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Cuba

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Abstract

This dissertation grew from the long history of Christian missionaries in Cuba and the rapidly changing political environment in Cuba as well as the recent U.S. responses. Within the research and literature on the role of missionaries in Cuba, a wide gap in the analysis exists regarding how the missionary work is affecting policy outcomes of the U.S. embargo of Cuba and how the embargo is affecting the work of the missionaries. As a result of these faith-based organizations having deep and wide networks within Cuba, providing services to the Cuban people, bringing supplies to the island, and sharing their perspectives with the people, there is likely a significant impact upon the people. This influence could be of significant aid to the U.S. in achieving its policy goals in Cuba, or these NGOs could be undermining U.S. policy intentionally or unintentionally. Therefore, it is critical as a case study to analyze this interaction in Cuba in order to provide a clear direction ahead for the missionaries and how they shape U.S. policy objectives.

This study utilized qualitative research methodology in order to delve more deeply to identify the inner experience of participants. This particular researcher collected significant amounts of information through the interview process with mission participants and pastors. In addition, the research addressed how the missionaries' efforts influenced the embargo, if they helped shape Cuban perceptions, if the missionaries were aware of U.S. policy objectives in Cuba, and if the missionaries were sympathetic to U.S. policy objectives in Cuba. This study found that U.S. missionaries are having a significant effect in achieving U.S. policy objectives. First, U.S. missionaries providing financial assistance and financial training to the Cuban people lays a foundation for increased understanding of capitalism and an increased openness to market reforms.

Secondly, missionaries have changed the Cubans understanding of America. Through open dialogue, providing supplies and moral support, Cubans now view Americans much more favorably and much more as empathetic partners. Finally, missionaries openly share the advantages of democracies and are often questioned by Cuban about the promise of democratic reforms. This leads to an increased desire for political reforms and a hope for an end to the Castro regime by Cubans thus helping to achieve another policy objective of the U.S. embargo.

Dedication

To my Mom and Dad

Acknowledgments

Love and thank you to (b) (6)

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The history of the Presbyterian Church's mission work in Cuba is long and well documented. In 1890, a Cuban layman, Evaristo Collazo, asked the Presbyterian Church of the United States (PCUS) Board of Foreign Missions for counsel and oversight for a Christian school and worship services he and his wife Magdalena were holding in their home in Havana.¹ The PCUS Board sent Rev. Antonio Graybill from Mexico to Cuba to work with Collazo. Rev. Graybill began leading the worship services at Collazo's home as well as baptizing adults, organizing the congregation, and ordaining two elders for the session. He then ordained Collazo to the ministry and installed him as pastor. Graybill and Collazo then traveled to Santa Clara, Cuba, to begin church planting and opened a Christian school. Thus began the Cuba-Presbyterian Church missionary partnership that continues today. During the late 1890s a continual stream of Presbyterian missionaries entered Cuba building on the foundation of Collazo's work. Collazo joined the PCUSA work in Havana under the Board of National Missions. In 1900, Rev. Robert Wharton led Presbyterian mission work in Cardenas and organized a school that grew into Colegio La Progresiva. In addition, at this time Presbyterian missionaries established and governed a network of schools and medical clinics throughout Cuba.

U.S. foreign policy decisions directly affected the growth of the Presbyterian Church in Cuba. A telling example of this nexus occurred when Wharton was establishing La Progresiva, strong expansionist fervor engulfed the U.S. As described by inter-American relations Professor Lars Schoultz, with many pushing for the annexation

¹ Cuban Partnership, "The History of the Cuban Partnership," <http://www.cubapartnership.org/index.php/partnership-manual?start=7> (accessed January 5, 2013).

of Cuba, the McKinley administration resisted this popular urge for two reasons: first, because of the pressure exercised by the sugar beet lobby, and second, due to the opposition of the Democratic Party.² As a result, the U.S. established administrative rule over Cuba in 1899 with the objective as described by British historian Hugh Thomas, to “set the Cubans on their feet and to leave the island as soon as this was accomplished.”³ However, as Spanish and Latin American Professor Helen Osieja wrote in her dissertation, McKinley opted for a middle ground to annexation by granting independence to Cuba while at the same time establishing control of the island by the U.S. through the Platt Amendment.⁴

The Platt Amendment, which passed the U.S. Senate in 1901 and was integrated into the Cuban Constitution of 1902, outlined this new role of the U.S. in Cuba and the Caribbean. The first stipulation of the amendment prevented Cuba from entering into any treaty or agreement with any foreign power, which would “impair” the independence of Cuba.⁵ In addition, the U.S. asserted the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence; for the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty; and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States. As a result of these foreign policy

² Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States – A History of U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988), 1.

³ Hugh Thomas, *Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode Publishers, 1971), 438.

⁴ Helen Osieja, *Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the U.S. Embargo against Cuba* (Boca Raton, FL: American University of London, 2005), 27.

⁵ Thomas, *Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom*, 28.

changes and the U.S. forcing a closer relationship with Cuba, the U.S. government fully supported and encouraged the activities of U.S. missionaries in Cuba.

As a result, during the early twentieth century, Presbyterian missionary outreach experienced significant growth. In 1904, the Presbyterian Church established the Presbytery of Havana with five pastors and seven congregations. The Presbytery of Havana elected Rev. Collazo as its Moderator in 1906. In 1909, in a move that reflected the growing reach, influence, and effectiveness of the Presbyterian Church's missionary work, the U.S. Congregational Church ended its work in Cuba and transferred its five congregations and ministers to the Presbytery of Havana. This would happen repeatedly with other denominations closing their Cuba missionary operations and transferring their resources to the Presbyterian Church.⁶ Yarmeko mentions that more than 24 Protestant missions from the United States arrived in Cuba after 1898. Since many American missionaries went to Cuba at the same time, it was necessary to have an interdenominational conference in Cienfuegos to impose order on their missionary endeavors.⁷

Both the foreign policy relationship and the ecumenical relationship with Cuba continued relatively unchanged until U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt began the Good Neighbor Policy in 1934, which focused upon non-intervention and non-interference in the domestic affairs of Latin America.⁸ The Roosevelt administration proceeded to open U.S. markets to Cuban sugar growers through trade agreements, thus providing a

⁶ Cuban Partnership, "The History of the Cuban Partnership," <http://www.cubapartnership.org/index.php/partnership-manual?start=7> (accessed January 5, 2013).

⁷ Thomas, *Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom*, 30.

⁸ Stephen G. Rabe, "The Johnson Doctrine," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006): 45.

significant advantage to the Cuban sugar growers but also in effect maintaining U.S. control over the Cuban economy. However, with this change the Presbyterian Church missionaries and activities within Cuba began receiving less indirect U.S. government support. In addition, the Cuban missionaries faced more obstacles to their work as Cuban nationalism increased, the breadth of the U.S. impact decreased, and the Cuban government was increasingly suspicious of foreign actors on Cuban soil.

Then on December 2, 1956, Fidel Castro led 82 rebels from the yacht *Granma* onto Cuban soil. Castro realized his goal of forming an armed resistance movement in the Sierra Maestra Mountains and weakened President Fulgencio Batista's regime. Political science professors Patrick Haney and Walk Vanderbush emphasize that in a reaction to this increased violence, the U.S. imposed an arms embargo on March 14, 1958.⁹ Thus began 55 years of a U.S. embargo on Cuba. During Castro's first few months in power, he tried and executed Batista loyalists. In retaliation, the Eisenhower administration in October 1960 prohibited U.S. oil refineries in Cuba from refining Soviet crude oil, drastically cut the Cuban sugar quota, and imposed an economic embargo on all trade with Cuba except food and medicine.¹⁰

As a result of the impact the revolution and the imposition of the embargo had on the Cuban economy, in 1959-1960 the Presbyterian Church began focusing missionary efforts on the poverty-stricken Orient Province. With over \$100,000 in funding, Presbyterian missionaries in partnership with the Presbytery of Cuba, as it was now

⁹ Patrick J. Haney and Walk Vanderbush, *The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2005), 7.

¹⁰ Haney, *Cuban Embargo*, 15.

called, established health care facilities, education, literacy training, Bible study, and worship services.¹¹ This would be the trend through and up to present day, i.e., Presbyterian missionaries seeking to address the basic humanitarian needs through missionary work and in tandem establishing worship services and Bible study. Castro responded to the U.S. embargo by confiscating all U.S. oil refineries, nationalizing all foreign-owned property, and demanding the U.S. embassy staff be reduced. In considering a response with further economic sanctions, U.S. President Eisenhower was unsure if sanctions would have much impact on Castro, but he pressed on in order to encourage Castro's opponents and to make a statement about U.S. power and credibility.

Eisenhower ended diplomatic relations with Cuba on January 3, 1961, and suspended trade with Cuba, invoking the Trading with the Enemy Act.¹² During the course of these diplomatic negotiations, Eisenhower developed a plan for an invasion of Cuba by trained former nationals. President Kennedy came to office, immediately learned of Eisenhower's task force focusing on a potential invasion of Cuba, and approved of the ongoing planning. The plan advanced and on April 17, 1961, 1,400 Cuban exiles landed in Cuba, but Cuban forces quickly overwhelmed them. This failed U.S.-supported and -initiated challenge to Castro's power increased exponentially the strain between the two governments. It resulted in widespread support and fervor for Castro, increased suspicion of the U.S., and accelerated the growth of the relationship between Castro and the U.S.S.R., thus planting the seeds for the Cuban Missile Crisis.

¹¹ Cuban Partnership, <http://www.cubapartnership.org/index.php/about-the-partnership/40-background-on-the-partnership/75-historical-highlights-of-the-cuban-presbyterian-church> (accessed February 12, 2013).

¹² Haney, *Cuban Embargo*, 16.

Following the breakdown of diplomatic relations, the imposition of an embargo by the U.S., and the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban government confiscated the schools and the clinics of the churches. The embargo not only blocked the flow of goods but also stopped pension payments to retired ministers and halted all aid to the Presbyterian churches and missionaries as well as all normal communication channels and mutual visits.¹³ As a result, the Presbytery of Cuba suffered from bitter internal division, and the departure of many of its members and missionaries. The departure was so great that, by 1964, more than half the ministers and missionaries had left.¹⁴

Following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963, Kennedy prohibited travel to or financial transactions with Cuba by U.S. citizens and in July 1963 he ordered all Cuban assets in the United States to be frozen. When President Johnson came to power, he maintained JFK's focus on Cuba and a hard line regarding the Latin American country. One of Johnson's motivating fears was what H.W. Brandis termed Johnson's "fidelphobia" or fear of another Communist dictator such as Castro taking over another country in the hemisphere. Johnson took the further step of encouraging all Latin American countries to break off diplomatic relations with Cuba, which resulted in only Mexico maintaining a full diplomatic relationship with the island. In order to reduce the possibility of the spread of communism, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann explained this posture in the Mann Doctrine. This further distanced the U.S. diplomatically and economically from Cuba. In addition, as a result of

¹³ Cuban Partnership, <http://www.cubapartnership.org/index.php/about-the-partnership/40-background-on-the-partnership/75-historical-highlights-of-the-cuban-presbyterian-church> (accessed February 12, 2013).

¹⁴ Ibid.

the U.S. persuading other countries to join in distancing themselves diplomatically from Cuba and in enforcing sanctions against the country, the diplomatic and economic isolation of Cuba was profound.

The embargo has had a dramatic impact on Cuban industrial production, especially in the 1960s with the initial imposition of the embargo. Prior to 1959 nearly all machines in Cuba were built and installed by Americans; thus, the scarcity of parts created by the embargo led to production standstills. The Cuban Economic Research Project of 1965 captured this significant challenge, stating:

Nearly sixty-two percent of all Caterpillar Tractors are not in operation due to a lack of spare parts ... forty-seven percent of all wheel tractors are out of order ... there are 200 tractors that are unusable due to a lack of spare tires ... In Camaguey 220 tractors had to be put out of operation due to a lack of spare parts, and another 622 tractors couldn't be used due to a lack of tires.¹⁵

This placed a greater reliance by the Cubans upon the Russians for parts, machinery, and support, which ultimately led to a strengthening of this relationship causing policy and military challenges later on for the U.S.

The structure and fundamentals of the embargo remained static until the mid-1990s. The Helms-Burton Law of March 12, 1996, was a significant addition to the U.S. embargo of Cuba. The broad goal of the Helms-Burton Law was to bring about "a peaceful transition to a representative democracy and market economy in Cuba."¹⁶ Title II of Helms-Burton allows U.S. citizens to bring lawsuits in U.S. courts against foreign

¹⁵ Cuban Economic Research Project, *Stages and Problems of Industrial Development in Cuba* (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1965), 199.

