth examination of terrorist use of third-party training.

**ANNEX 1:  
EXAMPLES OF STATE STATUTES ON PARAMILITARY TRAINING**

**ANNEX 1A: CALIFORNIA § 11460 PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS**

(a) Any two or more persons who assemble as a paramilitary organization for the purpose of practicing with weapons shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars (\$1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.

As used in this subdivision, "paramilitary organization" means an organization which is not an agency of the United States government or of the State of California, or which is not a private school meeting the requirements set forth in Section 48222 of the Education Code, but which engages in instruction or training in guerrilla warfare or sabotage, or which, as an organization, engages in rioting or the violent disruption of, or the violent interference with, school activities.

(b) (1) Any person who teaches or demonstrates to any other person the use, application, or making of any firearm, explosive, or destructive device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, knowing or having reason to know or intending that these objects or techniques will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in the furtherance of a civil disorder, or any person who assembles with one or more other persons for the purpose of training with, practicing with, or being instructed in the use of any firearm, explosive, or destructive device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, with the intent to cause or further a civil disorder, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars (\$1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.

Nothing in this subdivision shall make unlawful any act of any peace officer or a member of the military forces of this state or of the United States, performed in the lawful course of his or her official duties.

(2) As used in this section:

(A) "Civil disorder" means any disturbance involving acts of violence which cause an immediate danger of or results in damage or injury to the property or person of any other individual.

(B) "Destructive device" has the same meaning as in Section 12301.

(C) "Explosive" has the same meaning as in Section 12000 of the Health and Safety Code.

(D) "Firearm" means any device designed to be used as a weapon, or which may readily be converted to a weapon, from which is expelled a projectile by the force of any explosion or other form of combustion, or the frame or receiver of this weapon.

(E) "Peace officer" means any peace officer or other officer having the powers of arrest of a peace officer, specified in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2.



**ANNEX 1B: PENNSYLVANIA § 5515: PROHIBITING OF PARAMILITARY TRAINING.**

(a) Definitions. – As used in this section the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:

"Civil disorder."

Any public disturbance involving acts of violence by assemblages of three or more persons, which causes an immediate danger of or results in damage or injury to the property or person of any other individual.

"Explosive or incendiary device."

Includes:

- dynamite and all other forms of high explosives;
- any explosive bomb, grenade, missile or similar device; and
- any incendiary bomb or grenade, fire bomb or similar device, including any device which:
  - consists of or includes a breakable container including a flammable liquid or compound and a wick composed of any material which, when ignited, is capable of igniting such flammable liquid or compound; and
  - can be carried or thrown by one individual acting alone.

"Firearm."

Any weapon which is designed to or may readily be converted to expel any projectile by the action of an explosive; or the frame or receiver of any such weapon.

"Law enforcement officer."

Any officer or employee of the United States, any state, any political subdivision of a state or the District of Columbia and such term shall specifically include, but shall not be limited to, members of the National Guard, as defined in 10 U.S.C. 101(9), members of the organized militia of any state or territory of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or the District of Columbia, not included within the definition of National Guard as defined by 10 U.S.C. 101(9) and members of the armed forces of the United States.

(b) Prohibited training. –

Whoever teaches or demonstrates to any other person the use, application or making of any firearm, explosive or incendiary device or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, knowing or having reason to know or intending that same will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.

Whoever assembles with one or more persons for the purpose of training with, practicing with or being instructed in the use of any firearm, explosive or incendiary device or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, said person intending to employ unlawfully the same for use in or in furtherance of a civil disorder commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.

(c) Exemptions.--Nothing contained in this section shall make unlawful any act of any law enforcement officer which is performed in the lawful performance of his official duties.

(d) Excluded activities.--Nothing contained in this section shall make unlawful any activity of the Game Commission, Fish and Boat Commission, or any law enforcement agency, or any hunting club, rifle club, rifle range, pistol range, shooting range or other program or individual instruction intended to teach the safe handling or use of firearms, archery equipment or other weapons or techniques employed in connection with lawful sports or other lawful activities.

**ANNEX 1C: FLORIDA § 790.29: PARAMILITARY TRAINING**

(1) This act shall be known and may be cited as the "State Antiparamilitary Training Act."

(2) As used in this section, the term "civil disorder" means a public disturbance involving acts of violence by an assemblage of three or more persons, which disturbance causes an immediate danger of, or results in, damage or injury to the property or person of any other individual within the United States.

