

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

(U) REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

(U) Case Number: INV-2015-0008

(U) Subject: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

I. (U) Introduction and Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) Investigations Division (INV) initiated this investigation in response to an allegation received in October 2015. It was alleged that (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

assigned to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), created Facebook and Twitter accounts (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

and used a personal electronic device (PED) to access these accounts to collect information on U.S. Persons in violation of Executive Order 12333 (E.O. 12333) § 1.7 (j), *United States Intelligence Activities*. The information collected was then allegedly transmitted via (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) personal email account (b)(3)

The IC IG determined (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

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Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: (b)(3)

Declassify On: 20411231

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(b)(1)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The IC IG concluded that while (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) actions and activities did not constitute a violation of sections of E.O. 12333 including § 1.7 (j), there were substantial concerns identified which may affect [redacted] suitability for continued access to classified information. A summary of the investigative findings will be forwarded to CMO and Office of Security.

II. (U) Background

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] was relieved of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted] duties because of performance issues and allegations addressed herein.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Within NCTC, DTI's mission is to "Discover, enhance, and share identity intelligence that advances the most complete and accurate identity picture to our partners in supporting terrorism analysts and successful screening activities that ultimately helps prevent terrorist plans and operations against US interests."² DTI "creates new TIDE records or enhances existing records with biographic, biometric and derogatory information."³

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

[redacted]

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

¹ (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] was assisting, through [redacted] participation in NCTC's Publicly Available Information Working Group (PAIG), in the drafting of NCTC's (b)(3)

[redacted] remains in draft as of the date of this report.


² (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3) DTI's IC Website

³ (U// [redacted] NCTC, Business Process Overview, PowerPoint presentation.

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(b)(1), (b)(3)



A. (U) Authority:

(U//~~FOUO~~) IC IG INV conducted this investigation pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 3033, *Inspector General of the Intelligence Community*, 7 October 2010; ODNI Instruction 10.34, *Office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community*, dated 22 September 2013; and, *Quality Standards for Investigations*, dated 15 November 2011, set forth by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

B. (U) Applicable Executive Order:

(U) E.O. 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, 46 FR 59941

III. (U) Evidence and Findings

A. (U) Facebook and Twitter Accounts

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)



B. (U) Policy Issues

(b)(1), (b)(3)



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(b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(U//~~FOUO~~) During interview, ██████████ acknowledged NCTC in general is not a collecting agency, however ██████████ noted NCTC is authorized to overtly collect publicly available information and referenced E.O. 12333 and the "Interim Policy" as authorizing sources. ██████████ represents NCTC Legal on the PAIG. ██████████ provided the IC IG an email from ██████████ dated 21 October 2016 in which ██████████ describes (b)(3) ██████████ activities and asked ██████████ to "ensure that (b)(3) ██████████ operations, under the current guidance, are compliant with (b)(3) / ██████████ ██████████ outlined several sites ██████████ analysts used including, Facebook, Twitter, Peek You, Pipl, News Outlets and Spokeo. ██████████ asked, "With the above outlined processes, is (b)(3) covered under the existing policy to continue?" ██████████ noted during the interview that ██████████ does not recall responding to that email in writing, ██████████ recalled receiving a phone call shortly thereafter from ██████████ acknowledged ██████████ feels there is nothing of concern contained within the 21 October 2016 email.

(U//~~FOUO~~) NCTC ██████████ ██████████, noted ██████████ wanted to begin following (b)(3) ██████████ and solicited ██████████ approval to (b)(3) ██████████ (b)(3) ██████████ to collect information of KSTs. ██████████ advised that (b)(3) ██████████ was not completed and ██████████ did not possess that authority. ██████████ advised ██████████ to seek approval from ██████████ directorate management. ██████████ direct supervisor, ██████████ stated ██████████ was uncomfortable with (b)(3) ██████████ and following an unsigned draft policy. On 26 October 2016 ██████████ stated ██████████ ordered ██████████ to stop all activity related to publicly available information and (b)(3) ██████████

All redaction on page are (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), unless otherwise noted.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Both [REDACTED] stated DTI currently does not allow the use of (b)(3) [REDACTED] for collection of publicly available information until (b)(3) [REDACTED] (b)(3) [REDACTED] is approved.