¹⁶ Department of State, Helms-Burton Act, <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cuba/helms-burton-act.html> (accessed March 10, 2013).

firms and individuals who traffic (sell, lease, manage, or purchase) properties confiscated from them by the Castro government. Research Fellow at Tulane University Paolo Spadoni argues that Titles III and IV of Helms-Burton sought to discourage foreign direct investment in Cuba through the threat of extraterritorial sanctions while Title IV allows U.S. authorities to prevent entry into the U.S. to senior officials of those firms and their immediate family members.¹⁷

In order to avoid problems with Helms-Burton, prospective foreign investors now spend considerable time and money performing due diligence to verify that a project does not involve a confiscated property.¹⁸ Cuban officials reported an initial increase in new foreign investors insisting on thorough inquiries into the history of a potential property or asset when Helms-Burton was first passed. However, as time has passed, the enforcement of Title III has been lacking, leading foreign investors to worry less about obtaining “clean” assets.¹⁹

Following Castro’s rise to power, many expropriations of private land and assets occurred within the sugar industry. Thus, the Helms-Burton Law not only disrupted and delayed the flow of foreign financing into Cuba for strategic sectors such as sugar and tobacco but it also provided the grounds for significant claims against foreign firms.²⁰ The existing totality of claims by U.S. sugar companies through Helms-Burton is over \$500 million, which comprises over a quarter of the total Helms-Burton claims. The

¹⁷ Paolo Spadoni, *Failed Sanctions: Why the US Embargo against Cuba Could Never Work* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2010), 98.

¹⁸ Richard Lapper, “Ambiguous Stance Towards Attracting Big Guns,” *Financial Times* (March 24, 1999): 32.

¹⁹ Spadoni, *Failed Sanctions*, 103.

²⁰ United Nations Judicial Yearbook 1997 (New York: United Nations, 2007), 198.

majority of charges were against firms that financed or traded sugar originating in expropriated lands because direct foreign investment was, until 2001, permitted only in the sugar cane derivatives production and not in the raw sugar industry.²¹

As a result of Helms-Burton, however, foreign firms sought a way around the restrictions by creating fiduciary mechanisms that make it much more difficult to establish a connection between foreign investments and expropriated properties. The Cuban government took reactive measures to circumvent the U.S. regulations by passing the Law of Reaffirmation of Cuban Dignity and Sovereignty.²² The law is quite clear in its language in allowing the creating of investment funds to hold disputed properties: “The Government of the Republic of Cuba is empowered to apply or authorize the necessary formulas to protect foreign investors against the application of the Helms-Burton law, including the transfer of the foreign investor’s interests to fiduciary enterprises, financial entities or investment funds.”²³ This legislation resulted in the immediate formation of such entities allowing for an influx of foreign investment, and in turn the funds were invested discreetly with firms having outstanding U.S. claims. Another response was the creation of shell companies in Central America to mask direct foreign assistance.²⁴ This created a circuitous money flow, making it difficult for U.S. regulators to follow. This effectively limited U.S. and Cuban economic dialogue while increasing the mistrust, regulation, investigation, and oversight of the U.S.

²¹ Ibid., 102.

²² Ibid., 104.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., 105.

In 2001, the House of Representatives voted 240-186 to prohibit the Treasury Department from spending money to enforce the travel ban. This was ultimately not included in the Senate version of the Treasury appropriations bill but it does show the sentiment in the House of Representatives. Then, on Cuba Independence Day (May 20) of 2002, President George W. Bush vowed to maintain the embargo and travel restrictions while proposing small changes to the people-to-people contact between the U.S. and Cuba. President Bush named new scholarships for Cubans to study in the U.S., greater aid to Cuban civil society through religious and nongovernmental organizations, a willingness to resume direct mail service between the two countries, and efforts to modernize Radio and TV Marti. The U.S. also began to eliminate bureaucratic hurdles that hindered American aid groups, including faith-based missionary groups, from working in Cuba. Lastly, the Bush administration began providing funding to faith-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) focused upon providing aid to and in Cuba. NGOs have had a long history of engagement in Cuba through providing humanitarian assistance, educational support, and evangelism. However, with Bush's financial support and bureaucratic help these NGOs elevated their presence and activity levels within Cuba.

In the last twelve years, changes in the Marxist state, the Communist Party, and the constitution of the nation dramatically affected the Presbyterian missionaries.²⁵ First, with the Cuban government withdrawing its atheistic character by embracing the visits of religious leaders such as the Pope and allowing for more open religious discussion, this empowered the Presbyterian missionaries to come out of hiding and begin their work

²⁵ World Communion of Reformed Churches, <http://www.wcrc.ch/> (accessed on January 29, 2013).

anew. Second, as a result of the widespread economic hardship within Cuba, the government increased its tolerance for missionary work to meet the dire needs of so many Cubans lacking basic social services. Finally, the Presbyterian missionaries began working more closely together, allowing for a dramatic Presbyterian missionary revival in Cuba.

Need for the Study

There has been extensive research and writing on the U.S. embargo of Cuba, especially focusing on the initiation of the U.S. embargo and its development over time, as well as the economic impact it has had on Cuba. However, researchers have focused little upon the impact faith-based NGOs, including Presbyterian missionaries, have on the U.S. policy objectives of the embargo against Cuba. This thesis provides the U.S. policy-making community a deep understanding of Presbyterian missionary impact on the policy objectives of the Cuban embargo and a path ahead for continued and future NGO partnership to achieve desired foreign policy outcomes in Cuba and elsewhere.

Statement of the Problem

On April 13, 2009, the Obama administration made significant changes to U.S.-Cuban policy. Obama stated that the overall goal of these policy changes was to help make possible a “Cuba that respects basic human, political and economic rights of all its citizens.”²⁶ These changes included lifting all restrictions on transactions related to the travel of family members to Cuba and removing restrictions on remittances to family members in Cuba. In addition, President Obama authorized U.S. telecommunications

²⁶ White House, “Cuban Outreach,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-Reaching-out-to-the-Cuban-people (accessed on January 30, 2013).

network providers to enter into agreements to establish fiber-optic cable and satellite telecommunications facilities linking the United States and Cuba. The U.S. further allowed U.S. telecommunications service providers to enter into roaming service agreements with Cuba's telecommunications service providers. Finally, President Obama added certain humanitarian items to the list of items eligible for export through licensing exceptions.²⁷

President Obama's hope in easing restrictions on private travel to Cuba was that increased travel and interaction would build relationships between the countries while empowering Cubans to think and act as individuals, to see the possibilities of individual action, and to embrace the power of individual autonomy. Obama also ordered new steps to promote the "freer flow of information among the Cuban people and between those in Cuba and the rest of the world, as well as to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian items directly to the Cuban people."²⁸

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton further detailed Obama's Cuba policy objectives on October 27, 2011, stating that the U.S. position "has been the same for more than 50 years. We think Fidel Castro should go. That is the unfortunate commitment that we have put forth over many years." Clinton emphasized the U.S. policy focus as supporting the desire of the Cuban people to determine their future and for the U.S. to help those working toward positive social, political, and humanitarian change. Clinton stated, "we support a wide variety of activities on the island. We interact with a broad cross-section of individuals and groups in Cuban society. And we provide

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

humanitarian assistance, including food, over-the-counter medicines and so much more.”²⁹ The Secretary of State further expressed the U.S. desire for democracy in Cuba and the importance that the country move toward political and market reform.

Little research has been conducted on the impact Presbyterian missionaries in Cuba are having on these current policy objectives detailed by Obama and Clinton. This research involved interviews with Presbyterian missionaries who work in Cuba and with Cuban expatriates working alongside Presbyterian missionaries providing valuable insight into how the Presbyterian missionaries are affecting the U.S. policy outcomes of the embargo.

There are multiple questions of interest that will be posed to interviewees including:

1. How are missionaries affecting the U.S. policy outcomes of the embargo (encouraging the growth of free markets and representative democracy in Cuba through economic sanctions, travel restrictions, and international legal penalties)?
2. How does the U.S. embargo affect Christian missionary activities?
3. How do missionaries influence the Cubans’ desire for social, religious, political, and humanitarian change?
4. Do missionaries influence the perceptions of Cubans of the U.S.?

Purpose of the Study

Within the research and literature on the role of faith-based NGOs in Cuba, a wide gap in the analysis exists regarding how works of NGOs are affecting policy outcomes of the U.S. embargo of Cuba. As a result of these faith-based organizations having deep and wide networks within Cuba, providing services to the Cuban people,

²⁹ White House, “Cuban Outreach,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-Reaching-out-to-the-Cuban-people (accessed on January 30, 2013).

bringing supplies to the island, and sharing their perspectives with the people, there is likely a significant impact upon the people. This influence could be of significant aid to the U.S. in achieving its policy goals in Cuba, or these NGOs could be undermining U.S. policy intentionally or unintentionally. Therefore, it is critical to analyze this interaction in Cuba in order to provide a clear direction ahead for the U.S. government. If the faith-based NGOs with operations in Cuba are helping to achieve U.S. goals, then understanding how they are doing this would be very helpful in providing a template for how the U.S. government might partner with faith-based NGOs in the future to help achieve policy outcomes in other countries. However, if the faith-based NGOs are undermining U.S. policy objectives, then it is essential that the U.S. government be made aware of this and attempt to redirect the work of these NGOs.

Delimitations

The research focused upon Presbyterian Church missionary activities, as these are the activities with which the researcher had the most access. In addition, the Presbyterian denomination has the longest and most extensive tradition and history of missionary work in Cuba when compared with other Christian denominations. As a result, I did not assess the missionary work of the Catholic Church or other Christian denominations. Another reason for the focus upon the Presbyterian Church is that most Protestant denominations, including Presbyterian, base their missionary groups within the U.S. to increase ease of fundraising and exposure due to the number of sympathetic Protestant congregations. The author leveraged journal articles, writings of missionaries, the history of missionaries, interviews with current missionaries, interviews with Cuban expatriates in the U.S., and interviews with Cuban-American pastors. I did not interview Cuban church parishioners

or recipients of the missionary activities, and the sample interview population was limited to eight interviewees.

Methodology

This study utilized qualitative research methodology as it is able to delve deeply to identify the inner experience of participants.³⁰ In addition, the small sample size and the difficulty in reaching out to an unknown population lend themselves toward qualitative research. The researcher sought to understand the experiences and perceptions of the Cuban missionaries in order to fully grasp the impact they have upon the U.S. policy outcomes of the embargo. Within the qualitative research framework, the researcher implemented a grounded theory methodology for this research project largely because grounded theory is an effective design to use when a theory is not available to explain a process.³¹ Grounded theory is especially helpful when current research on a phenomenon is either inadequate or nonexistent as is the case here.³²

Grounded theory focuses on analyzing a situation through empirical research, which involves direct and indirect observation or experience. The researcher can gain empirical evidence and analyze it quantitatively or qualitatively. In most behavioral research endeavors, persons or patients are units of analysis, whereas in grounded theory the unit of analysis is the incident.³³ In grounded theory, a study analyzes multiple

³⁰ Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss, *Basics of Qualitative Research*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2008), 12.

³¹ John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2007), 66.

³² Paul Leedy and Jeanne Ormrod, *Practical Research: Planning and Design*, 9th ed. (Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education Publishing, 2010), 97.

³³ Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 67.

perspectives and incidents, as each interviewee will report many incidents. This particular research collected significant amounts of information through the interview process with mission participants and pastors. The interviews included broad questions intended to explore the breadth and scope of U.S. Christian missionary work. In addition, the research addressed how the missionaries' efforts influenced the embargo, if the missionaries helped shape Cuban perceptions, if they were aware of U.S. policy objectives in Cuba, and if they were sympathetic to U.S. policy objectives in Cuba.

Then the multitude of reported incidents is analyzed and common themes and concepts are identified. In this case, I found the common threads throughout the data and identified theories that are well-grounded in the data. Most grounded theory studies are qualitative since statistical methods are not used and figures are not presented. The result of grounded theory is the identification of relationships or an integrated set of conceptual hypotheses developed from empirical data.³⁴ Validity in its traditional sense is consequently not an issue in grounded theory, which instead should be judged by fit, relevance, workability, and modifiability.³⁵

Definitions of Terms

Margaret Doxey defines sanctions as conformity-defending measures, applied in a framework of social organization to support law or established custom with an understood obligation to obey the norm.³⁶ Doxey notes at the international level the term "sanction" is used to describe a variety of measures that can be applied to states violating

³⁴ Corbin and Strauss, *Basics of Qualitative Research*, 20.

³⁵ Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 70.

³⁶ Margaret Doxey, "Sanctions Revisited," *International Journal* 31, No. 1 (1976): 60.

international obligations. These obligations or agreed norms of conduct and provisions for enforcing or encouraging their observance are found in international treaties and the rulings of international bodies. While the trend toward the codification of international customary law has made this source of international law less important, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has the power to give opinions and judgments in cases referred to it. The weakness of the ICJ is that its judgments are binding only on the parties to the dispute and the Court lacks the capacity to enforce its judgments. Therefore, the use of sanctions became a viable alternative to enforce penalties upon states when the international justice system is unable.