(3)(a) Whoever teaches or demonstrates to any other person the use, application, or making of any firearm, destructive device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, knowing or having reason to know or intending that the same will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder within the United States, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(b) Whoever assembles with one or more persons for the purpose of training with, practicing with, or being instructed in the use of any firearm, destructive device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, intending to unlawfully employ the same for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder within the United States, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(4) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit any act of a law enforcement officer which is performed in connection with the lawful performance of his or her official duties or to prohibit the training or teaching of the use of weapons to be used for hunting, recreation, competition, self-defense or the protection of one's person or property, or other lawful use.

**ANNEX 2A:  
APPLICATION FORM FOR FORMAL TRAINING COMPANY:  
FRONT SIGHT FIREARMS TRAINING INSTITUTE**

**The Comfort of *Skill at Arms* Awaits You at Front Sight...**

**Application for Instruction**

Due to the time required to complete your criminal background check, **Front Sight must receive your completed application with payment in full at least two weeks before your selected course dates.** Front Sight reserves the right to deny training to anyone for any reason. In the event that an application is not accepted, the course fee will be promptly refunded in full.

**APPLICANT INFORMATION**

Full Legal Name \_\_\_\_\_  
 Current Email \_\_\_\_\_  
 Current Address \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone \_\_\_\_\_  
 E-mail address \_\_\_\_\_  
**IMPORTANT ITEM: PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY** \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address for correspondence in event of an emergency \_\_\_\_\_  
 Name of your current employer (if you are currently employed) \_\_\_\_\_  
 I am currently attending courses with other firearms \_\_\_\_\_

**COURSE SELECTION**

Please indicate the course you are applying for by writing the appropriate description, length, date, and cost in the section below.  
 Course Name \_\_\_\_\_  
 Make me a course in \_\_\_\_\_  
 Course Fee/Amount Due \_\_\_\_\_  
 For administrative purposes, an application must be completed for each course. For those wishing to reserve more than one course, a duplicate copy of this application for each course is acceptable.

**CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK**

Front Sight requires a criminal background check as part of your application process. A \$50 processing fee (payable to Front Sight) is added to this invoice. Please provide a Credit Card number to allow Front Sight to process your application.  
 Credit Card Number \_\_\_\_\_

**STATEMENT OF NO CRIMINAL RECORD, MENTAL ILLNESS, OR SUBSTANCE ABUSE**

By my signature on this application, I state that I have no criminal convictions, am not currently under indictment or prosecution for any offense, and am not wanted for questioning or arrest by any law enforcement or government agency. I further state that I have no history of mental illness or substance abuse. I understand that my training may be terminated at any time during the course if my actions are not deemed appropriate by Front Sight's staff. Upon arriving at the course, I agree to sign a document releasing Front Sight Firearms Training Institute from any liability that may occur during the course of training or thereafter. I understand that my tuition is non-refundable without 60 days advance notice of cancellation.  
 Applicant Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

**CHARACTER WITNESS STATEMENT**

The following Character Witness Statement must be completed and signed by a respected member of the applicant's community who has known the applicant for at least five years and is not a member of the applicant's immediate family.  
 Character Witness Full Name \_\_\_\_\_  
 Address \_\_\_\_\_  
 Telephone \_\_\_\_\_  
 Signature \_\_\_\_\_

**Front Sight Firearms Training Institute**

P.O. Box 2619, Aptos, CA 95001 Phone: 1-800-987-7719 Fax: (631) 884-2137 e-mail: info@frontsight.com www.frontsight.com

**ANNEX 2B:  
APPLICATION FORM FOR IRREGULAR TRAINING COMPANY:  
GLOBAL SURVIVAL INSTITUTE**

**APPLICATION**

Please print

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Age: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
Private Class enrolling For: \_\_\_\_\_ Desired start date: \_\_\_\_\_  
Home Address: \_\_\_\_\_  
City: \_\_\_\_\_ State: \_\_\_\_\_ Zip Code: \_\_\_\_\_  
Home Phone Number: \_\_\_\_\_ Emergency Number: \_\_\_\_\_  
Your Occupation: \_\_\_\_\_ List any allergies: \_\_\_\_\_  
Physical limitations: \_\_\_\_\_ Email Address: \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTE: PAYMENTS ARE NOW REQUIRED VIA PAYPAL SO YOU MUST LIST AN EMAIL ADDRESS  
OR YOUR APPLICATION WILL NOT BE APPROVED. IF A CLASS IS CANCELLED YOU WILL BE  
AUTOMATICALLY PLACED INTO THE NEXT CLASS - NO REFUNDS**