C. (U) Suitability Issues

(U//~~FOUO~~) IC IG interviewed 17 witnesses including the Complainant. Interviewees disclosed concerns about [REDACTED] which may affect a determination of suitability for continued access to classified information based on inappropriate or immature behavior and conduct toward coworkers. In addition, a lack of security discipline was alleged regarding [REDACTED] use of a non-government issued smartphone to capture Facebook images of KSTs in the Liberty Crossing Compound. Though IC IG did not establish that [REDACTED] violated sections of E.O. 12333 or NCTC's Interim Guidance, [REDACTED] alleged conduct raised concerns about [REDACTED] suitability for continued access to classified information.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Witnesses interviewed noted [REDACTED] persistence in determining who reported [REDACTED] to the IC IG for an E.O. 12333 violation. [REDACTED] actions raise reprisal concerns as [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED], was removed from OAB by [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] allegedly believed [REDACTED] may have reported [REDACTED] to the IG. [REDACTED] alleged that subsequent to [REDACTED] removal [REDACTED] believed [REDACTED] filed the IG complaint against [REDACTED] and "started a campaign to discredit" [REDACTED]. Both of [REDACTED] concerns were repeated in an interview of Complainant on 03 March 2016.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Confidential witness testimony stated [REDACTED] was with coworkers at a 26 February 2016 after work gathering at J. Gilbert's Restaurant in McLean, VA. The witness stated that [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] didn't know what was going on at work" and added "thanks, [REDACTED]", possibly referring to Complainant. [REDACTED] then stated, [REDACTED]. The confidential witness reported the concern on 29 February 2016 about these alleged statements and management was notified immediately thereafter.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Subsequently, on the evening of 02 March 2016, Complainant called [REDACTED], to report that [REDACTED] was in a public parking lot near Complainant's residence. Complainant took a picture using [REDACTED] smartphone of [REDACTED] vehicle as proof at 16:24. Complainant subsequently contacted Leesburg Police to report the incident. Leesburg Police "Detail Call For Service Report" Number 905, dated 02 March 2016 at 18:06 notes, "A co worker [sic] is threatening [REDACTED]... co worker [sic] is [REDACTED]" The report added Leesburg Police conducted a consensual encounter with [REDACTED] at 19:15. Leesburg Police documents that Complainant stated [REDACTED] "saw [REDACTED] sitting in [REDACTED] vehicle for a long period of time. However, [REDACTED] was never at or near [REDACTED]

█ residence on █ stated that route █ takes home is along █ and believes █ may have been there knowing that's the route █ takes.”

(U//~~FOUO~~) The following morning, on 03 March 2016, █ arrived unannounced at the IC IG office requesting to speak with IC IG Investigators. █ stated in a sworn, recorded interview █ “was a little nervous right now and kinda scared actually. I think I’m being stalked.” █ alleged Complainant was stalking █ however █ stated Complainant never made any threats against █ described personal and professional issues regarding █ interactions with Complainant.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Subsequent to █ interview, Complainant was also interviewed on 03 March 2016. Complainant alleged █ had been targeting individuals █ believed were responsible for reporting █ to the IC IG. Complainant alleged █ believed █ had initially reported █ to the IC IG and “█ had █ moved over to a different area on the contract.” Complainant then alleged █ “thought it was the Group Chief. █ even tried to get me to file a formal complaint against the Group Chief █ on █ behalf.”

(U//~~FOUO~~) Complainant recounted the events of seeing █ in █ vehicle the previous evening and contacting Leesburg Police.

(b)(1)



(U//~~FOUO~~) █ was badge blocked from entering the secure vault within DTI █

█ noted during interview that █ was instructed “several times” not to be in the vault. However, in

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March 2016 [REDACTED] was discovered within the vault by [REDACTED] who escorted [REDACTED] out of the vault. [REDACTED] voiced concerns regarding [REDACTED] "stability" and added [REDACTED] was "way too emotional" and a "walking mess." [REDACTED] added, "I have real issues with [REDACTED] having a clearance." [REDACTED] former direct supervisor, [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] would often come to work "disheveled" and was not arriving on time. [REDACTED] additionally noted she contacted EAP in April 2015 as [REDACTED] was having difficulty managing [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as a "highly intelligent employee" but also an "argumentative individual" who was "too close and too personal with [REDACTED] contract staff."