Doxey also believes that a rather loose usage of the term "sanction" is unavoidable in international society, but it is important to distinguish between authorized measures, based on the decision or recommendation of an international body, and non-authorized measures, justified by those who take them (whether unilaterally or in concert) as self-defense or as reprisals.³⁷ Arens and Lasswell add that sanctions are also penalties intended to deter and punish lawbreakers, while in the wider context of society they can be penalties or rewards (negative or positive) designed to support social norms.³⁸

Barber defines sanctions as "economic measures directed to political objectives." He maintains that the constant pressure of rather severe sanctions is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to meet the primary goals that sanctions may serve. Furthermore, sanctions have goals in addition to their primary ones. They may be aimed at sending a

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 58.

³⁸ R. Arens and H.D. Lasswell, "Towards a General Theory of Sanctions," *Iowa Law Review* 17 (1964): 234.

message to the sender's populace or altering the international system. Barber argues that these goals are far more elusive and probably unrelated to the economic stress the sanctions may cause.³⁹

It can be very difficult to determine whether a sanction has been effective or not. Doxey gives two measures to define success. The first measure of effectiveness is whether the international community is united in upholding its sanction against the target country. Part of this first criterion assesses whether or not countries are still trading with the target country, thus undermining the sanctions of the countries. A second measure of effectiveness is clarity on the objective of the sanction and then clarity upon when the sanction achieves that objective.

Morgan, Morgan, and Schwebach address how sanctions affect policy. They use a bargaining model to analyze sanction effectiveness. In both analyses, the authors break down which groups within the target are the most affected by the sanctions and hypothesize that the higher the costs to the target's ruling coalition the more likely it will capitulate. By exploring whom the sanctions hurt the most, the others are able to predict more accurately the sanctions' outcome. These analyses refine the conventional wisdom by asserting that the infliction of economic damage is a necessary requirement for success, but the sanctions must negatively affect the ruling coalition.⁴⁰

According to Hufbauer et al., economic sanctions are financial or trade restrictions used by a state in order to change another nation's policies in some pre-

³⁹ James Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument," *International Affairs* 55, no. 3 (1979): 365-380.

⁴⁰ Gary C. Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, *Economic Sanctions in Support of Foreign Policy Goals* (Washington, DC: Institute of International Economics, 1983), 23.

specified manner. Hufbauer and colleagues used two 4-point scales to measure effectiveness, one for achievement of the policy objective (1 = failure to 4 = success) and one for the contribution the sanctions made toward achieving the objective (1 = no contribution to 4 = sole contributor). Both scales are based on the expert opinions of several scholars regarding each case.⁴¹

Major Components

Chapter I of the study included an introduction of how the U.S. embargo of Cuba developed, a short history of Presbyterian mission work in Cuba, the need for the study, statement of problems and sub-problems, purpose of the study, delimitations, methodology, and definitions of terms. Chapter II reviews the literature relevant to the study. Chapter III explains the methodologies and research design used in the study. Included is a description of the sample, selection process, data collection methods, and data analysis procedures. Chapter IV presents findings from the surveys and interviews, and Chapter V discusses the study's results.

⁴¹ Ibid., 5.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Economic sanctions have long been a foreign policy tool employed by states against other states and non-state actors. As a result, researchers conducted significant analysis on the impact of economic sanctions, and the majority of this literature on economic sanctions emphasizes their ineffectiveness. However, scholars have offered differing perspectives on what makes sanctions effective or not, and each work often begins with a definition of what is an economic sanction, to which there is surprisingly little agreement.

Margaret P. Doxey was one of the first and most notable researchers on modern economic sanctions. A professor in the Department of Political Studies at Trent University from 1967 to 1991, Doxey studied problems of collective sanctions and international enforcement, and has published widely on the subject of international political studies. Through her research, Doxey laid the foundation for assessing and understanding the broad impact of sanctions in part by first providing a working definition of economic sanctions. Doxey defines economic sanctions as “economic measures levied by a constitutionally authorized international body seeking to compel the target nation to alter its policies in order that they no longer conflict with international norms.”⁴² As a result of this narrow definition Doxey excludes most of the sanctions that have taken place, as many sanctions, especially those most recent ones outside of her

⁴² Margaret Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective* (New York: McMillan Press, 1987), 10.

research, have not been levied by international bodies but by individual nation-states.⁴³

Doxey emphasizes the impact of economic warfare and argues that the intended goals of sanctions affect the amount of economic damage in a nation.⁴⁴ Thus, she points out how the power that economic sanctions may have is limited by their goals.⁴⁵ Throughout her analyses of Cuba and Rhodesia as case studies, Doxey asserts that economic sanctions will most likely be effective when they put tremendous pressure on the target.

Doxey identifies four goals of the embargo of Cuba. A primary goal of the embargo was to reduce the will and ability of the regime to export subversion and violence to other American states. Second, the U.S. sought to make plain to the people of Cuba that the regime could not serve their interests. Third, the U.S. desired to demonstrate to the hemisphere that communism had no future there. Finally, the U.S. hoped to increase the cost to the Soviet Union of maintaining a communist outpost in the Western Hemisphere.⁴⁶ Despite well-intentioned goals, Doxey emphasizes the ineffectiveness of the Cuban embargo. She acknowledges the economic strain placed upon Cuba as a result of the sanctions; however, she believes Soviet support alleviated the economic tightening placed on it by the U.S. This support mitigated popular unrest with the economic consequences of the embargo and allowed the Castro regime to placate, with the help of the Russians, the majority of the Cuban population. Thus, the

⁴³A. Cooper Drury, "Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered," *Journal of Peace Research*, 35, no. 4 (1998), 498.

⁴⁴ Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*, 125.

⁴⁵ Drury, "Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered," 501.

⁴⁶ Margaret Doxey, "Sanctions Revisited," *International Journal*, 31, No. 1 (Winter 1975/1976), 69.

risk for popular revolt was limited. As a result, the main success of the embargo was the financial cost to the Soviets in aiding the Cubans.

As a further example, Doxey discusses the embargo against Rhodesia from its unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 to 1976, the year she published her research. The Rhodesian sanctions intended to prod the government to end oppression of the majority population by the white minority. The United Nations Security Council undertook sanctions against Rhodesia and quickly increased the number of resolutions prohibiting travel, transport links, consular representation, trade embargos, and arms embargos. However, Doxey interprets these sanctions as having a significant impact on the Rhodesian economy, resulting in the diversification of agricultural production, the growth of secondary industry, a rise in unemployment among Africans, and some white emigration, but not successful at all in altering white attitudes and moving the country toward majority rule.⁴⁷

James P. Barber, also a political science professor, is equally critical of the potential for positive outcomes of embargos and economic sanctions. Barber writes extensively on Rhodesia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom's complicated history with those two countries. However, Barber defines sanctions as "economic measures directed to political objectives," thus evoking a broader definition than Doxey's.⁴⁸ There is a multitude of reasons for the implementation of any set of economic sanctions, according to Barber, and it is this diversity of aims which in part dilutes the effectiveness of any given sanction. Barber divides the goals of sanctions into three categories:

⁴⁷ Doxey, "Sanctions Revisited," 78.

⁴⁸ James Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument," *International Affairs*, 55, no. 3 (1979), 367.

primary, which are concerned with the behavior of the target state; secondary, which refer to the position and reputation of the imposing state; and tertiary, which are concerned with the structure and behavior of the international system.⁴⁹

There are a multitude of objectives behind every sanction. This is compounded by the inevitable modification of sanctions once in place. As a result, the imposing state has wide latitude in shifting from one objective to another as sanction strategies meet varying degrees of success. Barber highlights this with the case of Rhodesia. The United Kingdom's main objective with Rhodesia was to have it embrace majority rule. However, after a few years of economic sanctions on the minority ruling class, the economic sanctions of limiting oil trade had not contributed to make majority rule any more likely. Therefore, the British focused on achieving the secondary goal of ensuring that no British oil reached Rhodesia, thus salvaging the British reputation for effectively implementing economic sanctions. Barber argues that the constant pressure of severe sanctions is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to meet the primary goals that sanctions may serve.⁵⁰ As a result, Barber underscores that sanctions are part of a broad strategy including diplomatic efforts, isolation of the target state, and denying the legitimacy of a regime or its actions so that its will to resist is eroded and other states are deterred from renewing contact or supporting it.⁵¹

Barber further notes that sanctions can even have the reverse effect of an intended goal. He offers Cuba as an example where the economic impact of the sanctions has been

⁴⁹ Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument," 384.

⁵⁰ Drury, "Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered," 498.

⁵¹ Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument," 374.

severe but the sanctions allowed the Castro government an excuse for its failings. They helped Cuba build Castro into a national hero standing up against the imperialist United States. One concern with Barber's overall analysis is his emphasis that the primary objective of economic sanctions is to alter the behavior of a state. The goal before altering the behavior must first be for the economic sanctions to have a net negative impact on the target state's economy. Only once the sanctions have a negative economic impact can the country imposing the sanctions hope to see behavior modification in the target state. Barber widely discounts the effectiveness of sanctions yet fails to acknowledge the intermediate success of the sanctions, such as the one in Cuba, to have a stifling economic effect on the target country. Similarly, while the desired outcome of majority rule in Rhodesia did not quickly occur as a result of the sanctions, the sanctions limiting the importation of goods initially had a negative effect on the country and led Rhodesians to develop very strong domestic industrial production. Thus, it is important to include in the analysis of sanctions that they are routinely successful in the intermediate step of having a negative economic impact on the desired state but, as Barber and Doxey point out, the longer-term goals seem elusive through sanctions alone.

Johan Galtung offers a different perspective on sanctions. Galtung defines sanctions as actions initiated by one or more international actors against a target to punish it by depriving it of some value and/or making it comply with certain norms the actor deems important.⁵² Galtung argues that achieving both of these purposes through the same sanctions is not possible and thus sanctions should focus on one purpose or the

⁵² Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," *World Politics*, 19, No. 3 (1967), 379.

other. This touches on Barber's argument of how a scattered focus of sanctions can have a detrimental impact on the ultimate success of sanctions. In addition, Galtung identifies two key weak premises underlying the theory of economic sanctions: (1) political disintegration is more or less proportionate to economic disintegration, and (2) economic disintegration cannot be counteracted. To the first point, Galtung suggests that leaders have used sanctions to rally the populace against an outside force, thus deflecting the people's anger with the current situation toward someone else. Thus, it is possible that the severity of sanctions, as Drury points out, will only increase the political integration within the target, solidifying the leader's resistance to the economic pressure. Galtung argues for the falsity of the second premise as evidenced by successful counteractions against economic disintegration, such as the growth of a domestic industrial base in Rhodesia or Soviet financial assistance to Cuba.

Researchers have also begun to assess the humanitarian impact of sanctions. Eric Hoskins and Samantha Nutt conducted extensive research on the humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions placed on Burundi from July 1996 through April 1997. Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, Ethiopia, and Zaire imposed regional economic sanctions against Burundi in response to the July 25, 1996, military coup led by Major Pierre Buyoya.⁵³ The sanctioning countries demanded the immediate restoration of Burundi's National Assembly, the reinstatement of political parties, and unconditional negotiations among all parties to the conflict. Sanctions began as a total economic

⁵³ Eric Hoskins and Samantha Nutt, *The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions on Burundi* (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson, Jr., Institute for International Studies, 1997), xi.

blockade and within a short period of time began having a dramatic effect on the people of Burundi.

The embargo quickly cut off all access to legally imported goods and thus led to massive smuggling operations to avoid the sanctions. As a result, most products removed from local markets as a result of the sanctions soon became available through sanction-avoidance smuggling, albeit at a much higher cost to the consumer.⁵⁴ The Buyoya regime benefited financially from only a few of these imports, which greatly eroded its tax and revenue base. With legal exports cut off and the smuggling of fuel and other imports providing little or no revenue, the regime was gradually going bankrupt. As a result, it became increasingly difficult for the regime to finance ongoing social and economic programs and to pay the salaries of civil servants and the army. More and more, Burundi asked NGOs and UN agencies to fund, supply, or administer health care, education, and other social services.⁵⁵ The sanctions impacted Burundi's fledgling industrial base. The ban on imports depleted supplies of raw materials, spare parts, and other external inputs. In Bujumbura, many industries shut down or laid off employees with 60% of all Burundi workers having been laid off directly due to the economic sanctions.⁵⁶

Within days of the imposition of sanctions on Burundi, panic buying, hoarding, and stockpiling led to dramatic hikes in the prices of items such as salt, sugar, fuel, and most basic foodstuffs. All human medicines were technically exempt from sanctions from August 16, 1996, onward, yet the blockade stopped shipments of medicines in

⁵⁴ Ibid., 17.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 20.

⁵⁶ Hoskins and Nutt, *The Humanitarian Impact*, 24.

neighboring countries. Insecurity and a general lack of infrastructure maintenance also caused wide disruption of water and sanitation systems throughout the country. This access to safe drinking water and a functioning sewer system ceased as a result of Burundi being unable to import calcium hypochlorite necessary for the treatment of drinking water. There were also multiple outbreaks of infectious disease, which Hoskins and Nutt are unable to tie directly to the imposition of sanctions, but they argue an attenuated connection. Sanctions hurt the Burundi educational system as well. The high cost of fuel prevented transport of teachers to rural areas. Sanctions also prohibited the importation of educational supplies, including exercise books, chalk, pencils, pens, and printing materials for textbooks. The cost of such items, where available, was prohibitive for most schools and households.