**WAIVER AND RELEASE**

At all classes, demonstrations and fieldwork conducted by the Global Survival Institute (hereinafter GSI) reasonable care is taken to prevent serious injuries and minimize accidents. The student states that he/she is fully aware of the fact that all aspects of survival training, even under the safest conditions possible, may be dangerous, and the student hereby agrees to accept full responsibility and assume all risks, including those caused by acts of God, of injury, death, and/or loss to his/her person and/or property knowingly and voluntarily. The student agrees to obey the rules and regulations that GSI puts into effect to minimize these risks.

The student knowingly, voluntarily, and irrevocably waives any and all past, present, and/or future claims, demands, and causes of action which the student now has or may have in the future against all officers, employees, agents, instructors, assistant instructors, administrators, or any provider of facilities or equipment while on any premises where GSI survival training is being conducted, for any and all past, present, and/or future injuries, death, or loss, including those caused by acts of God, received while participating in the activities conducted by GSI as a student, participant, spectator, and or visitor, or in any other manner or form taking part in the exercises, practice, excursions, and/or demonstrations of said survival, tracking, and related skill training.

The student certifies he/she is physically capable to participate in the said survival, tracking, awareness and related skills training program despite the rigors and dangers inherent in such an undertaking. The student accepts full responsibility for any injury, death, and/or loss to his/her person or property, including those caused by acts of God, for the rigors and dangers inherent in this undertaking. The student releases to GSI rights to use any photographs or video taken while participating in any GSI survival classes to be used as deemed necessary by GSI, including advertising.

**Student Signature:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Signature of parent/guardian if minor:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

**FAX APPLICATION TO CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS  
FAX: 888-602-9877**

**ANNEX 3:  
THE POTENTIAL FOR TERRORIST EXPLOITATION OF PRIVATELY  
OWNED THIRD-PARTY PARAMILITARY TRAINING COURSES:  
AN INDICATOR-BASED RESEARCH MODEL**

Excerpt from: Benson, Kara, *ANA630 Final Paper*, National Defense Intelligence College, 7 November 2006.

There are three key scenarios that can be expected from the availability of third party training to terrorists; a complete shift in training program, a partial shift including some elements of private training courses and some time at terrorist camps, and a maintenance of the status quo or no change in training structure. The first scenario would be mean a complete abandonment of all current terrorist training camps and a full reliance on privately owned third-party courses. The second scenario, involving a measured switch may be broken down into two sub-scenarios. The new regimen could use third-party programs only for tactical weapons training and the like, while existing camps will continue to provide ideological radicalization and group cohesion. It could also use US courses only for “pre-members,” those persons wishing to join the terrorist organization, or brand new, and therefore “clean,” members. Either case will decrease the size and need for terrorist-run camps, but not preclude their existence altogether. The final scenario is the most straight forward, a maintenance of the status quo and no concerted effort to use private programs. These three scenarios will not only manifest themselves in different ways, they may have grave implications for the United States and its allies.

Determining the trends in terrorist training will be a difficult process in that all three scenarios mentioned above use the same indicators: existence of traditional training camps, student populations in US training courses, shifts in insurgent tactics and the

nature of terrorist attacks, and the evolution of certain terrorist rhetoric. Yet these indicators will exist in varying degrees and it is this measurement that will reveal the terrorist intent. Although other factors may influence the indicators, if used in combination, a comprehensive picture of the current terrorist training paradigm should be decipherable.

The two primary indicators are likely to manifest themselves simultaneously and will be the first observations to signify a trend. Traditional terrorist camps are known to exist around the world, particularly in Pakistan, parts of Northwestern India, the Philippines, Palestinian-controlled Gaza, and more recently, Sudan.<sup>74</sup> By applying the collection resources already devoted to the discovery of such camps and the history of camps in a particular area, analysts will be able to determine whether they still exist, have shrunk in size, or have disappeared altogether. Imagery (IMINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) will be particularly important in effectively recognizing changes to current terrorist training centers. The scenarios apply directly to the existence of traditional camps; no camps means the first scenario, a complete shift, is correct; smaller camps, particularly ones either with little weapons and tactical training or only older members, signifies a partial shift to private courses as seen in scenario two; and no change in camp size or education topics would support the status quo hypothesis.