(U//~~FOUO~~) Witnesses additionally noted [REDACTED] was "unprofessional" and a "rule breaker" who lacked an understanding of professional boundaries with contractors. One witness describing OAB under [REDACTED] leadership as "dysfunction junction." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A witness whose office was located near [REDACTED] expressed there was "absolutely" a concern for personal safety regarding [REDACTED] and added, "I don't say that lightly." [REDACTED] was described as "being friendly in instances and confrontational in the next." Following a disagreement with one of her contracting staff [REDACTED] allegedly told the contractor, "It's okay, you're just a liberal little twat." This comment offended the contractor who stated [REDACTED] cut all future social ties with [REDACTED]. The same witness stated [REDACTED] was, "scared to come to work because [REDACTED] was going crazy."

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] present supervisor, [REDACTED], expressed similar concerns as [REDACTED] with regards to [REDACTED] ability to regularly arrive at work on time and [REDACTED] appearance being at times "disheveled."

D. (U) Security Issues

(b)(1)



(U//~~FOUO~~) As previously noted, the IC IG was unable to determine how [REDACTED] obtained the Facebook screen shots/captures that originated from [REDACTED].


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an AOL account [REDACTED] accessed via [REDACTED] AIN workstation. Therefore a security concern may exist if a personal Facebook account or one of the accounts created for Complainant and/or [REDACTED] was used to collect these images as alleged. IC IG was unable to determine whether [REDACTED] collected these Facebook images while using a non-government issued electronic device/smartphone from the parking lot of the Liberty Crossing Compound as alleged. Evidence shows the images were downloaded from an AOL email account via [REDACTED] AIN workstation then GLIDED up to [REDACTED] CWE account. (b)(3)



[REDACTED] remains in draft as of the date of this report.

IV. (U) Conclusion

(U//~~FOUO~~) The IC IG found [REDACTED] alleged violations of Executive Order 12333 (E.O. 12333) § 1.7 (j) to be unsubstantiated. However, due to concerns regarding [REDACTED] suitability for continued access to classified information this matter is hereby referred to both the CMO and Office of Security for action as appropriate.

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V. (U) Recommendation

(U//~~FOUO~~) For the reasons articulated above, it is recommended that this matter be closed and referred to both the CMO and Office of Security.

Submitted By:

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Date: _____

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21JUN2018

17-0008-IN Request for Assistance-FBI Portland

Contact (U//~~FOUO~~) FBI employee, a program manager at the
Summary: Counterespionage section at FBIHQ, submitted this request.

(U//~~FOUO~~) FBI Portland has a pending criminal investigation in which the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO), District of Oregon, intends to charge a FBI subject with 18 U.S.C. 912: False Impersonation of an Officer or Employee of the U.S. The background of the matter, in short, revolves around the FBI Subject portraying himself as USG employee and directly contacting members of the Iraqi Parliament to advocate the placement and access of Iraqi nationals not supported by the current political establishment. Much to the consternation of the Iraqi Prime Minister and the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, these actions have adversely affected the U.S.-Iraq political relations and have violated Federal law.

(U//~~FOUO~~) During the course of this investigation FBI Portland has evidenced that the FBI Subject also mailed on what the FBI believes to be fraudulent ODNI Letterhead, Iraqi Government officials. FBI Portland and the USAO have asked FBIHQ to pass the purported fraudulent ODNI letter to an appropriate ODNI authority for review in an attempt to obtain written verification from

the same that the letter was fraudulent.

(U//~~FOUO~~) He suspects that if ODNI can provide sufficient documentation that the exemplar is indeed fraudulent, that may lead to an additional count/charge in the criminal matter.

Parent: 17-0188-CO

Current Status: CLOSED - FINAL (REFERRED TO OTHER AGENCY)

Current Status Date: 21JUN2017

Current Status Notes: Questioned document determined to be fraudulent; findings sent to FBI HQ for use by USAO in prosecution.

Date Received: 13JUN2017

Date Initiated: 19JUN2017

Initiated By: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Other Investigators:

Type: Contact - External

Subject Type: Unknown

Special Flags:

Category: Request for Information/Assistance
[None]
[None]

Received By: Email - Official Referral

Complaint Source: Other Gov Agency Employee

Complainant Organization:

Complainant Location: External - Other USG Spaces/Facilities

Allegation Organization: ; ;

Allegation Location: [Unknown]

Documents:
No Data Available

Close Actions



Allegation #1: Impersonation
Allegation Location: [Other]
Summary:
Finding Summary: Author of questioned document falsely claimed to be an IC officer by authoring a letter on ODNI-stylized letterhead addressed to Iraqi PM

Violations:

Subject:

Description: 18 USC 912 – False Personation

Other:

Other:

Summary:

Result: Substantiated - Evidence to Support

Other/Unspecified

Name: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AKA:

Bargaining Unit Employee: No

Victim: No

Fugitive: No

Employment Status:

Waive Confidentiality: N/A

DOB:

Org.: FBI

Pay Grade: [Unknown] null

Location: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Work

Unsecure:

Home:

Office Info: (b)(3)

Address:

Address 2:

City:

State:

Zip Code:

Country:

Work

Secure:

Mobile: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

User chronology entries:

21JUN2018

* All redactions on this page are (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) *

17-0010-IN Alleged Disclosure of Classified Information

Contact [REDACTED] hereafter SUBJECT. SUBJECT is
Summary: alleged to have routinely disclosed classified information over the Agency Internet Network (AIN) to the [REDACTED] particularly, [REDACTED] including to a named US PERSON (USP). SUBJECT provided classified or sensitive information via email to USP. It appears SUBJECT obtained the data from sources clearly marked SECRET/HCS/NOFORN, and, "UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//NCTOC. Updates are intended for NCTC and ODNI internal audiences". SUBJECT's disclosures include SECRET/HCS/NOFORN in 2017 however, it appears SUBJECT's disclosures date back to at least 2014.

In September 2012, SUBJECT submitted and received approval for an outside employment request with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SUBJECT indicated the status with the Agency or ODNI during this outside employment as LWOP, and noted he did not deal with this employer as part of his official agency or ODNI duties. In addition to disclosing classified information to [REDACTED] it appears SUBJECT may be conducting [REDACTED] while on duty at the DNI Watch. It is unclear if SUBJECT is compensated for the hours he claimed in support [REDACTED]

Parent: 17-0297-CO

Current Status: CLOSED - FINAL (CLOSE TO FILE / NO ACTION)

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Current Status Date: 16MAR2018
Current Status Notes: On 7 November 2017 IC IG received declination from EDVA. Subject subsequently retired in lieu of termination on 12 January 2018.
Date Received: 25AUG2017
Date Initiated: 11SEP2017

Initiated By: [REDACTED]
Other Investigators: [REDACTED]
Type: Contact - Internal
Subject Type: ODNI Cadre
Special Flags:
Category: Intelligence Oversight (IO)
 LEAKS/UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE
 [None]
Received By: Email - Official Referral
Complaint Source: Anonymous
Complainant Organization:
Complainant Location: [Unknown]
Allegation Organization: ; ;
Allegation Location: ODNI - LX1
Type of Confidentiality N/A
Documents: #008 MOIA - INTERVIEW : 1.
 2017.09.18 [REDACTED].interview (signed).pdf
 #011 MOIA - INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS (NON INTERVIEW) [REDACTED].pdf
 #012 MOIA - INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS (NON INTERVIEW) [REDACTED] : 20171116_17-0010-in_odni management brief.pdf
 #003 CORRESPONDENCE - AGENCY EXTERNAL [REDACTED] : 20170925_lhm_fbi_17-0010-in.pdf
 #013 [Other] : re_lhm 811 referral - 17-0010-in --- secret__orcon_noforn.pdf
 #010 ROI/RORI TRANSMITTAL LETTER [REDACTED] : 20171107_referral memo_17-0010-in.pdf
 #009 REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (ROI) [REDACTED]

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: final roi_17-0010-in.pdf

#004 MOIA - INTERVIEW [REDACTED] : 20171023_17-0010-in_[REDACTED]interview.pdf

#015 [Other] : cn_ic ig investigation_26feb2018.pdf

#014 CORRESPONDENCE - AGENCY

INTERNAL [REDACTED] : 20180119_17-0010-in.pdf

#006 REFERENCE / RESEARCH

INFORMATION [REDACTED] : 1b_[REDACTED] email on manchester attackers jun17.pdf

#007 REFERENCE / RESEARCH

INFORMATION [REDACTED] : 1c_[REDACTED] email fwd nctoc updates.pdf

#001 [Other] [REDACTED] : approval 17-0010-in [REDACTED].pdf

#005 REFERENCE / RESEARCH

INFORMATION [REDACTED] : 1a_[REDACTED] email on possible manchester uk suspect.pdf

#002 [Other] [REDACTED] : opening memo 17-0010-in [REDACTED].pdf

Close Actions

* All redactions on this page are (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) *

Allegation #1:

Allegation Location:

Summary:

Alleged Disclosure of Classified Information

[Unknown]

[REDACTED] hereafter SUBJECT. SUBJECT is alleged to have routinely disclosed classified information over the Agency Internet Network (AIN) to the [REDACTED] particularly, [REDACTED] including to a named US PERSON (USP). SUBJECT provided classified or sensitive information via email to USP. It appears SUBJECT obtained the data from sources clearly marked SECRET/HCS/NOFORN, and, "UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//NCTOC. Updates are intended for NCTC and ODNI internal audiences". SUBJECT's disclosures include SECRET/HCS/NOFORN in 2017 however, it appears SUBJECT's disclosures date back to at least 2014.