Kimberly Ann Elliot has found that sanctions are of limited utility in achieving foreign policy goals that depend on compelling the target country to take actions it resists. Moreover, she insists that the utility of sanctions has declined sharply over time with less than one in four sanctions having any success at all in the 1980s and even fewer when the U.S. acted unilaterally.⁵⁷ One primary reason for this is increased economic integration and interdependence. While countries are more dependent on international economic exchange than in the past and thus more vulnerable to economic coercion, at the same time the globalization of economic activity means that there are many more suppliers for most goods and services and, equally, many more markets for a target's exports.⁵⁸ Therefore, international cooperation is much more important now than ever

⁵⁷ Kimberly Ann Elliot, "The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?" *International Security*, 23, no. 1 (1988), 51.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

before to achieve successful economic sanctions. Moreover, time, effort, energy, and consensus building must be used to initiate and maintain successful sanctions by multiple trading partners. This is evident in the Burundi example in which international cooperation had a profound effect on the Burundi population. However, the ultimate success of the sanctions to achieve regime change, or at minimum a change in regime behavior, is not necessarily directly related to the impact the sanctions have on the nation's population as noted by Galtung.

Elliot builds on this toward a somewhat more positive view of economic sanctions in the comprehensive and influential study by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott. Basing their work on 116 cases, they found a success rate for economic sanctions of 34%. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott's study is the most influential attempt to identify the conditions for effective sanctions. They conclude that sanctions work best if (1) the goals of the sender are limited; (2) the target is already experiencing economic difficulties; (3) there are generally friendly relations between sender and target countries; (4) sanctions are forcefully implemented in a single step; (5) sanctions entail significant costs for the target; (6) the costs for sender countries are modest; (7) the sanctions are not accompanied by covert action or military operations; and (8) few countries are needed to implement the sanctions.

Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott hold that sanctions often fail because they are inadequate for the task, meaning they are too gentle, the goals too elusive, or cooperation from other countries too tepid. Second, sanctions create their own antidotes in that sanctions can unify support for a country's government and for the seeking of commercial alternatives. For example, the League of Nations sanctions against Italy in

1935-36 led to open defiance of the sanctions, growing support for Mussolini, and growth in domestic production to offset import restrictions.⁵⁹ A third reason sanctions fail, according to the authors, is they often prompt wealthy supporters of the target country to help alleviate the impact of the sanctions. An example of this is the Arab League's boycott of Israel leading to increased support to Israel by the United States. A fourth reason for the failure of sanctions is they can alienate allies abroad and business interests at home. If a sender's allies are not completely supportive of the sanctions, they can begin to raise uncomfortable questions which can ultimately impact the health of the relationship. Moreover, sanctions often affect national business interests through the cancelling or disrupting of contracts and the flow of goods. To improve the possible efficacy of sanctions, the authors suggest quickness in deploying a full range of sanctions rather than a slow, steady progression of them. Also, the larger number of coalition partners in building a sanction does not necessarily mean the greater likelihood of success, as finding agreement on the type of sanctions and then maintaining a collective will can be very difficult.

In her doctoral work exploring economic sanctions as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, Helen Osieja enumerates two definitions of an embargo: (1) the detention of foreign ships in the ports of a state; and (2) a trade ban imposed by a state with the purpose of exercising influence on another state.⁶⁰ Bernd Lindemeyer in his research of embargos further builds on the definition, stating that the trade embargo is a political

⁵⁹ Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliot, and Barbara Oegg, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (Washington, DC: United Book Press, Inc., 2007), 160.

⁶⁰ Helen Osieja, *Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the U.S. Embargo against Cuba* (Boca Raton, FL: Dissertation.com, 2006), 18.

measure of a state in international trade and constitutes a partial or total trade ban whose aim is to coerce another state into adopting a determined conduct.⁶¹ Lindemeyer views the aim of the embargo, as a tool of foreign policy, is to weaken the economy of another state so it behaves in a specific manner. Differentiating between embargos and trade bans, Lindemeyer identifies embargos as usually limited to a number of commodities, transactions, and branches of the international economy, whereas the trade ban with the enemy is total: it includes all economic traffic and utilizes military measures and control systems that are unusual in times of peace.⁶² One defining aspect of the embargo is the focus upon a specific state. A second characteristic is the desired weakening function of the state through the loss of a market for its exports. In addition, through the missing supply of specific goods, the state is economically and militarily weakened and forced to act in a way it would otherwise not.

One potential disadvantage of embargos is that the state imposing the sanction may injure itself as much or more than it injures the targeted state.⁶³ It is even possible that the state imposing the embargo is willing to suffer economic losses to make political gains.⁶⁴ This is especially true when the embargo includes an export embargo to the determined state. However, states are often willing to take such self-destructive action if they can achieve a greater policy outcome. It is in that scenario that a balancing test can determine the overall utility of imposing an embargo.

⁶¹ Bernd Lindemeyer, *Schiffsembargo und Handelsembargo-Völkerrechtliche Praxis und Zulässigkeit* (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1975), 183. Translated.

⁶² Lindemeyer, *Schiffsembargo*, 196.

⁶³ Peter Malanczuk, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force* (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1993), 4.

⁶⁴ Lindemeyer, *Schiffsembargo*, 209.

Osieja identifies four types of embargos. This provides a useful framework when analyzing the U.S. embargo of Cuba. First, the export embargo is the most commonly employed form and it aims to restrict the supply of goods to the opponent. Usually only strategic goods are included in this embargo, and, when the imposing state restricts its own shipments to the opposing state, other countries not supporting or partaking in the embargo are able to ship to the affected state. Second, the import embargo strives to limit the access of the opponent to the domestic market and to foreign currency. In theory, this further damages the economy of the state by making the purchase of necessary imports difficult. To be successful this embargo must include those goods that constitute the bulk of exports of the opponent. Third, the capital embargo forbids the export of capital to a specific country. The capital embargo prohibits the granting of loans and other credit instruments to the government and citizens of another state. The goal is to prevent the state from minimizing the effects of an import or export embargo by obtaining foreign credit. Thus, the capital embargo is often done in tandem with an import or export embargo. Fourth, the transportation embargo denies a means of transportation for goods going to and coming from the opponent state. This bans vessels and airplanes registered by the chosen state from transporting goods to and from the opponent state. The goal is to restrict supply to a country. A fifth type of embargo is a total embargo, which takes place when economic sanctions include the four categories mentioned above and include all types of goods.⁶⁵ The U.S. embargo of Cuba has progressed among the first four types of embargos and, while remaining free from being a total embargo, it has taken on various forms.

⁶⁵ Osieja, *Economic Sanctions*, 62.

An embargo constitutes, according to Osieja, a denial of economic cooperation with another state. As such, it could be seen as a violation of international law if the imposing state has contractual trade obligations, such as if it is a signatory of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.⁶⁶ However, embargos are legal when the state takes measures inside its jurisdiction to protect its political or economic interests. Although embargos go against the United Nations' goal of economic cooperation between states as loosely described in the Charter of the United Nations, they do not constitute an illegal act since they are not a form of military intervention. However, an embargo can be illegal when the state discriminated against has a right to economic equal treatment.⁶⁷ The General Assembly Resolution 2625 of 1970 emphasizes that economic discrimination goes against the principle of judicial equality of states. However, the fifth point of the resolution stipulates "every state has the right to determine and to develop its own political, social, economic and cultural system."⁶⁸ This provides strong evidence that within economic self-determination lays the power to enact economic sanctions against other countries. Furthermore, customary international law does not grant states the right to equal economic treatment by other states or the right to extension of the most favored nation clause. Thus, there is no prohibition against the economic discrimination of states.

The embargo policy of the U.S. began in 1947, as a supplement for its containment policy.⁶⁹ The events of the Second World War proved that trading with the

⁶⁶ Ibid., 63.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 66.

⁶⁸ *United Nations Judicial Yearbook* (New York: United Nations, 2007), 198.

⁶⁹ Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, *Western Economic Warfare-A Case Study in Foreign Policy* (New York: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1968), 22.

enemy could contribute to its military might, and the U.S. approved the first embargo regulations against the Soviet Bloc countries in 1947.⁷⁰ The U.S. Department of Commerce enacted the export regulations on December 31, 1947, and January 1, 1948. The first regulation intended to limit the export of scarce goods while the second regulation enforced the requirement for an individual license for all goods to be exported to Europe. Then, in 1949, the Export Control Act was passed. This allowed export controls exclusively for security reasons and permitted the President of the U.S. to limit or forbid the export of those goods, which were considered strategic.⁷¹ The purpose of the Act was for the U.S. and its allies to have a common trade policy with the communist bloc countries in order to support the foreign policy and the security of the U.S. Soon after the signing of the Export Control Act, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export (COCOM) was established. This was an informal agreement between the U.S. and its allies to contain the U.S.S.R. and communist bloc countries while providing a forum for all NATO members to decide trade policy.

The Export Control Act remains a foundation of the international trade policy of the U.S. The economic restriction of the USSR through embargo continued with the Cannon Amendment of 1950. This prohibited economic or financial assistance to countries that trade with the USSR or its allies during any period in which the armed forces of the U.S. are at war.⁷² Then, in 1951, Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (MDACA). This is widely regarded as one of the most

⁷⁰ Osieja, *Economic Sanctions*, 23.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 25.

important pieces of legislation conditioning U.S. aid on the trading conduct of its allies. As a result of MDADA, an arms embargo was imposed on the Soviet Union and its allies. Not only was an embargo instituted, but aid was denied to countries which sold military goods to communist countries. Furthermore, the General Assembly of the United Nations formalized an imposition of a collective embargo against China in May 1951. This joined together with the Truman Doctrine to provide a clear emphasis of U.S. willingness to use the tool of the embargo to achieve political goals.

Carlos M. Camps Cruell, the author of "Social Implications of the Missionary Heritage," was the secretary general of the Reformed Presbyterian Church of Cuba for 33 years. In his writings, Cruell detailed how humanitarian aid assistance and related work by missionaries in Cuba laid a firm foundation for education, agriculture, and religion. As Cruell points out, establishing key foundations for economic growth is critical to avoiding the possibility of a failed state and increasing the probability of cultivating a self-sufficient people. Cruell provides a helpful background on 19th century and early 20th century missionary work in Cuba and concludes the bulk of his research with Castro's rise to power. This provides a foundation from which researchers can further analyze current missionary work and the impact of the U.S. embargo on such work.

Early Protestant missionaries in Cuba came with the arrival of U.S. forces toward the end of the 19th century. Following the Cuban war for independence and the U.S. occupation, the island was considered "good hunting ground" by the political, economic, and cultural missions.⁷³ Newly independent Cuba was still under the direct influence of

⁷³ Carlos M. Camps Cruell, "Social Implications of the Missionary Heritage," *International Review of Missions*, 34, no. 2 (1998), 338.

the American political and economic system, and early missionaries focused on how to improve the Cubans' lives. As a result, missionaries provided Cubans with a steady diet of religious and educational programs by American missionaries, and the Cubans readily embraced these offerings. The early church programs focused especially upon education and missionaries established educational institutions. In particular, the missionaries strived through education to eliminate the poverty that gripped much of the island nation. The missionaries readily admitted the fact that class disparity would remain; however, the desire to elevate the poor through education was a key goal of the missionaries. One such effective missionary organization was the Salvation Army, which worked to provide educational and religious education. The missionaries sought to shape, through educational policy, a lower middle class that would later understand the urgent need to fight the ruling minorities and dictatorships.⁷⁴ From this foundation grew the Cuban desire for democracy and progress to which so many looked in the future. Interestingly, these two touchstones morphed into the concepts of nationalism and revolution, which are subjects for another time.

With the sugar industry playing the dominant role in the Cuban economy, missionaries also focused on providing advanced technology to lessen the physical burden on workers. In the 1880s, the production of sugar in Cuba changed dramatically as a result of the ending of slavery in the country. A new group of middle-class planters emerged, often referred to as *colonos*. The *colonos* contracted to plant, cultivate, harvest, and then deliver the cut cane to the sugar mills, which eventually became huge

⁷⁴ Ibid., 340.

complexes.⁷⁵ Missionaries pushed for advanced technologies to aid the workers in the planning and harvesting of the labor-intensive sugar cane. This laid the foundation for the economic growth of Cuba's main export as well as dramatically improving the quality of life for Cuban farmers.

A key component of humanitarian assistance of the faith-based NGOs is what Cruell describes as the humanistic and philanthropic relationships developed through humanitarian work. While missionaries reached out to Cubans throughout the country, especially those living in rural areas, missionaries built churches in or close to cities. As a result, many of the attendees were middle-class Cubans living in the city. This gave Cuban Protestantism one of its characteristic features, that of being a religion for the middle class.⁷⁶ This church construction allowed for social-gathering locations and soon churches began spreading into the countryside as the Protestant faith grew.