The other primary indicator, that of US paramilitary training course attendance, must be used in conjunction with traditional training camp intelligence to rule out advanced denial and deception (D&D) practices that may hide the camps more effectively from US sensors. US programs may be monitored through open source

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<sup>74</sup> Dumnigan, "Where Islamic Terrorist Training Camps Still Thrive," *Strategy Page Online: Dirty Little Secrets*, 3 August 2005, <[www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/200583234258.asp](http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/200583234258.asp)>, accessed 31 October 2006.

intelligence (OSINT) although liaison relationships with local law enforcement and non-governmental organizations, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center,<sup>75</sup> will significantly aid the collection effort. An increase in the number of students attending or seeking to attend weapons training and tactical warfare courses, particularly a significant increase in Arab and Muslim students will be a tip-off that a shift has occurred. If no change is monitored, then it can fairly be determined that terrorists continue to train themselves.

Again, these two primary indicators must be used in close combination as they may be influenced by other factors and therefore would give a false impression. In addition, tracking changes to US training courses will probably not be able to distinguish between the first two scenarios, a complete and a partial switch, since the number of terrorists is unknown. It will be hard enough to decide what "significant" change in student numbers at US courses is without trying to determine what connotes partial use and what is complete reliance. Therefore, neither statistic alone will reliably indicate a shift in the terrorist training paradigm.

The third indicator will only be measurable after recruits have gone through the training apparatus and had the chance to prove themselves operationally. A shift in insurgent tactics and the nature of terrorist attacks may give away their US training. Just as one can determine one army from another based solely upon the weapons they are comfortable with and the tactics they use to approach an environment, so too can US training be identified when used by terrorists in violent conflicts. This data can be collected only through HUMINT and debriefing of US military personnel, but may also

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<sup>75</sup> The Southern Poverty Law Center monitors hate groups and extremist activities within the United States, including weapons training programs used by such people. Their website is provided here <[www.splcenter.org/index.jsp](http://www.splcenter.org/index.jsp)>.



be measurable in success of insurgent operations against US or coalition forces. Terrorist attacks may also be more deadly if terrorist understand US culture and government responses better. There is the same difficulty in distinguishing between a full shift in training and a partial shift as mentioned above for the US courses indicator. Although it should be clear if the status quo is maintained, other factors contributing to terrorists' increased battlefield success must be taken into account if an accurate picture is to be had.

The final indicator is also the one that gives the least amount of time in which to act. Public rhetoric may be a valuable tool in determining current training trends. In this case, the US may be able to use the terrorists' desire to shame America and its allies to its own advantage. Speeches released through open source media are likely to allude to their skill in getting the US to train its own enemies, or claims of cultural knowledge obtained first-hand. Such boasts of superiority are common in terrorist rhetoric as part of their support comes from being the David to slay the US Goliath. Such phrases would indicate training of terrorists within the US, although close interpretation might be able to distinguish between the first and second scenarios, which would be a boon to United States intelligence analysts and policymakers.

All four indicators may be used to determine where terrorist groups are training their members. The first, and most reliable, indicator is the persistence or disappearance of traditional terrorist training camps. US intelligence and liaison agencies already track such camps, so trends in their size, and training regimen may be combined with synchronized intelligence analysis of the other three indicators. When used in conjunction, these observations should reveal any shifts in the terrorist training apparatus.

Although these indicators are unique to the issue and will go far in aiding analysts, it must be remembered that they can be influenced by other factors and they cannot measure the future. Only what is occurring at the moment or what trends seem to be developing will be identified since intentions will be impossible to decipher beyond HUMINT collection and hearsay. Other indicators may be used to strengthen analysis of the potential training shift: fewer 'red flags' of visits to countries with known terrorist camps for captured terrorists (determined after the fact), increased visa applications from states that sponsor terrorism and decreased weapons shipments, especially ammunition, to known areas of terrorist training. These are not unique indicators and therefore should never be used as primary analysis tools, but may help in clarifying the picture of terrorist training. All of the aforementioned factors must be taken into account since the implications of such a terrorist training paradigm shift are potentially so severe for the United States and its allies that they must not be ignored.

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