In September 2012, SUBJECT submitted and received approval for an outside employment request with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SUBJECT indicated the status with the Agency or ODNI during this outside employment as LWOP, and noted he did not deal with this employer as part of his official agency or ODNI duties. In addition to disclosing classified information to [REDACTED] it appears SUBJECT may be conducting [REDACTED] while on duty at the DNI Watch. It is unclear if SUBJECT is compensated for the hours he claimed in support [REDACTED]

Finding Summary:

Subject

Name: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AKA:

Bargaining Unit Employee: No

Victim: No

Fugitive: No

Employment Status: ODNI Employee

Waive Confidentiality: N/A

DOB:

Org.: DNI/EXSEC/WO

Pay Grade: [Unknown]

Location: ODNI - LX1

Work (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Unsecure:

Home:

Office Info: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

AIN

DUNS

Number

Other ID

Number

Unclass

Email

Other ID

Desc

Gender (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Federal Tax

ID

Address:

Address 2:

City:

State:

Zip Code:

Country:

Work (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Secure:

Mobile:

User chronology entries:

26MAR2018 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Evidence - Collection/Review/Transfer/Disposal
Separate 1A hard copy file maintained-
1A1- Interview Notes from Interview with Witness1
1A2- Original Privacy Act and Warning forms - Witness 1 Interview
1A3- Audio copy - Witness 1 Interview
1A4- Email communication presented during Subject interview
(Attachment 1A)
1A5- Email communication presented during Subject interview
(Attachment 1B)
1A6- Email communication presented during Subject interview
(Attachment 1C)
1A7- Original Privacy Act and Warning forms - Subject Interview
1A8- Copy of Subject's blue (IC) badge
1A9- Original Opening Memorandum and 811 Referral
1A10- Interview MOIA wet signature - Witness 1

26MAR2018 (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Case Notes - General/Daily
17-0010-IN
Chronology

Activity Number Interview/Activity Description Date

- 1 Activity Investigation assigned to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 28-Aug-17
- 2 Activity Case support Docs provided by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 28-Aug-17
- 3 Activity Follow-up phone call with Special Investigations Branch (SIB) for recap of case 5-Sep-17
- 4 Activity (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) requested OPF's on Subject 7-Sep-17
- 5 Activity INV team met with FBI, to discuss case. Referred to another unit with FBI. 8-Sep-17
- 6 Activity HR provides PERs for SUBJECT 11-Sep-17
- 7 Activity Opening Memo and Approval Forms Signed by (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 11-Sep-17
- 8 Interview Interview - SUBJECT supervisor (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 18-Sep-17
- 9 Activity MOIA Completed for Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 22-Sep-

- 17
- 10 Activity Security file review of SUBJECT Completed. 21-Sep-17
- 11 Activity 811 Referral Memorandum 25-Sep-17
- 12 Activity Weekly Audit Data revealed Unauthorized Disclosure of Highly Classified Information 16-Oct-17
- 13 Activity (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) send e-mail to CMO & EMR recommending EAL on Subject 16-Oct-17
- 14 Activity (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) communicated with SUBJECT's acting supervisor (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to obtain schedule, and request SUBJECT be notified to report to IC IG for an interview. 16-Oct-17
- 15 Interview Interview-SUBJECT 18-Oct-17
- 16 Activity MOIA Completed for Interview with SUBJECT 23-Oct-17
- 17 Activity Briefed SIB DIU on case status/interview with SUBJECT 25-Oct-17
- 18 Activity Submitted ROI for legal review 26-Oct-17
- 19 Activity Final ROI uploaded to CMTS 31-Oct-17
- 20 Activity Referral Memorandum to Management 7-Nov-17
- 21 Activity EDVA Declination 7-Nov-17
- 22 Activity E-mail confirming SUBJECT's separation from ODNI 19-Jan-18
- 23 Activity Congressional Notification 26-Feb-18
- 24 Activity Congressional Briefing 19-Mar-18