Cruell holds that humanitarian aid and humanitarian work done by missionaries in Cuba laid a powerful foundation in the areas of education, agriculture, and religion. The ability of missionaries to build institutions of primary and secondary education helped to lay a foundation of growth for Cuba. The education focus of early missionaries combined with assisting the Cuban people with agricultural development. With educational progress laying the foundation for Cuba's international strength in the areas of medicine and science, agriculture assisted in developing a key economic engine for the country. Finally, the religious institutions provided cultural centers for the gathering and interdependence of the Cuban people.

⁷⁵ History of Cuba, <http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/havana/Sugar1.htm> (accessed February 10, 2013).

⁷⁶ Cruell, "Social Implications," 340.

There has been some extensive research and writing on the U.S. embargo of Cuba. Specifically, researchers have assessed the initiation of the U.S. embargo and its development over time as well as the economic impact it has had on Cuba. However, researchers have not analyzed the impact of the embargo on missionaries, and specifically the embargo's impact on missionary activities in Cuba. Not only has there been a dearth of research on the impact of the embargo on missionaries in Cuba but also there has been a lack of investigation into how the missionaries' work in Cuba has impacted the embargo's policy outcomes. Therefore, this thesis provides an analysis of both sides and then recommendations for changes to U.S. policy which would improve in tandem the Cuban-American missionary outcomes and policy outcomes.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research methodology used. The problem statement, the questions this research seeks to answer, and the limitations of the project will all be restated. Additionally, this chapter discusses the use of grounded theory methodology. Then the participants will be discussed and the data collection process described. This chapter will conclude with an examination of the data analysis and how validity and reliability were achieved.

Research Design

The researcher chose qualitative research methodology as it is able to delve more deeply than statistics in order to identify the inner experience of participants.⁷⁷ The researcher sought to understand the experiences and perceptions of the Cuban missionaries to fully grasp the impact of the embargo upon their work. Within the qualitative research framework, the researcher implemented a grounded theory methodology for this research project largely because grounded theory is a good design to use when a theory is not available to explain a process.⁷⁸ Grounded theory is especially helpful when current research on a phenomenon is either inadequate or nonexistent as is the case here.⁷⁹ Furthermore, the researcher used grounded theory because of the significant amounts of information collected through the interview

⁷⁷ Corbin and Strauss, *Basics of Qualitative Research*, 12.

⁷⁸ Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 66.

⁷⁹ Leedy and Ormrod, *Practical Research: Planning and Design*, 97.

process. This theory then allowed for an identification of the common threads throughout the data and thus identifying theories that are well-grounded in the data.

Sources and Nature of Data

There were three targeted groups: Cuban pastors; U.S. missionaries doing work in Cuba; and U.S. church leaders overseeing and interacting with the U.S. missionaries doing work in Cuba. The researcher included those three groupings of people in the data collection and excluded other groups.

The grounded theory study allowed for the research questions to drive clarity of theory and ultimately a response to research questions. Interview questions had a broad, open-ended focus, which allowed interviewees to share a great deal of information and to dictate the direction of the discussion with clarifying questions, aiding in the data collection process. The research included interviews with eight mission participants and pastors. The interviews included broad questions to fully explore the effectiveness of U.S. Christian missionary work. Additionally, the interviewees discussed their beliefs on why the mission work has been as effective or ineffective as it has been. Then they shared their perception of the role the embargo has played on missionary activity.

The interviews began with broad questions to fully explore the impact the mission programs had in Cuba. Then the interviewees discussed their beliefs on why there is or is not an effect of the embargo upon the efficacy of Cuban missionary programs. Then I analyzed how church leaders felt the embargo's impact. While I leveraged a core set of questions, I also allowed for interviewees to discuss tangential topics as often these deviations led to insightful commentary on their interactions with the Cuban people.

Table 3.1. Interviewees

<u>Number of Times on Mission Trip to Cuba</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Gender</u>
8	54	Male
10	36	Female
4	51	Female
11	48	Male
2	32	Female
7	67	Female
6	58	Male
9	42	Female

Data Collection Methodology

The researcher worked towards concurrent data collection and data analysis in the hopes of immediately improving both. Kathy Charmaz, professor of sociology at Sonoma State University and a leading grounded theorist, wrote that “grounded theorists collect data to develop theoretical analysis from the beginning of a project.”⁸⁰ For data collection, the researcher used hand-written notes. The first analytical tool recommended by Juliet Corbin, professor of qualitative research at the University of Alberta, and Anselm Strauss, professor emeritus, University of California, is to use questions (probing and becoming acquainted with the data before each interview) to help with the analysis.⁸¹ During the interview the researcher used listening techniques to look for themes. Upon hearing a relevant theme, the researcher would ask the interviewee to tell more about that topic. The interviewee would then be presented with follow up questions. After each interview, the researcher relied heavily on hand-written notes which summarized the

⁸⁰ Charmaz, *Constructing Grounded Theory*, 2.

⁸¹ Corbin and Strauss, *Basics of Qualitative Research*, 3rd ed., 69.

major points and themes of each interview as well as relevant quotations.

After four interviews were completed, the researcher conducted a deeper analysis by looking for themes across all areas. When the researcher discovered a theme, he would explore it further. Early on the researcher identified emergent themes and therefore modified or used probing questions in the future to see if these themes were repeated by other participants. One key strength of qualitative research is the ability to “add new pieces to the research puzzle or conjure entire new puzzles” while data are gathered. This can occur late in the analysis, which allows the researcher to follow leads that emerge.⁸² This proved an invaluable tool as the themes that appeared required a flexibility to unearth the depth and scope of each.

The researcher used triangulation in this qualitative research to increase the credibility and validity of results. According to O’Donoghue and Punch, triangulation is a “method of cross-checking data from multiple sources to search for regularities in the research data.”⁸³ Specifically, the research utilized methodological triangulation by using more than one method to gather data such as interviews, observations, and documents. Furthermore, interviewing multiple individuals engaged in varying roles in the missionary process ensured the accuracy of the data.

In addition, the qualification of the researcher aided in ensuring the accuracy of the information as well as increasing the likelihood of gaining relevant data. Specifically, the researcher had significant experience in dealing with Latin America through his role as a U.S. Navy intelligence officer. He also had research and writing experience through

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Tom O’Donoghue and Keith Punch, *Qualitative Educational Research in Action: Doing and Reflecting* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 78.

the academic experiences of law school and two other graduate school programs. Having lived in Spain and majored in Spanish in college the researcher was a proficient Spanish speaker. Lastly, as a result of living in the midst of a significant Cuban-American population, he had excellent access to interviewees as well as already having existing relationships with many Cuban-Americans.

There is a significant Cuban-American population in south Florida which benefits the researcher. The interviewees fell into three groups. The first group was Cuban nationals living in Cuba who are visiting the United States for church conferences and meetings. The second group was Cuban-Americans, individuals who were born and raised in Cuba but are now U.S. citizens living in the United States. These individuals were pastors here in the U.S. and/or are involved in missionary work in Cuba. The third group of interviewees was Americans who are not Cuban-Americans but are U.S. citizens involved in missionary work in Cuba. Interviewees were told that their answers would be completely confidential throughout this research and publication process. In addition the names of all interviewees were not used and the researcher did not specify what church they serve or give any specifics that might disclose their identity.

To ensure the validity of the findings and to identify actionable steps to improve the outcomes of the missionaries' work in Cuba, after the first round of interviews the researcher collected and analyzed the data and then planed a second round. After the first round, the researcher reengaged each interviewee and discussed the findings with him/her to hear his/her reaction to the findings, ensured his/her perspective was captured, and identified solutions to improve outcomes based on the challenges presented by the data.

Criteria for the Admissibility of Data

After the first round of interviews, the researcher collected and analyzed the data and then held a second round of interviews to ensure the validity of the findings and identify actionable steps to improve the outcomes of the missionaries' work. In this second round of interviews, the researcher reengaged each interviewee and discussed my overall findings to hear his/her reaction to the findings, ensure his/her perspective was accurately captured, and identify solutions to improve outcomes based on the challenges presented by the data. Then the researcher made recommendations for how American missionaries can more effectively achieve their desired outcomes. The researcher also made recommendations for changes to U.S. policy, which would improve in tandem the American missionary outcomes and U.S. policy outcomes.

Analyzing Data

In terms of analyzing my data, an inductive form of thematic analysis was the most appropriate means for my research data. Thematic analysis is a qualitative analytic method for identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns within data. It minimally organizes and describes the data set in detail. However, frequently inductive thematic analysis goes further than this and interprets various aspects of the research topic.⁸⁴

Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke state:

Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology," *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3, No. 2 (2006), 84.

⁸⁵ Braun and Clarke, "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology," 85.

With uncertainty about the thematic trends that might result from the data analysis, a research method with a structure to identify the commonalities among responses was most useful. However, the term “theme” in itself can be nebulous and can be misused; thus, a definition is necessary. Richard Boyatzis, author of *Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code Development*, provides an excellent foundation, “A theme is a pattern found in the information that at minimum describes and organizes the possible observations.”⁸⁶

In the course of the research, thematic analysis consisted of multiple steps. First, data collection and data analysis began simultaneously through the initiation of interviews and my beginning to identify common themes throughout the interviews, which allowed for focusing upon certain topics during the questioning. Second, these themes were identified through active listening, and the researcher began grouping concepts and responses into emerging themes, which were discussed with interviewees. Third, the researcher identified data points related to the key emerging themes and outliers that did not seem to have linkages. Finally, in a final round of interviews, the researcher interviewed each participant a second time and shared with his/her the emerging themes that the researcher identified and sought his/her response to those themes as a means to validate the identified findings. This final round of interviews also provided the opportunity to integrate responses from all of the interviewees back into the missionary field so that improvements could be made and learning and experiences could be shared.

⁸⁶ Richard Boyatzis, *Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code Development* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998), 4-5.

CHAPTER IV

PRESENTATION OF DATA AND RESULTS

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the grounded theory model that guided the analysis and an introduction to the themes that emerged from this study. The components of the theory and examples from the data supporting the theory are next. Then a description of how the various components relate to the research question will be provided. The chapter will conclude with a summary of the analysis and the resulting conclusions.

The research focused on data collected from U.S. missionaries to Cuba. Some of these individuals are employed by the Presbyterian Church (USA) in varying capacities such as pastors, associate pastors, and directors of certain areas of ministry. Others work for varying Presbytery governing bodies and some are not employed by any faith-based organization at all but simply go on missionary work as a volunteer. Some of the individuals make regular trips to Cuba, one in particular having gone to Cuba as a mission on more than twenty trips. The majority of interviewees had gone to Cuba multiple times. The missionaries ranged in age from nineteen to the late seventies. The missionaries came from various socioeconomic backgrounds. Some missionaries were very successful corporate executives while others were retired teachers while others worked for churches. The interviews were evenly split along gender lines and there was a high degree of ethnic diversity.

Grounded theory techniques were used to collect the data. The analysis then resulted in a theory describing the impact of the missionaries on U.S. policy objectives of the embargo. The purpose of this study was to examine the impact U.S. missionaries have

on the policy objectives of the U.S. embargo of Cuba. This study was designed to explore the following questions:

1. How are missionaries affecting the U.S. policy outcomes of the embargo (encouraging the growth of free markets and representative democracy in Cuba through economic sanctions, travel restrictions, and international legal penalties)?
2. How does the U.S. embargo affect Christian missionary activities?
3. How do missionaries influence the Cubans' desire for social, religious, political and humanitarian change?
4. Do missionaries influence Cubans' perceptions of the U.S.?

This research addressed how the missionaries' efforts influenced the embargo, if they helped shape Cuban perceptions, if the missionaries are aware of U.S. policy objectives in Cuba, and if the missionaries are sympathetic to those U.S. policy objectives. It also focused upon how the embargo affects the ability of Presbyterian missionaries to achieve their evangelizing efforts. The focus is on how the Presbyterian missionaries are affecting the U.S. policy outcomes of the embargo.

This chapter presents the data collected and results from the interviews with Presbyterian missionaries. Throughout this chapter, the missionaries' exact words are quoted heavily and relied upon to provide the majority of the reporting of data. This is for several reasons, including the fact that the direct experiences and words of the missionaries provide the most powerful data without the need for paraphrasing. This also allows the reader to actively engage in analysis and interpretation and ultimately adds further credibility to the research analysis and findings. The quotes are grouped by category and theme for ease of reference and understanding. Some comments range

across major categories of data. The researcher attempted to place the quote in the most relevant category.

The data presented below represent many years of education and experience by the respondents participating in the interviews. The interviews were designed to be conversational in nature; hence, questionnaires and structured interviews were not used. This situation is the essence of grounded theory inasmuch as the theory emerges from the data. The fact interviews were unstructured enhances emergence and precludes the forcing of the data through the use of predetermined questions. The use of predetermined questions, though inadvertent, may bias answers from the informants.

Probing questions facilitated the gathering of increased information by allowing interviewees to address those topics most appealing to the missionary. Specific questions were avoided as much as possible even when asking probing questions. However, at times specific questions were found to be the only means of addressing a specific theme. At the end of each interview, participants answered the question, "Is there anything else that you can add that we have not discussed?" This question was asked until the interviewee responded negatively. Extensive notes were taken during the interviews for recall and to categorize themes during the course of the interviews which were conducted both in person and over the phone. Participants generally preferred not to be recorded due to the current political sensitivity between the U.S. and Cuba.

Goals of the U.S. Embargo

In assessing the impact of missionary work upon the U.S. policy objectives of the embargo, it is essential to summarize these objectives. U.S. foreign policy goals of the embargo include: penalizing the Castro regime; bringing about a removal of Castro from

power; working toward freer flow of information among the Cuban people and between those in Cuba and the rest of the world; and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian items directly to the Cuban people. On April 13, 2009, the Obama administration made significant changes to U.S.-Cuban policy. Obama stated that the overall goal of these policy changes was to help make possible a “Cuba that respects basic human, political and economic rights of all its citizens.”⁸⁷ These changes included lifting all restrictions on transactions related to the travel of family members to Cuba and removing restrictions on remittances to family members.

President Obama’s hope in easing restrictions on private travel was that increased travel and interaction would build relationships between the countries while empowering Cubans to think and act as individuals, to see the possibilities of individual action, and to embrace the power of individual autonomy. Obama also ordered new steps to promote the “freer flow of information among the Cuban people and between those in Cuba and the rest of the world, as well as to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian items directly to the Cuban people.”⁸⁸

The Secretary of State Hillary Clinton further detailed Obama’s Cuba policy objectives on October 27, 2011, emphasizing the U.S. policy focus as supporting the desire of the Cuban people to determine their future and for the U.S. to help those working toward positive social, political, and humanitarian change. Clinton stated, “We support a wide variety of activities on the island. We interact with a broad cross-section

⁸⁷ The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/04/13/reaching-out-cuban-people> (accessed April 18, 2013).

⁸⁸ Ibid.

of individuals and groups in Cuban society. And we provide humanitarian assistance, including food, over-the-counter medicines and so much more."⁸⁹ The Secretary of State further expressed the U.S. desire for democracy in Cuba and the importance that the country move toward political and market reform.

Structure of the Cuban Presbytery

In interviews with the missionaries, several began their discussion by sharing the structure of the Presbyterian Church in Cuba. This is a helpful starting point in understanding the missionaries' activities. There are three Presbyterian regions in Cuba. Each region or Presbytery is comprised of multiple churches and the presbytery oversees the work of all of the churches. The three Cuban Presbyteries are: Havana Presbytery, Matanzas Presbytery, and El Centro Presbytery. Matanzas Presbytery has the only Reformed Protestant seminary in the nation. El Centro, comprised of thirteen churches, is the poorest and most secluded. As a result of the high poverty rates and relative isolation, in 1993 a presbytery in the U.S. formed a relationship with El Centro and has been working to form partnerships with churches in that region. While El Centro is the focal point of Presbyterian missionary activity, that activity is not limited to this one presbytery. Missionaries reported fanning out across the country, engaging churches and Cubans in all of the presbyteries.⁹⁰

Financial Support of Cuban Churches

All missionaries stated that they provide financial assistance to Cuban churches as well as individual Cubans during their stay. The amount and frequency of financial gifts

⁸⁹ Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, testifying on Capitol Hill in Washington before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 27, 2011.

⁹⁰ Interviews with multiple Presbyterian missionaries.

varied. For example, one U.S. presbytery gives \$30,000 a year to El Centro Presbytery to help its churches. This U.S. presbytery views a financial commitment to the churches in Cuba as critical to facilitate growth and relationship building. The U.S. presbytery desires to help the Cuban churches become educated in budgeting and financial management. Thus the U.S. presbytery demands that the Cubans must determine how to spend money, how to budget, and how to make their needs and wants known. As one missionary stated, "Cubans have not developed the ability to budget. They have not learned to plan for tomorrow. This is not a common ability of Cubans because they never had to plan for tomorrow. They might not have electricity tomorrow, they might not have food tomorrow, and therefore, they live for the present. They are only given enough to get through the day."⁹¹ Another missionary told of staying in the homes of Cubans. The Cubans cooked and did the laundry of the missionary and in return the missionary would pay. The missionary referenced paying far more than the Cubans expected but the missionary saw this as a helpful gift to the Cuban family.

Missionaries provide significant financial assistance to Cuban churches as well as individual Cubans. This funding impacts the Cuban society and U.S. policy objectives in many ways. First, examples such as the aforementioned U.S. presbytery giving \$30,000 a year to El Centro Presbytery provide solid structural support to poor Cuban churches. Initially, Presbyterians believed significant financial support would immediately revive the recipient churches and allow for increased ministry opportunities. However, it was quickly discovered that upon receiving the assistance the Cuban churches could not effectively budget to manage the money and could not prioritize possible expenditures.

⁹¹ Missionary Participant One, interview by author, telephone interview, February 10, 2013.

The lack of financial planning and management by the Cubans led the U.S. missionaries to begin planning ways to provide financial literacy training to the Cuban churches. The Presbyterian missionaries felt passionate about not managing the money for the Cubans and not providing the Cubans with a budget but, instead, desired to teach the Cubans these core skills. This prompted the U.S. missionaries on return visits to begin offering financial training.

The identification of a need by the missionaries and then seeking to offer a solution is a quality that has resulted in positive gains in the missionary-Cuban relationship. First, this contributed to drastically changing the Cuban perception of Americans as the enemy, as many Cubans had viewed the Americans for so long. They now viewed Americans, especially these missionaries, as caring friends. Second, this highlights the responsive nature of the missionaries and their primary focus upon the needs of the Cuban population. This results in the missionaries not focusing on broader foreign policy goals, or the overall interaction between the U.S. and Cuba, but instead focusing on the immediate needs of the Cuban people. Interestingly, over time, these needs have changed. There was a time when the missionaries would bring significant amounts of medical supplies; however, that need has diminished as the missionaries are now focused on the long-term training Cubans and less on providing short-term supplies.

Missionary Access to Cuba

The travel restrictions which have long been part of the U.S. embargo of Cuba have varied in scope and nature. Recently, the Obama administration has eased these travel restrictions allowing for a greater flow of missionaries to Cuba. As one missionary said, "Recent developments towards a wider exposure to outside influence [as a result of

the loosened travel restrictions] have facilitated collaboration between the Church and the Cuban state. As beneficiaries of such opening and working in concert with other recognized groups, leaders of the Presbyterian Church in Cuba obtain from the government the authorization to invite their foreign counterparts to the Island to undertake religious activities. Such activities are to be carried out solely within the membership and never in public places.”⁹²

Missionaries bristle at the travel restrictions. As one said, “It is absurd that the number of Americans that can travel there is so limited. Travel restrictions make it difficult to travel. If the relationships change Cubans’ point of view and show the Cubans that they like us, then why not increase the ease and number of Americans that can travel to Cuba? Relationships are the key to making changes in Cuba.”⁹³ Missionaries must overcome the overriding perceptions of Americans: “Cubans were told how evil and bad missionaries are but we were talking to an old Cuban who started crying and saying ‘you are not as bad as I was told you were. You are our friends.’”⁹⁴ Missionaries are generally received back in the U.S. without question; however, one missionary recently reported that “the following day we flew back home to Miami, and, ironically, the team was briefly detained for questioning about the trip.”⁹⁵

⁹² Missionary Participant Two, interview by author, telephone interview, February 13, 2013.

⁹³ Missionary Participant Three, interview by author, e-mail interview, February 1, 2013.

⁹⁴ Missionary Participant One, interview by author, telephone interview, February 10, 2013.

⁹⁵ Missionary Participant Four, interview by author, in person interview, March 14, 2013.

Missionary Activities in Cuba

The activities of the missionaries while in Cuba varied dramatically. One missionary spoke of “conducting ten encounters in house-church settings. They consisted of a four-hour, well-planned Bible training in the morning and a three-hour evangelistic service in the evening each attended by forty to fifty people.”⁹⁶ Each missionary group tended toward a set of activities developed by that specific group over time through leaders who routinely facilitated the mission trips. Thus, while some missionary groups focused on meeting in churches with church staff and lay people, other groups rarely entered churches and focused on going to Cubans’ homes to interact with the church leadership.

Missionaries Encouraging Social/Humanitarian Change

As one missionary stated upon returning from Cuba, “Our work is not a matter of ‘missionary’ work per se; rather it is more akin to evangelization, in the sense that it is asking people, both us North Americans and our Cuban partners, to turn from our own inner darkness, from what we believe we know about any other people and nations, and what we hold fast to in failed stereotypes. If short-term mission is the tool we employ to realize these objectives, even more of our silly baggage [ideas] is brought into direct focus, but what we are after is a focus devoid of conflict.”⁹⁷ Missionaries such as Participant Five routinely addressed the recurring theme of missionaries identifying their own preconceptions and biases about the Cuban people in order to more effectively engage and support the Cubans.

⁹⁶ Missionary Participant One, interview by author, telephone interview, February 10, 2013.

⁹⁷ Missionary Participant Five, interview by author, e-mail interview, April 5, 2013.

Missionaries Encouraging Cuban Market Reform

Missionaries are having a profound impact on Cubans' desire for and understanding of a market economy. As Participant One stated, "We are helping Cubans understand market reforms and capitalism. We are helping them understand a different legitimate market system."⁹⁸ One of the main barriers to Cubans being engaged in the world market and thus a market system, according to a missionary, is that Cubans are only to possess and get paid in Cuban pesos. However, foreign visitors use convertible pesos (CUCs). These visitors, including U.S. missionaries, pay with CUCs and then Cubans convert those into Cuban pesos. The poverty and lack of basic foodstuffs is apparent across the country. As a missionary stated, "When you go into a government store there is nothing. They are given a monthly allotment. Pastors make 20 CUCs a month - \$18 a month."⁹⁹ Therefore, the Cubans live in the black market. It is a very complex market but one that directly reflects capitalism as well as employs a barter system.

The missionary went on to say, "We aren't teaching them capitalism but helping them to openly prepare a budget that you have a certain amount of money coming in and a certain amount of money going out. In other words, we are converting their black market skills to legitimate skills."¹⁰⁰ Missionaries are doing this through the teaching of Cubans direct market system skills and theoretical underpinnings. One missionary organization recently conducted a seminar at Cuban churches about how to start a small

⁹⁸ Missionary Participant One, interview by author, telephone interview, February 10, 2013.

⁹⁹ Missionary Participant Two, interview by author, e-mail interview, February 19, 2013.

¹⁰⁰ Missionary Participant One, interview by author, telephone interview, February 10, 2013.

business. The seminar leaders focused upon the church developing small business models but emphasized how Cubans can begin forming small businesses outside of the church which are increasingly permitted by the Cuban government. The missionaries stated that their “mission was to get congregations to start business to make money for the church.”¹⁰¹ Two Presbyterian missionaries who also are small business owners in the U.S. led the seminars, talking about income and how to determine how to price something, how to turn a skill into making money. They also talked about the cost of materials and the cost of labor.

The focus of the missionaries was how Cubans can begin making money to support their own churches, thus reducing the financial dependence many of the Cuban churches have upon the Presbyterian Church in the U.S. to provide financial support. Nevertheless, the broader impact of missionaries teaching the market-based principles to grow a church’s financial stability cannot be underestimated. The missionaries were well aware of the power of teaching market reform for the future of the church and of the country. Missionaries see the improvement of the economic condition of the Cuban people as a core part of their missionary goal.

During the discussion of growing capitalistic ventures on the island, missionaries stated that “Cubans would say that the main challenges are that they can’t depend on getting the raw materials and they need government approval to have a small business.” The Cubans indicated that the access to import raw materials is increasing and that the government is lowering the amount of time needed to receive permission to open a small

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

business. The missionaries then identified means by which they could help facilitate the delivery of raw materials to support these Cuban entrepreneurs.

The missionaries stated that they always held these seminars within the context of "church support" and "church improvement" to avoid government resistance but always encouraged Cubans to apply the small business initiatives outside of the church doors. The Cubans were very engaged in these seminars and the seminar leaders encouraged every congregation to turn free services into profit-making ventures. Many Cuban churches have laundry projects where elderly ladies of the church do the laundry of other Cubans for free while the people for whom they do the laundry receive a free meal from the church. In a surprising message, the U.S. missionaries encouraged the Cubans to continue these initiatives but to turn most of the services into a business in order to raise money to improve church facilities and enhance the church's outreach to the broader community. The missionaries ran financial modeling examples to show how much money the church could make in running a small laundry business out of the church. The missionaries identified jewelry making as another popular activity that could be used to make money. A final small business idea put forth by the missionaries was collecting used wedding dresses and renting them to people wanting to get married in church.

The theme of a recent engagement between U.S. missionaries and Cubans was "The Prophetic Voice of the Church." The missionaries emphasized that "if the church indeed does have a prophetic voice, one that reaches down into the depths of the collective spirit we have professed to having sought access to, it must consciously include open dialogue about the light and darkness that we all carry; otherwise we have no real hope of achieving the trust that will free us from suspicion." This missionary captures the

feeling many have of striving for goodness and positive change in a country and world that face so many challenges. Many missionaries conveyed the sense of their work being far greater than themselves or their organization but as a global effort to remedy poverty and persecution.

This challenge proved evident when money was introduced into the missionary activity, “no matter whether mutual trust either is or isn’t in equilibrium.” One missionary found:

Surmounting inequalities as action and progress will require consensus of approach and invariably needs the broadest possible input from within the participating individuals and their communities. No denomination can claim to have a prophetic voice as long as it consciously, unconsciously, or culturally limits the divergence of opinion. I think that’s where we North Americans have an innate cultural advantage: we are accustomed to hearing, reading, ingesting everything even when we violently oppose another’s conclusions and risk collective damage by partisanship. In that sense, the nature of the microcosm can come to reflect the apparently insurmountable obstacles of the macrocosm; the difference here is that there is more promise and opportunity to resolve issues given the smaller population size, fewer details under consideration, and absence of systemic radicalization.¹⁰²

Participant Five shares the perspective of many other missionaries of a belief in their ability to make significant and lasting change with and for the Cuban people. All missionaries interviewed expressed excitement about their ability to have a direct positive impact on Cubans. Missionaries routinely detailed specific instances of change they had seen, all of which heightened their eagerness to make return trips to reengage the Cuban populace.

One missionary stated that in a trip in February 2013:

Together we have proven to be willing to entertain the possibility of putting real issues on the table for discussion. We are moving towards and not away from that juncture. Missing was inclusivity and a discussion of

¹⁰² Missionary Participant Five, interview by author, e-mail interview, April 5, 2013.

how cultural norms determine who is and isn't asked to participate in such events, then assigning a timetable or framework to open such a dialogue. While these are no small matters, we do have a mandate to go forward together as Christian communities, because although we are imperfect and still harbor vestiges of darkness, we mutually agree that we're responsible for either creating or depleting the kingdom.

As reflected here, missionaries believe they have a stake in Cuba and can help shape the future of the country. This belief has grown and been reinforced not only institutionally from within each missionary organization but also individually as missionaries return to Cuba for multiple missionary trips.

Missionaries and Cuban Political Reform

The U.S. missionaries are very comfortable talking about politics. One participant reported, "A Cuban woman I was speaking with said 'don't worry, we know you are our friends and your government does not speak for you.' That is how they feel about their government. U.S. people said that is not true for us because we vote for our government and we choose that. When we invade Iraq that is me doing that because I voted. To them Fidel Castro is an idiot but they have no control – they have no control over so much of their lives."¹⁰³ Cubans have a great deal of exposure to the world and to the U.S. One missionary reported that one Cuban family has a family member who is a maid at a Havana hotel; she records CNN and they watch it every night at home. There is a greater openness to discussing political reform and even criticizing Fidel Castro. As one participant said, "Many are scared but less now – now the old people are not scared about talking about Castro."¹⁰⁴ This refers to the tendency of older Cubans as a result of

¹⁰³ Missionary Participant One, interview by author, telephone interview, February 4, 2013.

¹⁰⁴ Missionary Participant Four, interview by author, e-mail interview, April 22, 2013.

experiencing the revolution first-hand having much more of a cautious approach to discussing politics than younger generations.

Another missionary stated:

To state a simple truth: we are different cultures suspended between enormously contentious political ideologies; thankfully our Presbyterian roots are our saving common denominator. However, it's perhaps ironic to think that it's our very cultural differences, the irredeemable enmity between conflictive ideologies: the forces that have subverted Cuban individuality, now living under socialist rule since 1959, and the capitalistic-imperialistic hegemony we North Americans have lately come to challenge in these post 9/11 years, that constitute a depolarizing effect now involving all humanity's efforts to dispel and shake free of repression, tyranny, violence in all its forms, and lies.

Yet another missionary stated;

Everyone you meet in Cuba wants to leave Cuba. No one wants to stay; however, most would blame the economic situation in Cuba. The only way to really speak to a local about their government is by setting up a private conversation, in which both the missionary and local person feel secure. Personally, I have spoken to many on the island. They have a different perception of the problems, they understand Cuban government mentality does not work; however because they are so secluded, without internet, or television, unless they travel outside Cuba they have no idea how or what another government looks like. Many understand the problems with the Castro regimes, and they do a fantastic job in dissecting the problems. They even provide an amazing comparison between the Castro brothers and their differences in government. For the church, however, they focus more on the social problems brought by the government. Their mentality is basically survival. Anything is possible in Cuba outside the government; you just need the locals to think how to do it.¹⁰⁵

As Cubans continue to interact with missionaries, the degree of exposure to the opportunities afforded through differing systems of government increases, thus presenting continued contrasts for the Cuban people. This dissemination of ideas and

¹⁰⁵ Missionary Participant Six, interview by author, e-mail interview, May 1, 2013.

alternative governmental systems inadvertently achieves one of the U.S. State Department's key goals of the spreading of information among the Cuban people.

Missionaries Improving Cuban Perceptions of the U.S.

One missionary indicated that the missionaries have changed the Cuban understanding of America. In the past the "only people that could go to Cuba were missionaries. Now that is not true but it used to be just us." The missionaries all mention that they routinely bring medication, school supplies, and other goods for the Cubans. As a result, the missionaries have changed the point of view of Cubans about Americans. As one missionary stated, "We interact with at least 250 Cubans on every trip, we are changing their minds and influencing huge numbers of Cubans." The missionaries also believe that those 250 Cubans will then talk with other Cubans and the impact increases exponentially. Another missionary stated, "We have changed the way Presbyterian Cubans view Americans. We have been able to develop a real trust with the Cubans. They feel very free and open to have a conversation about what they can and can't do. The people whose lives we have touched changed their views about the U.S., our economy, and our freedoms." The breadth of impact missionaries have through the sheer number of Cubans with whom they interact provides a multiplying force, effectively shaping the perceptions of Cubans across the nation, even those never having a first-hand interaction with a missionary.

Another missionary pointed out the failing of short-term missionary trips to Cuba in that neither government nor mission boards were or are effective in reaching down into the essence of our human condition. Moreover, while they can certainly acknowledge the fundamental worth of "best practice" in dealing with the many complex and

commonplace problems that arise in this work, invariably they sense pervasive disparities as the hallmark of a top-down paradigm, inequalities that organizational bodies are unequipped, unwilling, or unable to resolve.

As one missionary said, "At best; perhaps we can say that missionaries have the ability to lift up micro communities; at worst, it divides those same communities by fostering the local 'I've got mine' mentality. Ideally, it would be best to assemble all the Cuba Partners Network members to address and resolve egregious problems created through short-term missionary work, but after fourteen years of watching for that sort of Aristotelian ideal I'm sad to say it's probably as far away as ever." This reflects the difficulty in bringing missionary organizations together despite their embrace of similar objectives. One missionary stated that the embargo "has been drilled into the Cuban population as the root cause of all Cuban problems. I have spoken to many Christians in Cuba about it; the way they feel is not their concern; politics or international relations is not the answer; Jesus is. So they focus on working within the barriers. Personally, I think since it seems never ending they don't want to focus any attention on something most of them have been born into." The challenge of working with Cuban organizations and the political challenges presented by the embargo provide a very difficult field for missionaries to navigate. At each level of power (individuals, organizations, and states), missionaries must confront the cultural and governmental differences. In addition, missionaries report that communication between themselves and the Cuban churches and between the Cuban churches and the Cuban people is a big challenge. Cuban churches want e-mail for their congregations; however, a church has to apply to the government for e-mail and churches are often turned down.

Future Prospects

As one missionary stated, "If I sound too upbeat about my experience in Cuba, unduly optimistic about the religious life there, and too hopeful about the future of the land, it may well be due to the excellent accommodations arranged by the Korean Presbyterian Church of Miami and their associates on the island as well as my refusal to measure my personal lived experience there to the living standard of the United States rather than to that of the average country in the region." Missionaries are working to define their future roles in Cuba. One missionary recounts:

I remember the first visit I made to a rural church in Taguasco, Cuba in 2007. A small group from Baltimore Presbytery had split off from the larger group celebrating the centennial of the Cabaiguán church to visit with Pastor Miriam Naranjo, now Moderator of El Centro Presbytery. During the service that night our group was asked to stand, identify ourselves, and say a brief little something in Spanish regarding our visit. These opportunities can be either wholly intimidating or offer a real opening for (self) illumination. That night I got stuck on trying to identify in Spanish the one word that would define my role in Cuba, but instead of choosing one I considered four or five that came to mind, wrestling aloud with each to either approve or cast it aside for another more appropriate to my thinking and as to my real goal there.

Representante: OK, but too obvious; *delegado*: that too was too superficial and also carries for me a sense of political affiliation; *Presbitereo Gobernante*: well yes, but so ...; *Enviado*: Hmm, here's some promise. Perhaps a missionary is an envoy, someone sent not only by the church he or she represents, rather by the Spirit who sends us humans outward to look, listen, and testify to the work of God in our midst, no matter where that is or what language it's conceived in. Perhaps from that vantage point we have a chance of merging and healing, coming together, joining not fighting, laughing not hitting, breathing not gripping. So, where are we with our quest to redefine 'missionary'? As far as I'm concerned he and she have been transformed by the *zeitgeist* of our times.

They have learned to listen and appreciate the flavors of other cultures, no matter how disparate. We are Co-Envoys because all the nations that formerly were spoken down to are now raising their voices at a world level, and they are here with us in our midst as invited friends and guests; they are with us on Facebook, sharing life's dreams, challenges, and ironies. We have begun to celebrate this change by the assuredly risky

phenomenon of short-term mission, which if carried out with integrity and forethought can become a beacon of hope and a solid foundation for reconciliation, not to mention the wonderfully rich experience of learning and sharing new ideas and mutual goals. Maybe we should just consider ourselves to be something like exchange students...but that doesn't sound too terribly prestigious.¹⁰⁶

The cultural difference overcome by the missionaries' impact not only their work in Cuba but provide a critical cultural bridge to helping the two distinct peoples better understand each other. This also provides an understanding and connection, thus increasing the exchange of ideas.

Conclusions

Presbyterian missionaries are helping to achieve the U.S. policy outcomes of the embargo by avoiding the embargo and finding ways around the embargo, i.e., despite the embargo not because of the embargo. As one missionary concluded, "Missionary work in Cuba is an individual transformation process that then leads communities to a collective transformation that can only be realized through frequent interaction and true collaboration; sharing of spirit base, and fair distribution of material values; discovery as a revelation appearing in an open invitation to participate in the broadest possible dialogue; and the surety of recognizing that none of this will reach fruition unless all of these elements are founded in a mutually held trust that is convertible through time and change."¹⁰⁷ Another stated, "We live in a particular situation in Cuba, one of strong secularism." Marrero noted, referring to the post-revolutionary period under Fidel Castro

¹⁰⁶ Missionary Participant Four, interview by author, e-mail interview, April 22, 2013.

¹⁰⁷ Missionary Participant Eight, interview by author, e-mail interview, February 18, 2013.

and now his brother, Raul: "It has been a difficult period for us. We have faced discrimination but have remained faithful."

Christians in Cuba have enjoyed far more religious freedom since a 1990 agreement with Fidel Castro, but the Cuban economy is still struggling to rebound from its collapse following the fall of the Soviet Union. "We are growing in spite of the difficulties," Marrero said. "We want to be more inclusive, more ecumenical, and more faithful to the gospel. We offer our gratitude, our support, and our solidarity for the PC(USA)."

Analysis

U.S. missionaries are having a surprising profound effect in advancing the U.S. policy objectives of the Cuba embargo. The alignment of missionary objectives and outcomes with U.S. foreign policy is by no mean intentional by either side however the alignment of objectives illustrates the difference NGOs can have in furthering U.S. interests while achieving their own organizational goals. The first theme found in the analysis of the missionaries work is their providing financial assistance and financial training to the Cuban people, which lays a foundation for increased understanding of capitalism and an increased openness to market reforms. Missionaries provide significant financial assistance to Cuban churches as well as to individual Cubans. Initially, Cubans could not effectively budget and manage the money given to them. As one missionary stated, "Cubans have not developed the ability to budget. They have not learned to plan for tomorrow. This is not a common ability of Cubans because they never had to plan for tomorrow. They might not have electricity tomorrow, they might not have food tomorrow, and therefore, they live for the present." This lack of financial planning and

management led the U.S. missionaries to begin planning ways to provide financial literacy training to the Cuban churches. The Presbyterian missionaries felt passionate about not managing the money for the Cubans and not providing the Cubans with a budget but, instead, desired to teach the Cubans these core skills. This prompted the U.S. missionaries on return visits to begin offering financial training to the Cubans. The Presbyterian missionaries now conduct regular financial literacy classes which focus upon budgeting, understanding the basics of banking, learning about interest rates, and discussing the benefit of savings.

The second main theme is that missionaries are having a profound impact on Cubans' desire for and understanding of a market economy. As one missionary stated, "We are helping Cubans understand market reforms and capitalism. We are helping them understand a different legitimate market system." The missionary went on to say, "We aren't teaching them capitalism but helping them to openly prepare a budget that you have a certain amount of money coming in and a certain amount of money going out. In other words, we are converting their black market skills to legitimate skills." Missionaries are doing this through the teaching of Cubans direct market system skills and theoretical underpinnings. One missionary organization recently conducted a seminar at Cuban churches about how to start a small business. The seminar leaders focused upon the church developing small business models but emphasized how Cubans can begin forming small businesses outside of the church which are increasingly permitted by the Cuban government. The missionaries stated that their "mission was to get congregations to start business to make money for the church." Two Presbyterian missionaries who also are small business owners in the U.S. led the seminars, talking about income and how to

determine how to price something, how to turn a skill into making money, the cost of materials, and the cost of labor.

The focus of the missionaries was how Cubans can begin making money to support their own churches, thus reducing the financial dependence many of the Cuban churches currently have upon Presbyterian Church in the U.S. to provide financial support. Nevertheless, the broader impact of missionaries teaching the market-based principles for growing a church's financial stability cannot be underestimated. The missionaries were well aware of the power of teaching market reform for the future of the church and of the country. Missionaries see the improvement of the economic condition of the Cuban people as a core part of their missionary goal.

There is a direct impact U.S. missionaries are having on the Cuban populace.

1. U.S. missionaries providing financial assistance and financial training to the Cuban people lays a foundation for increased understanding of capitalism and an increased openness to market reforms.
2. U.S. missionaries have changed the Cubans understanding of America. The missionaries all routinely bring medication, school supplies and other goods for the Cubans. This in addition to the open dialogue between Cubans and missionaries has resulted in missionaries changing the point of view of Cubans of Americans. They now view Americans much more favorably and much more as empathetic partners than ever before.
3. U.S. missionaries share the advantages of democracies and are often questioned by Cuban about the promise of democratic reforms. This leads to an increased desire for political reforms and a hope for an end to the Castro

regime by Cubans thus helping to achieve another policy objective of the U.S. embargo.

Applications

There are several applications of this research for U.S. policymakers. First, these findings highlight the potential for the U.S. government to leverage relationships with NGOs such as missionaries to achieve foreign policy objectives. If missionaries in Cuba are able to unintentionally and effectively work toward U.S. policy objectives, if a stronger relationship was built between the government and the missionaries the possibility of improving policy outcomes is a distinct reality. Not only could missionaries work in tandem to support the government, but they could also provide on-the-ground reporting of conditions and changes in country conditions.

Second, U.S. missionaries in Cuba are winning the hearts and minds of Cubans and subtly encouraging market reforms and political reforms, both of which are increasingly being viewed as positive by the U.S. churches supporting the missionaries and by the Cubans themselves. The surprising interest of missionaries promoting market reforms is helping to prepare and open Cubans to the possibilities of life after the Castro regime.

There is a striking alignment between U.S. missionary objectives and U.S. foreign policy objectives toward Cuba. While this was not always the case as the foreign policy objectives and missionary objectives have shifted over time, we are currently in a place where congruence exists which should continue into the near future. Even given the increasing age of both the Castro brothers, Cuba's transition from a communist country to one more open to democratic reforms will likely be a slow movement. As a result the role

missionaries can play in expediting that process through leveraging relationships of trust and confidence among the Cuban people can provide a sizeable group of political and market reforms. Not only can missionaries promote and encourage internal changes, but they could also identify advocates and leaders of a reform movement that would be willing to work for Cuban constitutional changes. As a result of the over 100 year history of missionaries in Cuba, the missionaries knowledge of Cuban culture, the understanding of its people, and the relationships with Cubans far surpasses that of many foreign policy experts thus missionaries can be leveraged as guides through the Cuban cultural, political and economic terrain.

However, the U.S. could best be served by beginning to establish a working relationship with missionaries now as opposed to when regime change is imminent. By presenting the shared values and similar goals, the U.S. could show the alignment in objective with the missionaries and emphasize the opportunity to work in tandem to achieve the same ends. While this offer might initial meet with skepticism from the missionaries, a facilitating of missionaries gaining the appropriate travel documentation to travel to and from Cuba could show the commitment of the U.S. towards a growing relationship. The U.S. would likely not tend towards a long-term interventionist policy in Cuba and this would be evident from the onset to the missionaries. However, this difference between a shorter-tem governmental focus and a longer-term missionary focus could not be ignored but highlighted as a further reason for the importance of this growing relationship. The U.S. could emphasize its near-term goals and discuss the need for long-term support to the Cuban that would take the form of continued missionary engagement. In other words, with desire for market and political reforms, the U.S. would

hope that once those changes were accomplished the missionaries could provide key humanitarian, financial and training to the fledging institutions of newfound religious freedom, political democratization and capitalism. The missionaries by themselves would not be the lone supporter as corporations for one would be very happy to support the growth of capitalism in Cuba but the missionaries could serve a vital role.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter provides a summary of the project, conclusions, and recommendations for the future. First, a brief synopsis of each chapter will be given. Second, conclusions from the data will be examined. Third, a grounded theory that has emerged from the data will be reintroduced. Fourth, a report of findings from the research is presented. Fifth, applications from the study are shared. Finally, recommendations for future research are shared.

Several key findings resulted from this research. First, missionaries providing financial assistance and training to the Cuban people lays a foundation for increased understanding of capitalism and an increased openness to market reforms. Second, U.S. missionaries have changed the Cubans' understanding of America. The missionaries all routinely bring medications, school supplies, and other goods for the Cubans. This, in addition to the open dialogue between Cubans and missionaries, has resulted in missionaries changing the point of view of Cubans about Americans. They now view Americans more favorably and much more as empathetic partners than ever before. Third, U.S. missionaries share the advantages of democracies and are often questioned by Cubans about the promise of democratic reforms. This leads to an increased desire for political reforms and a hope for an end to the Castro regime by Cubans, thus helping to achieve another policy objective of the U.S. embargo.

Summary

Chapter I provides an introduction to the project. The chapter began by showing the long history of Presbyterian missionary work in Cuba. The growth of the Presbyterian missionary presence in Cuba coincided with increased U.S. government interest in the island. With Cuba's independence came U.S. assertion of the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. As a result of these foreign policy changes and the U.S. forcing a closer relationship with Cuba, the U.S. government fully supported and encouraged the activities of U.S. missionaries in Cuba. Then, in the 1950s, Fidel Castro realized his goal of forming an armed resistance movement and weakened President Fulgencio Batista's regime. In a reaction to the increased violence, the U.S. imposed an arms embargo on March 14, 1958.¹⁰⁸ Thus began 55 years of a U.S. embargo against Cuba prohibiting U.S. oil refineries there from refining Soviet crude oil, drastically cutting the Cuban sugar quota, and imposing an economic embargo on all trade with Cuba except food and medicine.¹⁰⁹ There has been extensive research and writing on the U.S. embargo of Cuba, especially focusing on the initiation of the embargo and its development over time as well as the economic impact it has had on Cuba. However, researchers have focused little upon the impact faith-based NGOs, including Presbyterian missionaries, have on the U.S. policy objectives of the embargo against Cuba. This thesis provides the U.S. policymaking community a deep understanding of the Presbyterian missionaries' impact on the policy objectives of the Cuban embargo and a

¹⁰⁸ Patrick J. Haney and Walk Vanderbush, *The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2005), 7.

¹⁰⁹ Haney, *Cuban Embargo*, 15.

path ahead for continued and future missionary partnership to achieve desired foreign policy outcomes in Cuba and elsewhere.

Chapter II explores the literature relevant to the study. The chapter then explores the history of economic sanctions as foreign policy tools and how those sanctions can affect missionary work. There has been some extensive research and writing on the U.S. embargo of Cuba. Specifically, researchers have assessed the initiation of the U.S. embargo and its development over time as well as the economic impact it has had on Cuba. However, researchers have not analyzed the impact of the embargo on missionaries and, specifically, the embargo's impact on missionary activities in Cuba. Not only has there been a dearth of research on the impact of the embargo on missionaries in Cuba but also there has been a lack of investigation into how the missionaries' work in Cuba has impacted the embargo's policy outcomes. Therefore, this thesis provides an analysis of both sides and then recommendations for changes to U.S. policy which would improve in tandem the Cuban-American missionary outcomes and policy outcomes.

Chapter III explains the research methodology used in the study. It provides an explanation of why a qualitative and grounded theory methodology was used. Then the participants and data collection procedures were outlined. The chapter concludes by examining how the data were analyzed and how validity and reliability were improved.

Chapter IV presents the data collected and results from the interviews. As mentioned in Chapter III, a technique to improve reliability in qualitative research is to present the information as close to verbatim as possible. Quotes from the participants were grouped by category and theme for ease of reference.

Research Questions

In this section an overview of the conclusions is provided. Before going into the conclusions, the research questions and purpose of the study are reexamined. The purpose of this study is to examine the impact U.S. missionaries have on the policy objectives of the U.S. embargo of Cuba. This study is designed to explore the following questions:

1. How are missionaries affecting the U.S. policy outcomes of the embargo (encouraging the growth of free markets and representative democracy in Cuba through economic sanctions, travel restrictions, and international legal penalties)?
2. How does the U.S. embargo affect Christian missionary activities?
3. How do missionaries influence the Cubans desire for social, religious, political, and humanitarian change?
4. Do missionaries influence the perceptions of Cubans about the U.S.?

Purpose of the Study

Within the research and literature on the role of faith-based NGOs in Cuba, a wide gap in the analysis exists regarding how works of NGOs are affecting policy outcomes of the U.S. embargo of Cuba. As a result of these faith-based organizations having deep and wide networks within Cuba, providing services to the Cuban people, bringing supplies to the island, and sharing their perspectives with the people, there is likely a significant impact upon the people. This influence could be of significant aid to the U.S. in achieving its policy goals in Cuba, or these NGOs could be undermining U.S. policy intentionally or unintentionally. Therefore, it is critical to analyze this interaction in Cuba in order to provide a clear direction ahead for the U.S. government. If the faith-

based NGOs with operations in Cuba are helping to achieve U.S. goals, then understanding how they are doing this would be very helpful information and provide a template for how the U.S. government might partner with faith-based NGOs in the future to help achieve policy outcomes in other countries. However, if the faith-based NGOs are undermining U.S. policy objectives, then it is essential that the U.S. government be made aware of this and attempt to redirect the work of these NGOs.

Methodology

This study utilized qualitative research methodology as it is able to delve more deeply than to identify the inner experience of participants.¹¹⁰ In addition, the small sample size and the difficulty in reaching out to an unknown population lend themselves to qualitative research. This study aided the reader in understand the experiences and perceptions of the Cuban missionaries so that the reader might fully grasp the impact missionaries have on the U.S. policy outcomes of the embargo. Within the qualitative research framework, the researcher implemented a grounded theory methodology for this project largely because grounded theory is an effective design to use when a theory is not available to explain a process.¹¹¹ Grounded theory is especially helpful when current research on a phenomenon is either inadequate or nonexistent, as is the case here.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Corbin and Strauss, *Basics of Qualitative Research*, 3rd ed., 12.

¹¹¹ John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2007), 66.

¹¹² Paul Leedy and Jeanne Ormrod, *Practical Research: Planning and Design*, 9th ed. (Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education Publishing, 2010), 97.

Findings

There are several findings from the research. First, missionaries providing financial assistance and training to the Cuban people lays a foundation for increased understanding of capitalism and an increased openness to market reforms. Missionaries providing financial assistance to Cuban churches as well as individual Cubans, in addition to improving the Cubans' financial literacy, is rapidly increasing the Cubans' interest in market reforms. Second, through the missionaries increasing Cubans' desire for a market economy, so too is the Cuban desire for political reform as one is seen as integral to achieving the other.

There is a direct impact U.S. missionaries are having on the Cuban populace.

1. Missionaries provide financial assistance and financial training to the Cuban people lays a foundation for increased understanding of capitalism and an increased openness to market reforms.
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3. U.S. missionaries share the advantages of democracies and are often questioned by Cubans about the promise of democratic reforms. This leads to an increased desire for political reforms and a hope for an end to the Castro regime by Cubans, thus helping to achieve another policy

objective of the U.S. embargo.

Recommendations

There are several areas that require further research. This research focused on the activities and impact of Presbyterian missionaries in Cuba. Further research into the impact missionaries of other faiths are having in Cuba would be very interesting. In addition, to better understand how the U.S. government might partner with NGOs, research could be conducted to determine how missionaries and other NGOs are impacting U.S. foreign policy objectives in countries where similar economic sanctions are being imposed. In an increasingly fiscally-restrained environment, it is more important for the U.S. government to seek cost-sharing partnerships. The connection with NGOs could easily help, not only from a budgetary perspective but also from an emotional one. As we have seen in recent foreign conflicts, the ability to gain support from the local population is critical to U.S. foreign policy objectives. Further research could also be conducted assessing the potential role for NGOs to play in countries with whom the U.S. is having strained relations and how partnerships between the U.S. government and NGOs might form to advance policy objectives.

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